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INTRODUCTION
I bought a copy of Neal Stephenson's book Snow Crash when it
came out in paperback. It was a good read, but it's unlikely I will
want to read it again, so I am inclined either to offer it for sale or to
donate it to the public library. The book embodies a copyright-
protected literary work, and as a copyright teacher I like to be careful
about such things, so I checked the copyright laws and determined
that neither of my proposed methods of getting rid of the book will
infringe the copyright of Bantam Books, the publisher.
I also bought a copy of Quicken Premier 2003, personal finance
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software from Intuit, on a CD-ROM. This computer program is
likewise a literary work protected by copyright. If once I have no
further use for it I sell the CD-ROM, or give it away, will I have
infringed Intuit's copyright? Another question: The license
agreement that appeared on my computer's monitor when I installed
it (yes, I actually read those things) says that I am not allowed to
"resell" the CD-ROM "for profit," nor may I "distribute" it. If I ignore
that prohibition and sell the CD-ROM for more than my purchase
price, or otherwise "distribute" it, will I have breached my
contractual obligations?
A layperson, whose intuitions have not been rearranged by close
study of the Copyright Act, will likely fail to see any distinction
between these two products that should result in differing treatment
under the copyright laws. I bought each of them: shouldn't I be
allowed to sell or give away either one without risking infringing
somebody's copyright? The layperson (and even the contracts
teacher) may not be so sure about the breach-of-contract question. If
I assented to the no-distribution term, am I not bound by it?
Although a book publisher is unlikely to invoke its copyright to
prevent me from reselling one of its products, software publishers'
frequently have asserted that their copyright empowers them to
prevent me from disposing of my disks containing their software. In
fact, the software publisher will advise me that, contrary to the
distinct impression I had when I walked out of the store with a paid-
for shrinkwrapped box in my hand, I am not in fact the owner of the
product, but only a "licensee." A number of courts have agreed with
this proposition, and held that I will infringe the software publisher's
copyright if I resell the CD-ROM without the publisher's
authorization.2 The Copyright Office itself has stated that the donee
of a CD-ROM containing a copyrighted computer program will
infringe the copyright of the software publisher if she loads the
* Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. I received helpful
comments on earlier versions of this article from Laura Bartell, John Dolan, Joan
Hartman, Mark Lemley, Jessica Litman, Peggy Radin, and Tony Reese. I also wish to
acknowledge helpful feedback from students in Professor Radin's Property and
Contract Go High-Tech seminar at Stanford University Law School. C 2005 John A.
Rothchild.
1. I use the term "software" to refer to what the Copyright Act calls a "computer
program," namely "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)
(definition of "computer program"). By "software publisher" I mean the entity that
owns the copyright to a computer program, manufactures software copies, and makes
them available to the public. It is immaterial to my argument whether these three
roles are unified in a single entity, or are divided among two or more entities.
2. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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software onto her computer.3
In this Article I argue that, in all but the most atypical
situations, the Copyright Act grants the software publisher no more
authority to prohibit my resale of the CD-ROM in my example than it
grants the book publisher to prohibit my resale of the book.4 That is
to say, neither publisher has any say over my resale of its product.
According to a provision of the Act called the "first-sale doctrine," I
have an unrestricted right to resell a copy of a copyrighted work as
long as I am the owner of that copy. 5 Everyone agrees that I am the
owner of the book I bought. But software publishers employ several
devices in an effort to prevent me from becoming the owner of copies
of their products. My argument will show that in almost all cases
these efforts are legally ineffective: nearly everyone who believes
himself to have purchased a copy of a computer program has in fact
done so. Furthermore, attempts by software publishers to create a
legal restriction on use that inheres in and travels with the copy
itself should, consonantly with well-established principles, be held
ineffective. As for the contract claim, I show that the Copyright Act
preempts state law to the extent it would allow enforcement of a no-
distribution provision.
After clarifying existing doctrine and showing where courts have
gone wrong, I argue that this is an appropriate outcome: the policy
considerations that justify legal rules promoting free alienability of
copies of copyrighted works in general, and of items of personal
property still more generally, apply just as strongly to software
copies.
Some of the key points I make in the course of my argument are
the following:
The applicability of the first-sale doctrine as a limitation on
the software publisher's public distribution right depends on
ownership of the material object on which the software is
distributed, usually a CD-ROM disk or a floppy diskette, not
on ownership of the copyright to the computer program. The
majority of courts that have addressed the first-sale doctrine
as applied to software transactions have failed to grasp this
utterly fundamental point.
* The software publisher's characterization of a software
3. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
4. My focus is on software, since most of the recent efforts by copyright owners to
control alienation of copies in the hands of end users have been applied to that
product. However, the same methods have occasionally been applied to other types of
information goods, and my critique of their use is equally applicable to those other
contexts.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).
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transaction as a "license" rather than a sale obscures the fact
that every transaction involving acquisition of a software copy 6
involves two separate components: a license to use the
copyrighted computer program (or conceivably, but rarely, a
transfer of ownership of the copyright), and a sale of the disk
or other material object on which the software is distributed
(or conceivably, but rarely, a lease or other bailment of that
object). Framing the issue as whether a transaction involves a
license or a sale has led numerous courts and commentators
into error.
* One is the "owner" of a software copy for purposes of the first-
sale doctrine if she acquired it in a transaction that is a "sale"
under state law, regardless of any restrictions on use of the
copy that the contract of sale imposes. One is not the owner of
the copy if she acquired it in a transaction that is a lease or
other bailment.
" A statement in a software license agreement, declaring that
the software publisher retains ownership of the software, or
that the acquirer7 is merely a 'licensee" and not an owner of
the software, has no effect on ownership of the software copy,
and therefore is irrelevant to whether the publisher's
distribution right with respect to that copy is exhausted by
virtue of the first-sale doctrine.
* A declaration in the contract accompanying a software
transaction that the software publisher "licenses" the material
object on which the software is distributed does not, without
more, prevent the acquirer from becoming the owner of the
copy. In almost all cases, what the contract characterizes as a
"license" of the material object is, in legal effect, a sale.
Characterization of such a transaction as a 'license" is an
effort to control legal analysis through misdirection.
" A contractual restriction on a software distributor's authority
to dispose of software copies does not prevent one .who
acquires the copy via the distributor from becoming its owner.
6. By "software copy" I mean a material object in which a computer program is
embodied. This might be a floppy diskette, CD-ROM, hard drive, flash memory, tape
cartridge, or read only memory (ROM) chip, among other possibilities. The distinction
between the software copy and the computer program embodied in it is crucial to my
argument, and to proper application of the first-sale doctrine.
7. I use "acquirer" as a neutral term, to avoid either begging or conceding the
issue whether an end user is the owner of the material object on which software is
distributed. "Purchaser" implies that the acquirer owns the copy of the software that
the sales clerk handed to her when she paid her money; "licensee" implies that she
does not.
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Indeed, even a distributor that does not itself hold title to the
software copy can transmit good title to a good-faith
purchaser.
" Attempts by software publishers to impose a use restriction
that runs with the software copy, and binds any possessor of
the copy, are unenforceable.
* The characterization that a software publisher applies to a
transaction involving a software copy does not establish the
legal effect of the transaction, which is determined by the
economic realities underlying the transaction. Therefore,
calling a transaction a 'lease" rather than a sale does not
make it so, and does not prevent the acquirer from becoming
the owner of the copy entitled to the prerogatives that the
first-sale doctrine confers.
" An end user who acquires a software copy that was distributed
through a standard retail chain of distribution is invariably
the owner of that copy, and is free to dispose of it as permitted
by the first-sale doctrine. The same is true of one who acquires
the software through an authorized digital download.
" If an end user acquires software as part of a
hardware/software system, and the user is the purchaser
(rather than lessee) of the hardware, the user is ipso facto the
owner of the software copy. That is because the hardware is
the software copy.
* A software publisher can avoid the first-sale limitation on its
distribution right if it leases rather than sells copies of its
software, or if it eschews distributing copies altogether and
operates as an application service provider.
The same policy considerations that gave rise to the first-sale
doctrine more than a century ago justify application of the
doctrine to software copies. The differences between software
and other types of products embodying copyrighted works offer
only equivocal support for an argument that the scope of the
public distribution right with respect to software copies should
not be limited by the first-sale doctrine.
* The Copyright Act preempts state law to the extent it would
permit enforcement of contractual limitations on the authority
of an end user to sell or otherwise alienate a software copy in
his possession.
Part I of this Article addresses efforts by software publishers to
extend the scope of their public distribution right beyond the limits
that the first-sale doctrine establishes, as well as their efforts to
[Vol. 57:1
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impose restrictions that inhere in the software copy itself. Part I(A)
explains and interprets the relevant provisions of the Copyright Act,
developing a methodology for determining whether the possessor of a
copy of a copyrighted work is the "owner" of that copy for purposes of
the first-sale doctrine.
Part I(B)(1) - (3) describes and critiques three strategies that
software publishers have invoked in an effort to expand their control
over copies of their products. These strategies consist of (1) declaring
that acquirers of copies of their software are "licensees" and therefore
not "owners" for purposes of the first-sale doctrine; (2) placing
restrictions on the distributors of their software that purport to limit
the distributors' authority to transfer title of software copies; and (3)
using clickwrap licenses to create restrictions that travel with the
software copies. The critiques show that these strategies are flawed,
and that upon a proper application of the law of copyright, the law of
commercial transactions, and the common law of property, the
strategies are ineffective to accomplish the software publishers'
purposes. A number of courts have, however, erroneously accepted
the publishers' arguments. Part I(B)(4) speculates about the source of
the courts' confusion.
Part I(B)(5) summarizes the principles, derived from the
preceding sections, that courts should apply in determining whether
end users have a right to sell or give away a particular copy.
Part I(C) applies those principles to three common paradigms
that are employed in distributing software copies to the public. It
concludes that under each of these paradigms, the end user generally
becomes the owner of the material object on which the software is
distributed, and is therefore freed from the software publisher's
public distribution right with respect to that object. Part I(D)
continues by describing two distribution methods that software
publishers could employ to prevent applicability of the first-sale
doctrine to copies of their products-leasing rather than selling
copies of their software, and avoiding distribution of copies
altogether.
Part I(E) inquires whether existing legal doctrine, as clarified in
Part I(A) - (D), is justified, or whether it should be modified to give
software publishers greater control over copies of their software in
the hands of end users. It finds that arguments for revision of current
doctrine are equivocal at best.
Part II of the Article addresses the enforceability of contractual
restrictions on the authority of an end user to alienate a copy of a
software program. Part II(A) provides a general introduction to the
Copyright Act's preemption provision, section 301. Part II(B)
examines the applicability of section 301 to contract claims. Part
II(C) applies section 301 to contract provisions that purport to limit
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the right of the possessor of a software copy to alienate the copy, and
concludes that state contract law is preempted to the extent it would
permit enforcement of such a term. Part II(D) considers the
application of general conflicts preemption to such contract
provisions, finding enforcement of such provisions preempted under
this mode of analysis too. Finally, Part II(E) argues that many
software license agreements should be held unenforceable for lack of
consideration.
I. RESTRAINING ALIENATION OF SOFTWARE COPIES THROUGH EXERCISE
OF COPYRIGHT
To understand how software publishers seek to use the law of
copyright to limit the secondary market in material objects
embodying their products, it is necessary to have a basic
understanding of relevant aspects of copyright law.
A. Copyright law
1. Copyright basics
The Copyright Act grants authors a set of rights with respect to
certain intellectual creations.8 Works that may qualify for protection
include, for example, the words of a book, the notes of a song, the
colors and shape of a piece of visual art, and the code making up a
computer program.9 To qualify for copyright protection, a work must
meet several threshold requirements. First, the work must be an
"original" one: the work must originate with the author, rather than
being copied from some other work, and it must exhibit some degree
of creativity.lo Second, the work must be "fixed" or embodied in some
material object, such as ink on paper (books), paint on canvas
(paintings), grooves stamped into vinyl (record albums), dye coloring
celluloid (motion picture film), orientations of dipoles on magnetic
media (audio tapes, videotapes, floppy diskettes, flash memory), or
8. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
9. A non-exclusive list of the types of works that may be protected by copyright is
set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), and includes literary works, musical works, dramatic
works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, sound recordings, and architectural
works.
10. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
("Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that
it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity."). The creativity criterion is
easy to meet. Id. See also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250
(1903) ('The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality
always contains something unique."); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191
F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) ("No large measure of novelty is necessary.").
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pits and lands on optical media (CDs, CD-ROMs, DVDs).11
The creation of a work of authorship within the scope of
copyright protection gives rise to a set of rights to control uses of that
work. These are referred to as the copyright owner's "exclusive
rights," and consist of the rights to make a copy of the copyrighted
work, to create a new work based on the copyrighted work, to
distribute copies of the work to the public, to perform the work
publicly, and to display the work publicly.12 The "exclusive" nature of
these rights means that the exercise of any one of them, without
authorization from the copyright owner, is a violation of the
copyright owner's rights, which the Act terms "infringement" of
copyright. 13
Thus if Laurie owns the copyright to a literary work embodied in
a book, and Pat, without Laurie's authorization, makes a copy of the
book, Pat has infringed Laurie's reproduction right (assuming no
statutory exception applies). Likewise, if, without Laurie's
authorization, Pat distributes a copy of the book to the public, she
infringes Laurie's public distribution right; if she makes a movie
based on the book, she infringes Laurie's adaptation right; and if she
publicly reads the book out loud, she infringes Laurie's public
performance right.
These rights, although exclusive to the copyright owner, are not
plenary, but are limited in various ways. The most important of these
limitations are (1) exclusion of the right to control "fair use" of the
work,14 which allows anyone to use the work, without authorization
from the copyright owner, in ways that promote the purposes of
copyright law and do not impinge unduly on the owner's economic
interests in the work;15 (2) the "idea-expression dichotomy," which
grants the owner exclusive rights with respect to the work's
expression, but denies any protection to the ideas underlying the
work;16 (3) the expiration of the copyright after a term of years; 17 and
11. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ("Copyright protection subsists.., in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .. "). The copyright law does
not protect unfixed works, such as an extemporaneous speech, jazz performance, or
dance. See id. (explaining what the law protects). Such works may, however, be
protected under state law. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 60 (1976) [hereinafter HOUSE
REPORT]. In addition, federal law prohibits unauthorized recording or communication
to the public of a live musical performance. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1)-(2).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
13. Id. § 501(a).
14. Id. § 107.
15. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) ('The fair use
doctrine thus 'permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed
to foster."') (quoting, with modifications, Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection... extend to any
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(4) the first-sale doctrine, which with certain exceptions limits the
copyright owner's distribution right so that it applies only to the first
sale of a particular copy, and allows the owner of a copy to sell or
otherwise dispose of that copy without the authorization of the
copyright owner.1S
The exclusive rights that the Copyright Act grants belong
initially to the "author or authors" of the work.19 But ownership of
the copyright need not remain with the author. Like other property
rights, a copyright may be transferred from one owner to another.20
Either the entire copyright, or some subset of the rights included
within the grant of copyright, may be transferred.21 As an alternative
to transferring ownership of the copyright, a copyright owner may
grant a "nonexclusive license" to use the copyrighted work.22 A
nonexclusive licensee, like an assignee, acquires the right to make
certain uses of the work, as specified in the license.23 However, the
licensee does not become the owner of the copyright, and the
copyright owner retains the right to grant the same license to others.
2. The distribution right and first sale
The public distribution right entitles the copyright owner to
prevent others from distributing copies of the copyrighted work to the
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery....").
17. Id. §§ 302-305. Such a limitation is required by the Constitution's grant of
congressional authority to extend copyright protection only for "limited Times." U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
19. Id. § 201(a). The author of a work is generally the person who actually creates
it. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989). However, in
the case of certain works that are created in the context of an employment
relationship, the employer or other hiring party, rather than the employee or
independent contractor who actually creates the work, is deemed the author, and thus
the owner of the copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) ("In the case of a work made for hire,
the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the
author .... ); id. § 101 (definition of "work made for hire").
20. See 17 U.S.C. 201(d)(1) ("The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in
whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be
bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate
succession.").
21. See id. § 201(d)(2) ("Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright...
may be transferred as provided by [§ 201(d)](1) and owned separately."). The
transferee of the copyright, or of any subdivision of the copyright, may exercise those
rights to the same extent as the author could have if she had retained them.
22. An exclusive licensee is treated like an owner of copyright, for purposes of
enforcement. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2).
23. E.g., Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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public.24 As the wording of section 106(3) indicates, a copyright owner
has the right to control distribution of copies of its works not only by
sale, but also by rental or by lending to the public.25 There is
authority for the proposition that even a gift of a copy can constitute
a public distribution.26 The public distribution right is, however, only
a right to control distributions "to the public."27 This limitation
implies that transfers of copies that are not "to the public" are not
within the copyright owner's control, but the dividing line between
public and non-public distributions is not easy to discern. While it is
clear that distribution of only a single copy can constitute
distribution "to the public,"28 it is not so clear how to classify a
distribution consisting of a gift of a copy in a non-commercial
context.29
Since the public distribution right gives the copyright owner
control over distribution of copies of her work, it would seem on its
face to restrain one who has purchased a copy from redistributing it
publicly. For example, the owner of a book would seem to need the
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (giving the copyright owner the exclusive right "to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending"). The distribution right has its
roots in the first federal copyright statute, the 1790 Act, which granted the copyright
owner "the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending"
copies of the work. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124. In fact, the
distribution right is older than the 1790 Act. The English Statute of Anne, which is
generally regarded as the first modern copyright statute, and upon which the 1790 Act
is modeled, forbids any person to "sell, publish, or expose to Sale" any book without the
authority of the copyright owner. Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
25. See Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203
(4th Cir. 1997) (library that made an unauthorized copy of a work available for
borrowing by the public infringed copyright owner's distribution right).
26. The House Report accompanying the 1976 Act says that the distribution right
includes the right to control distribution "by sale, gift, loan, or some rental or lease
arrangement." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 62 (emphasis added). See also Ford
Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 1991) ('The term
'other transfer of ownership' is broad enough to encompass gifts"); Tangorre v. Mako's,
Inc., No. 01 Civ. 4430 (BSJ) (DF), 2003 WL 470577, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation) (business engaged in public distribution when it
gave copies of a swimsuit-model calendar to its customers). For a contrary view, see
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11 [A]
(assimilating the 1976 Act's public distribution right to the 1909 Act's right to "vend,"
and concluding that "the lack of pecuniary remuneration takes the transaction out of
the 'vend' category").
27. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
28. The House Report describes the distribution right as extending to "the first
public distribution of an authorized copy or phonorecord of his work." HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 11, at 62 (emphasis added); see also Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 299-300
("[A] violation of section 106(3) can.., occur when illicit copies of a copyrighted work
are only distributed to one person ....").
29. See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 338 (2002).
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copyright owner's permission to resell the book at a garage sale. This
is not so, however, because the distribution right is limited by the
first-sale doctrine, which allows the owner of a copy to transfer it to
somebody else without obtaining the copyright owner's permission.30
The doctrine takes its name from the fact that it limits the copyright
owner's rights to controlling the first sale of a particular copy: the
copyright owner has no right to control subsequent sales of that
copy. 31 Under the first-sale doctrine, the owner of a copy may freely
dispose of it either by sale, or by other methods such as donation,
lending, lease, or rental. Thus, for example, the copyright owner of a
book may not invoke its public distribution right to prevent the
owner of a copy of the book from disposing of it by donating it to a
library, lending it to a friend, renting it, or selling it.
The first-sale doctrine originated in judicial interpretation of the
copyright law. The Supreme Court's first acknowledgement of the
doctrine32 came in the 1908 case Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.33 The
publisher and copyright owner of a book had sold it with a
stipulation, printed on the copyright page of each copy of the book,
prescribing a minimum resale price: "The price of this book at retail
is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a
sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the
copyright."34 The defendant, R.H. Macy & Co., sold the book for 89
cents.3 5 The publisher sought to restrain such sales, as an
infringement of its exclusive right to "vend" copies of its copyrighted
work.36
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord
lawfully made... is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.").
31. Note that the first-sale doctrine limits the public distribution right, and to
some extent the public display right, id. § 109(c), but does not limit any of the other
exclusive rights of the copyright owner. Thus, your ownership of a music CD does not
entitle you to make a copy of it, to make a new work based on it, or to play it publicly.
32. Lower courts had earlier articulated the first-sale doctrine. E.g., Harrison v.
Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1894) ("The new purchaser cannot
reprint the copy. He cannot print or publish a new edition of the book; but, the copy
having been absolutely sold to him, the ordinary incidents of ownership in personal
property, among which is the right of alienation, attach to it."); Henry Bill Publ'g Co. v.
Smythe, 27 F. 914, 925 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1886) ("Whenever [the copyright owner] parts
with that ownership [of a copy], the ordinary incident of alienation attaches to the
particular copy parted with, in favor of the transferee, and he cannot be deprived of
it.").
33. 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
34. Id. at 341 (internal quotes omitted).
35. Id. at 342.
36. Id. at 343. The exclusive right to "vend" under the 1831 Act, in effect when this
case was decided, is the equivalent of what, under the 1976 Act, is currently termed
the right to distribute publicly. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436
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In rejecting the publisher's claim, the Court held that the
copyright owner's exclusive right to vend does not limit the right of
the owner of a copy to resell it: "To add to the right of exclusive sale
the authority to control all future retail sales, by a notice that such
sales must be made at a fixed sum, would give a right not included in
the terms of the statute, and, in our view, extend its operation, by
construction, beyond its meaning ... 37
Although the holding of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus concerns the
attempt by a copyright owner to control the price at which a material
object holding a copyrighted work may be resold, the Court's
rationale is based upon a more general common-law aversion to
restraints on alienation, and therefore extends more broadly.38 In the
year following the decision, Congress codified this broader version in
the Copyright Act of 1909.39 The current Act expresses the first-sale
doctrine as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title,
or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
("sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending").
37. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 351. The first-sale doctrine has a counterpart in
patent law: once the patentee sells a patented article, its right to control the use or
resale of that article is exhausted. See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873)
("[W]hen the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument
whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts
with the right to restrict that use."); Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d
1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ('The law is well settled that an authorized sale of a
patented product places that product beyond the reach of the patent.").
38. See infra text accompanying notes 162-67.
39. See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135,
141-42 (1998) ("Congress subsequently codified our holding in Bobbs-Merrill that the
exclusive right to 'vend' was limited to first sales of the work."). The 1909 Act provides:
"[N]othing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any
copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained." Act of
Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (formerly codified at 17 U.S.C. § 27).
While this provision literally extends the right of alienation to anyone in lawful
possession of a copy, courts have interpreted it as meaning that the copyright owner's
distribution right is exhausted only once the copy has been lawfully sold. See United
States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Although the statute speaks in
terms of a transfer of possession, the judicial gloss on the statute requires a transfer of
title before a 'first sale' can occur."); see also Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics,
Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1963) ("If lawful possession by another sufficed to
deprive the copyright proprietor of his right to control the transfer of the copyrighted
objects, any bailee of such objects could sell them without infringing the copyright,
whatever his liability for conversion might be."). The phrasing of the current statute's
version of the first-sale doctrine, which grants the alienation right to "the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made," 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (emphasis added),
reflects this understanding.
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the possession of that copy or phonorecord.40
The first-sale doctrine, as a limitation on the copyright owner's
exclusive right to distribute publicly, is itself subject to significant
limitations. In 1984, Congress amended section 109 of the Copyright
Act to deprive the owner of a phonorecord4l of the right he would
otherwise have under the first-sale doctrine to dispose of the
phonorecord "by rental, lease, or lending" for commercial purposes. 42
This amendment came in response to the phenomenon of record-
rental stores: commercial establishments that rented phonograph
albums for a brief period of time, perhaps one to three days,
sometimes together with blank cassette tapes. It was generally
understood that the customers of these stores were making
unauthorized copies of the record albums onto cassette tapes.4 3
For similar reasons, in 1990 Congress amended section 109 once
again, to limit the rights that the owner of a copy of copyrighted
software would otherwise enjoy under the first-sale doctrine. As a
result of this amendment, a "person in possession of a particular copy
of a computer program" is likewise not permitted to dispose of
possession of that copy "by rental, lease, or lending" for commercial
purposes. 44
Because of the first-sale doctrine, the owner of a book, painting,
music CD, movie on videotape, or software on CD-ROM does not
40. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
41. In the terminology that the Copyright Act employs, the material object in
which a work is embodied is called a "phonorecord," if it holds sounds (other than the
sounds accompanying a motion picture), or a "copy," if it holds something else. See id.
§ 101 (definition of "copies"; definition of "phonorecords"). For simplicity, I will
generally use "copy" to refer to both types of material objects.
42. Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, § 2, 98 Stat. 1727
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A)).
43. See S. REP. No. 98-162, at 2 (1983) ('The Committee has no doubt that the
purpose and result of record rentals is to enable and encourage customers to tape their
rented albums at home."); David H. Horowitz, The Record Rental Amendment of 1984:
A Case Study in the Effort to Adapt Copyright Law to New Technology, 12 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 31, 32-34 (1987) (discussing the practice of record rentals in the
1980s); R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44
B.C. L. REV. 577, 619-20 (2003) ("Congress heard evidence that many of the two
hundred or so record rental establishments in the United States sold blank tapes to
renters and engaged in other practices that seemed likely to encourage renters to
make copies.").
44. Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§ 802, 104 Stat. 5134 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A)). The 1990 amendment
responded to the development of a software-rental industry. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-
735, at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6939 ("At this point in time, the
number of businesses renting only software is small."). Members of the software-rental
industry unsuccessfully opposed the amendment. See Cent. Point Software, Inc. v.
Global Software & Accessories, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 957, 960 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting the
defendant's lobbying against the amendment).
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implicate the copyright owner's distribution right when she sells or
gives away her copy. The owner of a copy of most types of copyrighted
works is also free to dispose of it by rental, lease or lending. Thus,
movie rental stores flourish, whether the movie studios like it or
not.45 The owner of an artwork may rent it, and some colleges are
experimenting with textbook rental programs.46 However, by virtue
of the 1984 and 1990 amendments to section 109, phonorecords and
copies of computer software generally may not, without the copyright
owner's permission, be rented, leased, or loaned for commercial
advantage.47
The first-sale doctrine thus limits the ability of a software,
publisher to control the disposition of copies of its products once they
have been sold. Why might a software publisher want to exert control
over those copies? Like manufacturers generally, software publishers
prefer, all else being equal, to ship more of their products rather than
less. When the end user of a good lends, gives, sells, or rents it to
somebody else, the manufacturer of the item may lose a sale.48 A
manufacturer that can control the secondary market in its products
may thus be able to increase its sales. In addition, by suppressing
competition with its own products, the manufacturer may be able to
45. Historically, they did not like it. The movie studios expended great efforts
seeking an amendment to the Copyright Act that would treat movies like phonorecords
and computer software for purposes of the first-sale doctrine. Bills that would
accomplish this were introduced, but not enacted, in several successive congressional
sessions. Julie Kane-Ritsch, The Videotape Rental Controversy: Copyright
Infringement or Market Necessity?, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 285, 302-03 (1985). The
studios also sought, unsuccessfully, to eliminate the rental market in videotapes by
having videocassette recorders declared illegal. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (holding the sale of video tape recorders does
not constitute copyright infringement). Only a few years after that ruling, discovering
that they were making more money from video sales and rentals than from theatrical
showings, the movie studios learned to love the videocassette recorder. As Jack
Valenti, long-time President of the Motion Picture Association of America, expressed
it: "So when I fetch from my memory that long time ago when I first met a VCR, I can
only tell you if I thought I was going to be sick then, I am now able to say that I am
just fine." Kenneth R. Corsello, Note, The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act
of 1990: Another Bend in the First Sale Doctrine, 41 CATH. U.L. REV. 177, 192 n.79
(1991) (quoting Software Rental Amendments of 1990: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990)).
46. See Stephanie Kang, New Options for Cheaper Textbooks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24,
2004, at D1 (describing programs allowing students to rent textbooks at $50-80 a
semester).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A).
48. Then again, it may not. The second user may be willing to buy the item used at
a reduced price, or receive it for free as a gift or loan, but may be unwilling to pay full
price for it. Transfers via the secondary market may therefore allow more people to get
the use of goods without depriving the manufacturer of any sales.
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maintain a higher selling price.
The perceived benefits of control over the secondary market give
software publishers a strong incentive to prevent the users of their
products from becoming the "owners" of the material objects on which
the software is distributed, thereby avoiding application of the first-
sale doctrine.
3. When is one the "owner" of a copy?
As discussed in the preceding section, one who is in lawful
possession of a copy of a copyrighted work is entitled to the benefit of
the first-sale doctrine if she is the "owner" of that copy. Deciding
whether a person is the owner of a particular copy creates some
difficulty, stemming from the ill-defined nature of the concept of
ownership in our legal system.
At the outset, we must recognize that a person's status as the
"owner" of an object does not necessarily mean that he is free to
dispose of it however he wishes.49 The law imposes numerous
limitations on the uses one may make both of real property that one
owns in fee simple absolute,5o and of one's personal property.51
Indeed, the Copyright Act itself provides that the owner of a material
object containing a copyright-protected work may not dispose of that
object as he chooses.52 The mere existence of a limitation on the use
that one may make of a copy of a copyrighted work that is imposed by
law therefore does not entail the conclusion that the possessor of that
copy is not its owner for purposes of section 109(a).
On the other hand, use limitations that are imposed by contract,
rather than by law,53 may well have the effect of preventing the
49. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 10 cmt. c (1936) ("The owner may part
with many of the rights, powers,. privileges and immunities that constitute complete
property and his relation to the thing is still termed ownership both in this
Restatement and as a matter of popular usage.").
50. See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1203, 1207 (1998) (describing various limitations on the prerogatives of
landowners).
51. For example, you may not drive your car without a license or while under the
influence; you may not swing your baseball bat into somebody else's Ming vase; you
may not play your trumpet on a neighborhood street at 3:00 a.m.
52. Section 106(1) of the Copyright Act, for example, denies you the right to place a
book that you own on the glass of a photocopy machine, create multiple copies, and sell
them in competition with the book's publisher. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
53. Of course there is no such thing as a purely private enforcement paradigm:
private contracts are enforced through mechanisms established by the state. See
Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering
Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1295-96 (1998). Still, it is
useful to distinguish between constraints that have their origin in private agreements
and those which are imposed solely by law.
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rightful possessor of a copy of a copyrighted work from being its
owner. For example, if you possess such a copy pursuant to a contract
providing that you are the lessee of the copy-as is the case, for
example, when you rent a movie DVD from a video-rental store-
then you are not its owner, and are not entitled to the prerogatives
that section 109(a) confers.
The Copyright Act does not contain a definition of "owner" or
"ownership,"54 and the primary source of legislative history, the 1976
House Report, is not helpful. We must therefore assume that
Congress intended the ordinary meaning of the term, taking account
of the context and purposes of the statute.55 State common law may
serve as a source of this ordinary meaning.56 However, at common
law ownership is not a well-defined concept, 57 and therefore reliance
upon the non-technical meaning of the term is unavoidable.58
One possible non-technical gloss on ownership is that you are the
owner of a copy if you acquire it through a transaction that places no
contractual restrictions on your disposition of it. This definition of
ownership probably accords with many people's ordinary
understanding of the term. However, this interpretation would not
effectuate Congress's intent in adopting the first-sale rule. The
rationale for the first-sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner
has sold a copy at the price that he has set, he has obtained all the
54. Section 101 of the Act does contain a definition of "copyright owner," but that
definition refers circularly to "the owner of [a] particular [exclusive] right." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101.
55. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 47 (1989) ("We
have often stated that in the absence of a statutory definition we 'start with the
assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used.' We do so, of course, in the light of the 'object and policy' of the statute....
That we are dealing with a uniform federal rather than a state definition does not, of
course, prevent us from drawing on general state-law principles to determine 'the
ordinary meaning of the words used."') (citations omitted).
56. See id. ("Well-settled state law can inform our understanding of what Congress
had in mind when it employed a term it did not define.").
57. See Blumenfield v. United States, 306 F.2d 892, 900 (8th Cir. 1962) ("[The
word 'owner' has no precise or definite meaning and ... the word must be examined in
its context and setting to determine the meaning intended."); Realty Trust Co. v.
Craddock, 112 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1938) ('The meaning of the term owner is not the
same under all circumstances. It is not a technical term or word at all, but one of wide
application in various connections."); Animal Rescue League of Boston v. Bourne's
Assessors, 37 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (Mass. 1941) ('The term 'owner' as it appears in
various statutes.., is one of flexible meaning depending upon the other language of
the particular statute in which it is employed and the purpose and aim of the statute.
It varies from an absolute proprietary interest to a mere possessory right.').
58. See, e.g., Bush v. State, 194 S.W. 857, 858 (Ark. 1917) ("In statutes prescribing
certain duties to be performed by the 'owners' of railroad companies and providing a
penalty for failure to perform those duties, it is held that the word 'owners' is used in
the popular rather than in the technical sense .... ").
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revenue to which the statute entitles him, with respect to his public
distribution right in connection with that particular copy.59 Thus, an
unimportant (and as a practical matter unenforceable) contractual
limitation on the acquirer's right to use the copy-such as a
prohibition against using it between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. on Tuesdays,
or against taking it to the Gobi Desert-cannot prevent exhaustion of
the distribution right, since in that case the copyright owner would
have obtained full (or nearly full) price for the initial sale-with-
restrictions, while retaining the right to extract additional revenue
from the purchaser's resale of it. On the other hand, a more
significant limitation on the acquirer's use of a copy, such as an
enforced requirement to return it at some time during its useful life,
as in the case of a lease or other bailment,60 is likely to prevent the
copyright owner from obtaining that full quantum of revenue, since
possession so restricted is worth less to an acquirer than unrestricted
possession.
The possible limitations on an acquirer's rights with respect to a
copy may be arranged along a spectrum, with outright sale at one
end, lease or other bailment at the other, and variations of sales-
with-restrictions in between:
p
Sale Sales-with-restrictions Lease
The question, then, is whether any of these intermediate, sales-
with-restrictions transactions should be deemed not to constitute a
first sale. I believe the statute requires a negative answer to this
question. While a lease or other bailment of a copy does not
59. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 351 (1908) ("The owner of the
copyright in this case did sell copies of the book in quantities and at a price
satisfactory to it. It has exercised the right to vend."); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C
Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1993) ("[T]he distribution right
and the first sale doctrine rest on the principle that the copyright owner is entitled to
realize no more and no less than the full value of each copy or phonorecord upon its
disposition."); Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 884
(E.D. Pa. 1964) ("[T]he ultimate question under the 'first sale' doctrine is whether or
not there has been such a disposition of the copyrighted article that it may fairly be
said that the copyright proprietor has received his reward for its use.").
60. 'The word 'bailment' is generally defined as meaning a delivery of property for
some particular purpose on an express or implied contract that after the purpose has
been fulfilled the property will be returned to the bailor, or dealt with as he directs." 8
C.J.S. Bailments § 2 (1988).
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constitute a first sale, a transaction that imposes any lesser
restriction on the acquirer's right to dispose of the copy, in the form
of a sale-with-restrictions, is a first sale.61 That this is the correct
gloss on "owner" in section 109(a) is supported by several
observations.
First, this interpretation corresponds with the ordinary
understanding of ownership. In a lease or other bailment, the
acquirer must return the copy at some point. In a sale-with-
restrictions, on the other hand, the acquirer may keep the copy
indefinitely, or destroy it with impunity. In ordinary understanding,
if you are the "owner" of some item you are free to treat it as badly as
you like, and are under no obligation to return it.62
Second, the same result follows from an alternative
interpretative approach, which focuses on the nature of the
transaction through which the copy is distributed, rather than on the
nature of the resulting property relation between the copy and the
acquirer. That is, instead of asking whether the acquirer of the copy
is its "owner," we ask whether the transaction through which she
acquired it is a "sale." Transforming the inquiry in this way is
supportable, for several reasons: the Copyright Act occasionally uses
the terms "sale" and "ownership" as cognates;63 the discussion of the
first-sale doctrine in the 1976 House Report does the same;64 courts
sometimes analyze the question of ownership under section 109(a) by
ascertaining whether the transaction is a sale;65 and it is, after all,
61. The court applied this principle in United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1192
(9th Cir. 1977), holding that a transaction in which actress Vanessa Redgrave paid
$401.59 for a print of the movie "CAMELOT" (apparently the studio's cost of making the
copy), and was allowed to retain it indefinitely, but was required to keep it in her
possession at all times, was "a sale with restrictions on the use of the print." Id.
62. '"Both in common parlance and in legal acceptation, he is the owner of property
who, in case of its destruction, must sustain the loss of it."' Am. Motor Corp. v. City of
Kenosha, 80 N.W.2d 363, 366-67 (Wisc. 1957) (quoting 42 AM. JUR. Property § 37, at
215).
63. For example, the definition of "publication" in section 101 refers to distribution
of copies or phonorecords "by sale or other transfer of ownership." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
64. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 79 (indicating that an "outright sale" of a
book is an example of a situation "where the copyright owner has transferred
ownership").
65. See, e.g., Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135,
145 (1998) ("After the first sale of a copyrighted item 'lawfully made under this title,'
any subsequent purchaser, whether from a domestic or from a foreign reseller, is
obviously an 'owner' of that item."); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc.,
38 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1994) ("However, under the 'first sale' doctrine, embodied in
§ 109(a) of the Copyright Act.... a sale of a 'lawfully made' copy terminates the
copyright holder's authority to interfere with subsequent sales or distribution of that
particular copy."); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1229
(D. Utah 1997) ("If it is established that the transaction wherein the end-user obtains
possession of the software is a sale, the so called 'first sale' doctrine, applies."), vacated
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called the first sale doctrine.66
Third, this interpretation results in a rule that is administrable.
It is ordinarily straightforward to determine whether a transaction is
a sale or a lease. By contrast, it is not at all clear how one would
devise an administrable standard for determining whether a sale-
with-restrictions should be deemed the equivalent of an unrestricted
sale, or the equivalent of a lease, for purposes of the first-sale
doctrine. How would we classify, for example, a perpetual transfer of
a software copy with the restriction that it may not be used on
Thursdays, may not be used for commercial purposes, or may only be
used on one specified computer? The possible variations are infinite.
In some contexts, determining whether a transaction involving
goods is a sale or a lease does present substantial difficulties, but the
courts are accustomed to dealing with such questions. The sale-
versus-lease issue is frequently litigated under the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC"). For various reasons, one or both parties
may want to characterize as a lease what is really a sale, to
characterize as a sale what is really a lease, or even to characterize a
transaction one way for some purposes and the other way for other
purposes. 67 Under the UCC, the issue turns on the factors set out in
section 1-203.68 Although there are transactions that fall in a gray
in part due to parties' settlement, 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999); T.B. Harms Co. v.
Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575, 1582 (D.N.J. 1987) ("Under the first sale
doctrine, when a copyrighted work is the subject of a valid first sale, the distribution
rights of the copyright holder are extinguished and title passes to the buyer.").
66. Under European Community law, the first-sale doctrine with respect to
computer programs is expressed in terms of "sale," rather than transfer of
"ownership": 'The first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the
rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the
Community of that copy ... " Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the
legal protection of computer programs, art. 4(c), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42. For a discussion
of the first-sale doctrine under this Directive, see Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier
Felmeth, Don't Judge a Sale by Its License: Software Transfers Under the First Sale
Doctrine in the United States and the European Community, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 71-75
(2001).
67. See Corinne Cooper, Identifying a Personal Property Lease Under the UCC, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 197-98 (1988) (referencing several laws that treat transactions
differently depending on whether they involve a sale or a lease).
68. The provision is rather complex. It provides, in part:
(b) A transaction in the form of a lease creates a security interest if the
consideration that the lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to possession
and use of the goods is an obligation for the term of the lease and is not
subject to termination by the lessee, and:
(1) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the
remaining economic life of the goods;
(2) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic
life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods;
(3) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining
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area that makes them difficult to classify, in most cases it is clear
whether a transaction is a sale or a lease. The key criterion is this:
"First, in an unconditional sale, the buyer gets to keep the goods....
Second, in a lease, the lessor gets the goods back."69 In addition,
return of the goods must be required at a point in time before the end
of their useful life.70 The courts have relied on this distinction,
holding that if the goods must be returned, the transaction is not a
sale.71 Conversely, if the recipient is entitled to possession of the
goods in perpetuity, upon payment of some nominal consideration,
economic life of the goods for no additional consideration or for nominal
additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement; or
(4) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no
additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon
compliance with the lease agreement.
U.C.C. § 1-203(b) (2004). Note that before the 2001 revision of Article 1, this provision,
in substantively unaltered form, was located in section 1-201(37).
69. Cooper, supra note 67, at 203; see also JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 720 n.11 (4th ed. 1995) ("A lease involves payment for
the temporary possession, use and enjoyment of goods, with the expectation that the
goods will be returned to the owner with some expected residual interest of value
remaining at the end of the lease term.").
This criterion is reflected in U.C.C. § 1-203(b)(4), quoted supra in note 68. It also
finds expression in U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(p), which defines 'lease" as "a transfer of the
right to possession and use of goods for a period." (emphasis added).
70. See In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 1982) ("An
essential characteristic of a true lease is that there be something of value to return to
the lessor after the term. Where the term of the lease is substantially equal to the life
of the leased property such that there will be nothing of value to return at the end of
the lease, the transaction is in essence a sale.") (citation omitted); In re QDS
Components, Inc., 292 B.R. 313, 322 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002) ("The hallmark of a lease
is that it grants the lessee the right to use property for a period less than its economic
life with the concomitant obligation to return the property to the lessor while it retains
some substantial economic life.").
71. See George F. Mueller & Sons, Inc. v. N. Ill. Gas Co., 299 N.E.2d 601, 604 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1973) (finding that there was no sale of vending machines where "the
defendant has an obligation to return the machines"); Garfield v. Furniture Fair-
Hanover, 274 A.2d 325, 326 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971) (finding that a furniture
store's temporary provision of a bedroom set was a bailment, not a sale: "in a bailment
situation the property in question is to be restored to the owner whereas in a sale
transaction there exists no obligation on the buyer to return the specific article"). The
same is true under pre-UCC common law. See Bretz v. Diehle, 11 A. 893, 894-95 (Pa.
1888) ("The fundamental distinction between a bailment and a sale is that in the
former the subject of the contract, although in an altered form is to be restored to the
owner, while in the latter, there is no obligation to return the specific article .... ");
Carlisle v. Wallace, 12 Ind. 252 (Ind. 1859) (holding that where wheat was placed in
the hands of a miller, under an agreement permitting the miller to mix it with his own
wheat, grind it, and sell it, and requiring the miller to return either an equivalent
quantity of wheat or flour, or its current price, the transaction was a sale, not a
bailment).
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the transaction is a sale, and the recipient is the owner. 72
In sum, a person is the "owner" of a material object containing a
copyrighted work, for purposes of the first-sale doctrine, if she
acquired it through an outright sale or its non-commercial
equivalent,73 or through a sale-with-restrictions, but not if she
acquired it through a lease or other bailment.
B. Efforts to circumvent the first-sale doctrine: three strategies of
software publishers
A software publisher that wants to control disposition of its
products after they reach the hands of end users, thereby controlling
the secondary market, can accomplish part of this goal by invoking
its exclusive right to distribute its works to the public. That right
allows it to prevent anyone in possession of a copy of its software-
even assuming the possessor is the lawful "owner" of that copy-from
renting, leasing, or lending that copy to anyone else for commercial
advantage. But the copyright laws do not grant the software
publisher any authority to prevent the owner of a lawfully made
software copy from selling it or giving it to someone else, or from
lending it to someone else if not for commercial advantage; and these
activities constitute the core of the secondary market.
A software publisher could eliminate much of this remaining
segment of the secondary market, using the copyright laws, if it were
able to prevent an acquirer of its software from gaining ownership of
the material object on which the software is distributed. If this could
be accomplished, only one narrow aspect of the secondary market
would remain outside the software publisher's control: the acquirer's
gift, sale, or loan of the software copy in a manner deemed not to be
"to the public" for purposes of the public distribution right.
Accomplishing this objective would bring an additional benefit to
the software publisher, by rendering section 117(a) of the Copyright
Act unavailable. Section 117(a) entitles the "owner of a copy of a
computer program" to take two actions with respect to that copy that
would otherwise constitute infringement.74 First, the owner may load
72. See In re PSINet, Inc., 271 B.R. 1, 45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that
where equipment could be purchased at end of "lease" term for one dollar, transaction
was a sale, not a lease); C.F. Garcia Enters., Inc. v. Enter. Ford Tractor, Inc., 480
S.E.2d 497, 499 (Va. 1997) (same).
73. Qualifying non-sale transactions would include donations, bequests, and
transfers resulting from operation of law.
74. Section 117 was amended in 1980 to add the language implementing this. Act
of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028. The amendment resolved an
issue concerning the copyrightability of computer programs that had lingered since
before passage of the 1976 Act. In 1974, Congress had established the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU"), with a
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the software from that copy onto her computer, or may make and
load an adaptation of that software, as required to make use of it.75
Second, the owner may make a backup copy of it.76 But these
privileges are not available to a person who is not the "owner of a
copy" of the program. Under ordinary circumstances, a software
publisher will have no objection to an end user's loading the software
onto her computer in order to use it, or making a backup copy of it.77
However, if a dispute should arise, the additional control that a
mandate to address how the pending rewrite of the Copyright Act should address new
technologies, including computers. In its 1978 report, CONTU recommended an
amendment to section 117, as well as the addition of a definition of "computer
program" to section 101. Congress adopted those recommendations in the 1980
amendment, with one change. The language that CONTU proposed would have
granted the rights described in text to the "rightful possessor" of a copy of the
software; Congress, without explanation, changed this so that the right attaches to the
"owner" of a copy. See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 12 (1978). For speculation on why
Congress made this change, see Jule L. Sigall, Comment, Copyright Infringement Was
Never This Easy: RAM Copies and Their Impact on the Scope of Copyright Protection
for Computer Programs, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 181, 188 n.41 (1995).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2000). Courts have uniformly held that the loading of a
computer program into the random access memory of a computer, which is a necessary
step in the ordinary use of the program, constitutes the making of a copy that, if
unauthorized, infringes the copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduce the
program. See DSC Comms. Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1996)
(noting the defendant does not dispute that downloading operating system software
into the RAM of a microprocessor card constitutes copying); Triad Sys. Corp. v.
Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating "[i]t is clear"
that turning on a computer, thereby loading software into RAM, is "copying"); MAI
Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (treating any copy
made in RAM as a copy under the Copyright Act); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech,
Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1332 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("Loading a computer's memory requires
'copying' of the program from a disk into memory, and that copy is a direct
infringement of the copyright.").
This conclusion has been subjected to a good deal of criticism. See, e.g., Jessica
Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 41-42 (1994)
(arguing that "the act of reading a work into a computer's random access memory is
too transitory to create a reproduction within the meaning of' the law); Joseph P. Liu,
Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1245, 1258-60 (2001) (discussing the policy reasons why copyright law
should not focus so much on RAM copies).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(2).
77. It would be anomalous for a software publisher to supply its product to its
customers under terms that render them infringers as soon as they install the product
onto a computer in order to use it. Therefore, software licenses-including those in
which the software publisher purports to retain ownership of the copy-typically grant
the end user the rights she would have under section 117(a), to use the software and
make a backup copy of it, if the acquirer was in fact the "owner" of the copy acquired.
For example, the license agreement in MA! Systems Corp., 991 F.2d at 517 n.3,
includes the statement: "Customer may use the Software (one version with maximum
of two copies permitted-a working and a backup copy)."
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software publisher would have if section 117(a) were not available-
as it would not be if the end user were not an "owner" of the copy-
could come in handy.78
Software publishers have employed several strategies aimed at
preventing an acquirer of their software from becoming the owner of
the material object on which it is distributed, and have achieved a
fair measure of success in the courts. First, and most commonly,
software publishers assert, in the license agreements accompanying
their products, that the software is "licensed" and not sold, or that
the publisher "retains title" to copies of the software that it provides
to the user. Second, software publishers limit contractually the
authority of their distributors to distribute the software. As I argue
below, in general neither of these methods is effective in preventing
the acquirer of a software copy from obtaining ownership of the copy.
In addition, copyright owners have sometimes attempted to
control the disposition of a copy containing their copyrighted works
by attaching use restrictions to the copy itself, so as to impose non-
contractual constraints on any possessor of the object. As I show
below, such running servitudes are generally disfavored at common
law, and are flatly inconsistent with the Copyright Act.
78. Before 1998, rendering section 117(a) inapplicable by retaining title to the copy
resulted in an additional benefit to certain software publishers. Some publishers not
only produce and distribute software, but also build the computers the software is
designed to run on, and perform maintenance on the computers. Other companies-
competitors-also offer to perform such maintenance. To service a computer, however,
one needs to turn it on; and when the computer is turned on, the system software is
automatically loaded into the computer's RAM, thus making a copy of it. In several
cases, hardware/software providers successfully sued third-party providers of
maintenance services, arguing that by turning on the computer the maintenance
company infringed the hardware/software provider's exclusive right to make a copy of
the software. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1); see Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d at 1335; MA Sys. Corp.,
991 F.2d at 519; Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356,
363 (E.D. Va. 1994).
Congress overturned the result reached in these cases by enacting the Computer
Maintenance Competition Assurance Act, Title III of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117(c)).
The amendment allows the owner of a computer to authorize a repair person to turn
on the computer, causing a copy to be made in RAM, "for purposes only of maintenance
or repair of that machine." Id. However, the amendment does not affect the courts'
determination that loading a computer program into a computer's RAM constitutes the
making of a "copy" that is infringing if unauthorized, and that one who possesses but
does not own the software copy is not entitled to the rights that section 117 grants.
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1. Declaring that users are licensees, not owners, of the
software
a. The strategy
It is very common for a license agreement 79 accompanying the
transfer of a software product to state that the software is "licensed"
to the end user, who is invariably referred to as the "licensee" and
never as the "purchaser" of the software.0 Based upon that
79. Software publishers usually refer to the statement of terms and conditions that
accompanies virtually all software distributed to consumers in mass-market
transactions as a "License Agreement" or "End User License Agreement." This term is
in large measure a misnomer.
Software license agreements typically include a variety of terms, which may be
divided into three categories. The first category consists of terms that permit uses of
the software that would otherwise infringe the copyright. For example, the license
might permit the user to install one copy on her home computer, and another
simultaneously on her office computer. The license might also permit the user to make
and use adaptations of the software, beyond what is necessary for utilization of the
software. In the absence of license terms permitting these uses, they would infringe
the copyright owner's exclusive rights of reproduction and adaptation. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(1), (2) (2000).
The second category of terms consists of those which purport to narrow the
permitted uses of the software, using contract to expand the rights of the copyright
owner beyond those granted by the copyright laws. These include provisions
prohibiting reverse engineering, prohibiting commercial use, limiting use of the
software to employees of the licensee, and forbidding processing of data for third
parties. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual
Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 128-32 (1999).
The third category consists of terms relating to ancillary matters, such as
mandatory arbitration, choice of forum, or disclaimer of warranties.
Only terms in the first category are in fact "license" terms-i.e., provisions that
permit uses of a copyrighted work that would otherwise infringe the copyright. Terms
in the second category do not permit, but rather restrict: they are contract terms
having nothing to do with licensing. Terms in the third category do not relate
particularly to software, but are found in contracts governing all sorts of commercial
transactions. Characterizing all of these provisions as 'license" terms benefits the
software publisher by making it appear that the publisher is simply protecting its
intellectual property rights, when in fact the publisher is attempting to supplement
via contract the rights that the Copyright Act grants.
Deferring to tradition, I will perpetuate the misnomer by referring to the terms
accompanying a software transaction as the "license agreement," rather than
employing a more cumbersome, but more accurate, label such as "contract
accompanying a software transaction, including license terms."
80. For example, the license agreement accompanying the TurboTax software
installed on my computer states: "Intuit grants to you and Members of Your Family
Household ... a personal, limited, non-exclusive, non-transferable license to install
and use the Software .... Similarly, a treatise writer suggests the following form
language: "In accordance with the terms and conditions of this License Agreement,
Licensor Corporation (Licensor) grants Licensee the non-exclusive license to use the
accompanying software...." RICHARD RAYSMAN, ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
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characterization of the transaction, the software publisher argues
that since the acquirer is only a "licensee" of the software, and not its
"owner," the acquirer is not entitled to the rights granted by sections
109(a) and 117(a).81 Another form of words that software publishers
use in an effort to prevent the acquirer from becoming the "owner" of
her copy is a declaration that the software publisher "retains title" to
the software or to the copy.8 2
Representatives of the software industry have been candid in
acknowledging that the main purpose of characterizing transactions
involving their products as licenses rather than sales is to defeat the
exhaustion of their distribution right that would otherwise result
through application of the first-sale doctrine. In continuing-education
materials written in 1993, two in-house attorneys for the Microsoft
Corporation explain:
Software publishers offer the following reasons for licensing
rather than selling copies of software:
Negating the "Doctrine of First Sale." Under the Copyright
Act, once a copy of a copyrighted work has been sold, the
copyright holder's rights in that particular copy are
exhausted, and the copy may be freely resold, leased or
loaned. See 17 U.S.C. [§] 109. If title to the particular copy
of the program is not transferred to the user, the user may
only transfer the software to others as described by the
terms of the license agreement.8 3
Several courts have accepted the software publishers' argument
LICENSING: FORMS AND ANALYSIS, at § 10.15.
81. See, e.g., Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055
(N.D. Cal. 2002) ('"Adobe does not sell its software. Instead, Adobe distributes its
software products under license to a network of distributors ....") (quoting
declaration submitted by Adobe).
82. This approach may be implemented through licensing language like the
following:
Ownership of Copies: The original and any copies of the Licensed Programs,
in whole or in part, which are made by ABC or the Licensee or otherwise,
remain at all times the sole and exclusive property of ABC.
2 ESTHER C. RODITTI, COMPUTER CONTRACTS, FM 8.08-1, at 8-70 (2002).
83. William H. Neukom & Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Licensing Rights to Computer
Software, 354 PLI/Pat 775, 778 (1993); see also Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse
Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991) ("When these form licenses were first
developed for software, it was, in large part, to avoid the federal copyright law first
sale doctrine."); 2 RODITTI, supra note 82, § 8.10[1], at 8-268 ("A principal purpose of
transferring software products to consumers via a shrinkwrap license rather than via
a sale transaction is to negate the copyright 'doctrine of first sale'...."); Pamela
Samuelson, Modifying Copyrighted Software: Adjusting Copyright Doctrine to
Accommodate a Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 179, 189 (1988) (licensing of software
"seems to have been adopted solely to strip consumers of rights they would otherwise
have under copyright law").
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that they do not sell, but only license, their software, and that this
disposition of the merchandise makes unavailable the rights granted
by sections 109(a) and 117(a) of the Copyright Act. Typical of such
cases is the statement: "[slince MAI licensed its software, the Peak
customers do not qualify as 'owners' of the software and are not
eligible for protection under § 117."84 The Copyright Office too has
adopted this view of the matter. In a congressionally mandated
report concerning the effects of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act's anti-circumvention provisions on sections 109 and 117 of the
Copyright Act, the Copyright Office observes that "[1]ibraries are not
able to use CD-ROMs donated to them because the donors are not
owners of the CD-ROMs, only licensees, and thus lack the legal
84. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993).
Other courts accepting the argument that a software publisher may prevent sections
109(a) and 117(a) from applying if it licenses, rather than sells, its products, include:
DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1361-1362
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (license agreement stating that "[a]ll rights, title and interest in the
Software are and shall remain with seller, subject, however, to a license to Buyer to
use the Software" held to establish that the acquirer is not the owner of its copies of
the software); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1333 (9th
Cir. 1995) (since software publisher "began licensing rather than selling its software,"
licensees have no rights under section 117); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Stargate Software Inc.,
216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (agreement between software publisher
and reseller is interpreted as a license, so distribution of software is not a sale for
purposes of first-sale doctrine); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d
1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (same); Microsoft Corp. v. Software Wholesale Club, Inc.,
129 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1002 (S.D. Tex. 2000) ("If the copyright owner licenses, rather
than sells, the copyrighted work, the first-sale doctrine may not apply."); Microsoft
Corp. v. CMOS Techs., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1329, 1334-35 (D.N.J. 1994) (defendant that
purchased Microsoft software on a stand-alone basis from a dealer that Microsoft
authorized only to sell software bundled with computer systems, and that resold the
software, was engaged in distribution of "counterfeit" software and infringed
Microsoft's distribution right); Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc.,
846 F. Supp. 208, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Plaintiffs counsel declares that Microsoft only
licenses and does not sell its Products .... Entering a license agreement is not a 'sale'
for purposes of the first sale doctrine."); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F.
Supp. 1310, 1314 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("ISC did not sell copies of its software to its
customers; it only licensed them, making the 'first sale' doctrine inapplicable.").
It may well be that "[t]he majority of courts conclude that copies of software are
licensed," not sold. Deanna L. Kwong, Note, The Copyright-Contract Intersection:
Softman Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc. & Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 349, 358 (2003).
Treatise writers have made similar statements. See 2 RODITTI, supra note 82,
§ 8.01[21, at 8-10 to 8-13 (venturing to explain "why software is licensed and not sold
like other copyright protected products, such as books or CDs."); id. § 8.05[1], at 8-38.3
("[A] copyright owner does not forfeit his right of distribution by entering into a
licensing agreement. Licensing thus avoids the first sale doctrine of the Copyright
Act."); RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW § 11:70 (2002) ("licensees are
ordinarily not owners of copies").
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authority to transfer the copy of the work they possess."85
Courts, commentators, and the Copyright Office have thus
accepted the software publishers' argument that since they only
license their software, and do not sell it, they retain ownership of the
software, with the consequence that sections 109(a) and 117(a) of the
Copyright Act, which by their own terms confer rights only on the
"owner" of software, are unavailable to the acquirers of their
software. Therefore, the argument continues, an end user who sells
or gives away licensed software to the public, without authorization
from the copyright owner, infringes the copyright owner's
distribution right; and an end user who, without such authorization,
loads the software onto her computer or makes a backup copy
infringes the copyright owner's reproduction right.
b. Critique of the strategy
Acceptance of this argument depends upon a curiously persistent
confusion between a computer program and the material object on
which it is distributed. The two are quite different. A work of
authorship, such as a computer program, is incorporeal. In its
pristine state, you can't touch it, see it, hear it, smell it, or taste it. It
is like a Platonic Form. On the other hand, the material object in
which it is embodied is just that: a material object.
Thus, a literary work, consisting of the words of a book, may be
embodied in a material object consisting of ink on paper; a musical
work, consisting of the notes of a song, may be embodied in sheet
music, or in a recording of a rendition of the song; a pictorial work,
consisting of color, line, and shape, may be embodied in paint on
canvas. The code of a computer program, consisting as it does of text,
is treated under the Copyright Act as a literary work, and may be
embodied on a floppy diskette, CD-ROM, hard drive, or some other
storage medium.86
Although both (1) the copyright in the work of authorship and (2)
the material object in which it is fixed are forms of property that are
capable of ownership, ownership of one is independent of ownership
85. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 105 (Aug. 2001)
[hereinafter SECTION 104 REPORT]. The same report makes a similar observation
concerning the availability of section 117: "[Slince the overwhelming majority of
computer programs sold in the United States are sold pursuant to a license, and
section 117 applies only to 'owners,' the terms of the license agreement generally
determine whether a user has the right to make an archival copy. In cases where the
license does not permit the creation of an archival copy, even absent technological
protection measures, the copying is prohibited." Id. at 77 (footnote omitted).
86. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining 'literary works" to include works
expressed in "numerical symbols or indicia").
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of the other.87 Thus, one becomes the owner of a copyright either by
being the author of the work to which it pertains,88 or through
transfer of copyright ownership.89 One becomes the owner of a copy
through the same actions that result in ownership of any other
moveable good, typically by purchasing it or otherwise acquiring
ownership from the prior owner. But the transfer of ownership of a
copy of a work does not imply any corresponding transfer of the
copyright to that work; 90 an artist who sells a painting parts with the
canvas but retains the copyright, absent a signed writing assigning
the copyright.91 Likewise, transfer of ownership of the copyright to a
work does not affect ownership of any particular copy embodying that
work: an author who assigns the copyright in a literary work to a
publisher does not thereby lose ownership of her manuscript
embodying the work.92
Most crucially for present purposes, the fact that one is only the
licensee, and not the owner, of the copyright is not of any relevance to
the question whether one owns the associated copy. The two
ownership interests are entirely independent. It is quite possible, and
quite common, for a person to own either the copyright in a work of
authorship (in whole or in part), or the material object in which it is
fixed, but not both.
Consider the books on your bookshelf. You do not own the
copyright to any of the literary works that are embodied in those
books (unless, perhaps, you are the author of the work). You may or
may not be the owner of any one of the material objects on your shelf:
you own the ones that you bought or received as a gift; you do not
own the ones that you borrowed from the library. But your ownership
87. Id. § 202 ("Ownership of a copyright.., is distinct from ownership of any
material object in which the work is embodied.").
88. Id. § 201(a) ("Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in
the author or authors of the work.").
89. Id. § 201(d)(1) ("The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in
part by any means of conveyance .... ").
90. Id. § 202 ("Transfer of ownership of any material object... does not of itself
convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object .. "); Applied Info.
Mgmt., Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("As a result of Section 202,
a court interpreting a licensing agreement must determine ownership of the copy
separately from ownership of the copyright."); cf. Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604,
605 (1st Cir. 1993) (under state-law copyright, before applicability of the 1976 Act,
transfer of a material object creates a presumption that transfer of copyright in the
work embodied therein was intended, but the presumption may be defeated by
evidence to the contrary).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) ("A transfer of copyright ownership ... is not valid unless an
instrument of conveyance ... is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights
conveyed .... ).
92. Id. § 202 ("[T]ransfer of ownership of a copyright... [does not] convey property
rights in any material object.").
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of any particular book does not depend on whether you own the
copyright in the corresponding literary work. That is equally true
whether you own the copyright or not: if you are the author of a
literary work, and own the copyright to it, that does not make you
the owner of the stack of books embodying that work on display at
the bookstore; if you are not the copyright owner of the literary work,
you may nevertheless be the owner of a particular book embodying it.
The same principles that apply to books apply to music CDs, art
posters, movie DVDs, and other information goods93 in tangible
form-including software. Consumers typically own many such
material objects, but own few, if any, copyrights to the works
embodied in those objects.
Recall that what triggers applicability of the first-sale doctrine of
section 109(a), and the prerogatives respecting software under
section 117(a), is ownership of the copy, not ownership of the
copyright.94 It follows that a statement in a software license
agreement that the publisher grants the user a license to use the
software, but does not transfer ownership of the copyright, does not
93. By "information good" I mean any commodity the primary value of which
consists of information. Information includes, among many other possibilities,
"baseball scores, books, databases, magazines, movies, music, stock quotes, and Web
pages." CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 3 (1999). An information good may be embodied in a material
object, such as a book, CD-ROM, or DVD, or may consist of access to intangible
information, such as electronic text on Westlaw or LEXIS, or streaming audio that is
played using RealPlayer software. An information good may be in an analog format,
such as a book, music on a phonograph record or cassette tape, or a movie on
videotape, or a digital one, such as electronic text, music on a CD, or a movie on a
DVD.
94. Numerous courts have failed to appreciate the distinction between the
copyrighted work and the material object on which it is distributed, erroneously
adopting the software publisher's argument that if the copyrighted work is licensed,
the material object has not been sold. See cases cited supra note 84. Courts that have
explicitly declared their misunderstanding of this crucial distinction include MA!
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., Civ. A. No. CV 92-1654-R, 1992 WL 159803, at
*13 (C.D. Cal. 1992) ("It should also be noted, in the context of § 117, that only the
copyright owner qualifies for protection under § 117 and not any licensee."), affd in
part, revd in part, dismissed in part, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); and Advanced
Computer Services of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 367 (E.D.
Va. 1994) (stating that section 117 provides rights only to '"the owner.., of a computer
program"') (emphasis added by the court). See also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,
847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that section 117 applies to the "owner of a
program"); CMAXICleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 356 (M.D. Ga. 1992)
(holding defendants were not "owners" under section 117 because "[d]efendants'
possession of [the source and object] codes did not make them the 'owner' of them.").
Even further from the mark is the reasoning of Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 289 F. Supp.
2d 316, 318 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), according to which a business owned a copy of a computer
program by virtue of the fact that it paid a consultant lots of money to produce it.
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determine the applicability of either of those provisions.95
Some license agreements, however, purport to license not only
use of the copyrighted work, but also possession of the material
object on which it is distributed. For example, Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd.96 involves a license agreement that declares: "This copy
of the PROLOK Software Protection System and this PROLOK
Software Protection Diskette (the 'Licensed Software') are licensed to
you, the end-user, for your own internal use."97 This language
explicitly says that both the computer program (i.e., the copyrighted
work), and the diskette on which it is distributed (i.e., the material
object that embodies the copyrighted work), are licensed, not sold, to
the acquirer.98
Other license agreements are ambiguous: it is unclear whether
the publisher purports to "license" only the computer program or also
the material object on which it is distributed.99 Consider the
following provisions of a Microsoft license agreement:
95. Courts that have stated this principle correctly include Novell, Inc. v. CPU
Distribution, Inc., Civ. A. No. H-97-2326, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9975, at *18-19 (S.D.
Tex. 2000) ('The Court... concludes that the transfer to the OEM of tangible copies of
Novell software under the OEM Agreement is a sale of the particular copies, but not of
Novell's intellectual property rights in the computer program itself, which is protected
by Novell's copyright."); and SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems Inc., 171 F. Supp.
2d 1075, 1084-85 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("Adobe frames the issue as a dispute about the
ownership of intellectual property. In fact, it is a dispute about the ownership of
individual pieces of Adobe software.... In this case, no claim is made that transfer of
the copy involves transfer of the ownership of the intellectual property within....
What is at stake here is the right of the purchaser to dispose of that purchaser's
particular copy of the software.... The Court finds that the circumstances
surrounding the transaction strongly suggests that the transaction is in fact a sale
rather than a license.").
96. Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 255.
97. Id. at 257 n.2. Vault apparently used this language in its license agreements
starting in 1983. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 753 (E.D.
La. 1987), affd, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
98. To the same effect is the language of a treatise-writer's form mass-market
software license agreement. The agreement defines 'THE PROGRAM" as 'THE
PROGRAM DISKETTES, THE COMPUTER SOFTWARE THEREIN, AND THE
ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTATION," and then declares that "THE PROGRAM IS
COPYRIGHTED AND LICENSED (NOT SOLD)." CLARENCE H. RIDLEY, PETER C.
QUITTMEYER & JOHN MATUSZESKI, COMPUTER SOFTWARE AGREEMENTS Fm. 10-2, at
10-16 (1993). See also Samuelson, supra note 83, at 181 n.7 (mass-market softtvare
licenses "typically claim to retain for software developers not simply ownership of the
intellectual property rights in the software, but also ownership of the personal
property rights in it as well.").
99. See Applied Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
("The simple conclusion that section 117 applies only to the owner of a copy of a
computer program.., has proven difficult to apply because software companies
frequently license their programs and the licenses do not always distinguish between
the copyright and the copy.").
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1. GRANT OF LICENSE. This Microsoft License Agreement
("License") permits you to use one copy of the specified version
of the Microsoft software product identified above
("SOFTWARE") on any single computer, provided the
SOFTWARE is in use on only one computer at any time....
2. COPYRIGHT. The SOFTWARE is owned by Microsoft or its
suppliers and is protected by United States copyright laws and
international treaty provisions. Therefore, you must treat the
SOFTWARE like any other copyrighted material (e.g., a book or
musical recording) except that you may either (a) make one
copy of the SOFTWARE solely for backup or archival purposes,
or (b) transfer the SOFTWARE to a single hard disk provided
you keep the original solely for backup or archival purposes. 100
The language of this license agreement elides the critical
distinction between ownership of the copyright in a protected work
and ownership of the material object containing that work.
Paragraph 2 of the license agreement declares that "[t]he
SOFTWARE is owned by Microsoft." But what is "[tihe
SOFTWARE"? Is it the copyrighted work of authorship, a computer
program? Or is it the floppy diskette in which the copyrighted work is
fixed? "SOFTWARE" is a defined term in this license agreement, but
the definition, in Paragraph 1, is itself ambiguous. Does
"SOFTWARE" mean a "copy of the specified version of the Microsoft
software product identified above," in which case Paragraph 2
declares that Microsoft owns the material object? Or does
"SOFTWARE" mean "the specified version of the Microsoft software
product identified above," in which case it designates the copyrighted
work, and the declaration in Paragraph 2 means that Microsoft is not
transferring ownership of the copyright? The clause in Paragraph 2-
"Therefore, you must treat the SOFTWARE like any other
copyrighted material (e.g., a book or musical recording)... "-may
suggest the latter. It says that because Microsoft owns the
"SOFTWARE," the user has only limited rights to make use of it;
that is a limitation on use that flows from Microsoft's ownership of
the copyrighted work, not from its ownership of the diskettes on
which it is distributed. Furthermore, saying that the user must treat
the "SOFTWARE" like a book or musical recording seems to imply
that Microsoft is not claiming ownership of the floppy disk, but only
of the copyright, since it is clear that the purchaser of a book or a
music CD owns those material objects.
Whether ambiguous or not, a declaration in a software license
agreement purporting to "license" not only use of the computer
program, but also possession of the material object on which it is
100. Neukom & Gomulkiewicz, supra note 83, at 787.
[Vol. 57:1
2004] THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING FIRST-SALE RULE 33
distributed, cannot, on a proper construction of the term "owner" in
sections 109(a) and 117(a), prevent the acquirer of the software copy
from being entitled to the benefits that those two provisions confer.
To see this, consider what it means to say that one 'licenses" a
material object. This is nonstandard usage of the term "license." In
its standard usage, a license is a grant of permission.101 Thus, a
license in connection with a copyrighted work constitutes permission
to use the work in a manner that would otherwise infringe the
copyright. Likewise, a license in connection with a patent permits the
use of an invention in a way that would otherwise infringe the
patent. A marriage license permits one (two, actually) to marry, as a
driver's license permits one to drive. In the context of real property, a
license is a permission to enter upon land, which would otherwise be
trespass. 102
The current Copyright Act does not define "license," but uses the
term in several contexts to mean permission to use a copyrighted
work;1o3 the Act never uses the term as a property relation applicable
to a copy or phonorecord. Under prior copyright statutes, the term
"consent" was used in contexts where 'license" is currently used, and
likewise denoted permission to use a copyrighted work.104
101. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Licenses and Permits § 1 (2000) ("A license is in the nature
of a privilege or special privilege, entitling the licensee to do something that he would
not be entitled to do without the license."). Similarly: (1) a license is "[a] revocable
permission to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful," BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 931 (7th ed. 1999) (definition of "license"); (2) a license is "[a] formal,
usually a printed or written permission from a constituted authority to do something,
e.g. to marry, to print or publish a book, to preach, to carry on some trade, etc .. ," 6
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 244 (1933) (definition of 'license"); (3) "A license is
permission granted by competent authority to do some act which would be illegal were
it done without such permission," HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
LITERARY PROPERTY 530 (1944).
102. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 790 (4th ed. 1998). The
common law distinguishes between two types of permission in connection with real
property. A "license" is a permission that may be withdrawn at any time. An
"easement" is a permission that is not revocable at the will of the grantor. See ROGER
A. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 437 (1st ed. 1984).
103. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of "performing rights society") ("A
'performing rights society' is an association, corporation, or other entity that licenses
the public performance of nondramatic musical works .. "); id. § 112(e)(1) ("statutory
license"); id. § 115(a)(1) ("compulsory license" to make a sound recording of a musical
work); id. § 203 (a "license" is subject to termination).
104. The Statute of Anne imposes liability on one who reprints a book "without the
Consent of the Proprietor or Proprietors thereof first had and obtained in Writing,
signed in the Presence of two or more credible Witnesses." Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c.
19, § 1 (1710) (Eng.). The term "consent" was used interchangeably with the term
"license." Thus, in Power v. Walker, Lord Ellenborough stated of the Statute of Anne:
"[T]he statute having required that the consent of the proprietor, in order to authorize
the printing or reprinting of any book by any other person, shall be in writing, the
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Thus, "license," when used as a verb, means "permit" or
"authorize." When used as a noun, it means "permission" or
"authorization." It makes perfect sense to say that a copyright owner
"licenses" use of a copyrighted work: this means that she permits or
authorizes the specified use of the work.105 What the licensee receives
is well described as a license, since it is a permission or authorization
to engage in activities that would otherwise infringe the rights of the
copyright owner.
But what can it mean to say that one "licenses" (or licenses use
of) a material object, such as a CD-ROM or floppy diskette? Based on
the foregoing, this is to say that one "permits" or "authorizes" use of
it. Such a statement is ambiguous. The law recognizes several types
of transactions in which one person "permits" another person to
make use of his property. That characterization is equally consistent,
for example, with a sale, lease, loan, consignment, pledge, or other
bailment of the object. On the other hand, it may be that the "license"
of a material object defines a new property relationship-a new
"bundle of sticks," to use the conventional metaphor-that fits within
none of these categories.
Which of these property relations the term "license" denotes,
when applied to a material object, is of crucial importance in
conclusion from it seemed almost irresistible that the assignment must also be in
writing; for if the license, which is the lesser thing, must be in writing, a fortiori the
assignment, which is the greater thing, must also be." 3 Maule & S. 9 (1814), quoted in
EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL
PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 303 (1879).
The 1790 Copyright Act has similar language: it is a violation to exercise rights
belonging to the copyright holder "without the consent of the author or proprietor
thereof, first had and obtained in writing, signed in the presence of two or more
credible witnesses." Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 124. So does the 1831
Act. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 6, 7, 4 Stat. 436, 437-38. The 1909 Act uses the term
'license." Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 1(e), 25(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076, 1082.
105. It is common in the copyright context to say that one licenses the work itself,
rather than licensing use of the work. The former is simply an ellipsis of the latter.
Thus, for example, movie studios historically engaged in the practice of 'licensing"
their films for exhibition in movie theaters, under an arrangement whereby the
studios did not sell the movie prints, but provided them to a theater for a period of
time after which the print had to be returned to the studio. Jodi Zechowy, Comment,
Cheaper by the Dozen: Unauthorized Rental of Motion Picture Videocassettes and
Videodiscs, 34 FED. COMM. L.J. 259, 262-63 (1982). In this context, to say that a studio
"licensed" a film is merely to say in shorthand form that it authorized a particular use
of the film-public performance-that would otherwise infringe the studio's copyright.
If this meaning is what software publishers intend when they claim to "license" the
diskettes and CD-ROMs that they distribute, then the usage is unobjectionable but
does not accomplish their purposes. As discussed above, the fact that the publisher is
only licensing use of the software, rather than transferring ownership of the copyright
in it, has no bearing upon the ownership of the diskettes and CD-ROMs. 17 U.S.C.
§ 202.
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assessing the applicability of the first-sale doctrine. If the 'license" of
a CD-ROM containing software is the equivalent of a sale of the CD-
ROM, then the recipient is the owner of the CD-ROM and is entitled
to the benefits of sections 109(a) and 117(a) of the Copyright Act. If,
on the other hand, such a "license" is the equivalent of a lease or a
loan, then the recipient is not entitled to those benefits. If the license
constitutes some entirely new species of property relation, then the
incidents of that relation must be ascertained before we can
determine how the copyright laws apply to it.
By applying licensing rhetoric to a transaction involving a
material object, software publishers have sought to import the key
incident of licensure as applied to copyrighted works: the fact that
licensing a copyrighted work does not imply transfer of ownership of
the copyright. However, as the above discussion indicates, the
carryover to transactions involving material objects is unjustified.
Characterization of a software transaction as involving a 'license" of
the CD-ROM or floppy diskette on which the software is delivered is
at best radically ambiguous.106 It simply does not answer the
question whether the transaction constitutes a first sale of the
material object' that exhausts the software publisher's public
distribution right.
To answer that question, applying the methodology developed in
Part I(A)(3), we must consider the incidents of the property relation
that results from the "license" of a material object containing
copyrighted software, and ask whether that relation is properly
described as a sale (including a sale-with-restrictions) or a lease. The
critical question is whether the 'licensee" of the CD-ROM or floppy
diskette has to give it back during its useful life: if not, the
transaction is a sale, and the acquirer is the "owner" of the software
copy for purposes of sections 109(a) and 117(a).
The claim by software producers that they are "licensing" the
material objects on which their software is distributed has a parallel
in the efforts by the software rental industry to evade the effect of
the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990. After
enactment of that amendment, which was designed to put software
rental stores out of business, some of these stores took pains to
recharacterize their transactions as not involving any "rental, lease,
or lending" of the software copies but rather as-something else. For
106. At worst, it is incoherent. In ordinary parlance, one does not speak of
"licensing" a material object. The locution is no more familiar in general legal
parlance. Even in the rarified atmosphere of copyright terminology, one does not
encounter references to 'licensing" material objects other than in software license
agreements, except in contexts where it is clear the locution is an elliptical reference to
license of the embodied copyrighted work. Use of the term in this context might most
charitably be considered a neologism.
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example, in Central Point Software, Inc. v. Global Software &
Accessories, Inc.107 a group of software publishers sued Global, a
company that operated three stores offering software on non-sale
terms. 0 8 Prior to the 1990 amendment, Global offered software for
rental. After 1990, Global put into effect what it termed a "Deferred
Billing Plan."109 The court explained:
[Ujnder the DBP, Global permits its customers to take
computer software home and keep it for up to five days for a fee,
which Global refers to as a "nonrefundable deposit" or
"restocking fee." If the customer returns the software within the
five-day period, the customer is not charged the balance of the
purchase price.110
These transactions, Global argued, constituted sales of the
software followed by returns, not rentals."'1 Global pointed out that
under state law, namely section 2-326(1) of New York's Uniform
Commercial Code, its DBP transactions constituted bona fide "sales
on approval."112
The court was not impressed. It explained that "Congress
intended to proscribe not only transactions that are called rentals,
but also practices that are in substance rentals."113 The fact that the
DBP transactions might be treated under state law as something
other than a rental was not controlling. "Although, as between
transacting parties (e.g., Global and its customers), whether a
transaction is a 'sale on approval' is one of state law, this
determination does not control the determination of rights afforded
the copyright owner (e.g., plaintiffs) by the federal copyright
statute."114
The courts were not fooled by the attempts of software-rental
stores to avoid the prohibitions on renting their products by
recharacterizing the transactions as sales-plus-returns or sales on
approval. They should not allow themselves to be fooled by software
publishers that seek to avoid the first-sale doctrine by
107. 880 F. Supp. 957 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
108. Id. at 959.
109. Id. at 961.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 963.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 964.
114. Id. at 964-65 (citations omitted). Record-rental stores made similar efforts to
evade the 1984 Record Rental Amendment of 1984. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v.
A.L.W., Ltd., 855 F.2d 368, 370 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Appellants contended that they no
longer rent records, but merely sell them pursuant to a buy-back provision: customers,
defendants contended, may buy a record for two dollars plus a five dollar deposit,
which will be returned at the customer's choice within a specified time limit.").
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recharacterizing their sales of copies of their software as "licenses" of
those copies.115
2. Restricting distributors: retaining title, or limiting their
authority to distribute
a. The strategy
Another strategy that software publishers have employed to
prevent the end user from gaining ownership of the material objects
containing their software consists of limiting the authority of
distributors to dispose of those copies. The publisher may implement
this strategy through any of three methods: (1) inserting in the
distribution agreement a statement that the publisher retains
ownership of the copies, (2) structuring the transaction so that the
publisher actually does retain ownership of the copies, or (3)
inserting in the distribution agreement a statement that the
distributor is authorized to transfer ownership of the copies only to
certain persons or under certain conditions.
Microsoft invoked this strategy, following the third approach, in
Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, Inc.116
Harmony, a computer and software dealer, distributed Microsoft
software without Microsoft's authorization.117 The software that
Harmony distributed consisted of operating system programs (MS-
DOS and Windows) that Microsoft declared could not be offered on a
stand-alone basis, but only bundled with computer systems.11s That
declaration was in the form of a "license agreement" between
Microsoft and the authorized distributors of its products. The license
agreement stated that its distributor-licensees
115. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act [hereinafter UCITA]
uses certain terms relating to software transactions in unaccustomed ways. It defines
"computer information" as including not only "information in electronic form," but also
"a copy of the information and any documentation or packaging associated with the
copy." UCITA § 102(a)(10) (2002). Thus, "information" includes not only the computer
program, but also the CD-ROM on which it is distributed, the printed manual that
accompanies it, and the box in which it is packaged. Conversely, since "goods" is
defined as excluding "computer information," the disk and the manual and the box are
not "goods," but only "information." Id. § 102(a)(33). With the terms so defined, it
becomes very difficult to make a statement like "Joe owns the floppy diskette that the
program came on" (or even "Joe owns the box it came in")-for how can one own
information? On the other hand, 'Microsoft licensed that floppy to Joe" trips lightly off
the tongue. Federal copyright law, however, is not controlled by such linguistic
novelties. The fact that UCITA deems a software copy to be "licensed" does not mean
that the acquirer of the copy is not its "owner" for purposes of the first-sale doctrine.
116. 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
117. Id. at 209.
118. Id. at 213.
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shall distribute Product(s) only with [licensee's] Customer
System(s) ... for the particular Product(s) and only inside the
Customer System package. [The licensee] shall provide a copy
of the... Product with, and only with, each Customer System
on which the corresponding Preinstalled Product Software is
distributed.119
In other words, Microsoft would provide its software only to
those dealers who agreed that that they would distribute the
software only in conjunction with the sale of a computer. The
software had to be pre-installed on the computer, and the dealer had
to include with the computer a copy of the software on the media
(floppy diskettes) on which Microsoft distributed it. A dealer that
resold the software inconsistently with these limitations would be
violating its contract with Microsoft.
Harmony acquired the software from a supplier, and then
distributed the software to end users on a stand-alone basis, without
any accompanying computer.120 Neither Harmony nor its supplier
had entered into a license agreement permitting it to sell Microsoft
products.121 Microsoft sued Harmony for copyright infringement.
Harmony argued that it was entitled to the benefits of the first-
sale doctrine, since it had purchased the software copies. But the
court held that Harmony could get good title to the software only if
its supplier was authorized to sell it. That was not the case, since
Harmony's immediate supplier was not a licensee of Microsoft and so
was not authorized to sell the software.22 Some of the software was
traced back to upstream suppliers that were Microsoft licensees and
so were authorized to sell the software; but under the terms of their
distribution agreements with Microsoft, they were not authorized to
distribute the software apart from an accompanying computer. Since
each reseller's sale was unauthorized, the court held, Harmony never
acquired good title to the software copies, and therefore the first-sale
doctrine was not available as a defense.123
b. Critique of the strategy
Limiting a distributor's authority to sell software copies, using
any of the three methods described above, generally does not prevent
an end user who purchases a copy from that distributor, in a manner
119. Id. (bracketed material and ellipses in original).
120. There was an allegation that at least some of the software was counterfeit,
consisting of pirated copies of Microsoft's software. On this preliminary injunction
motion, the court did not resolve that issue, and proceeded on the assumption that the
software was genuine. Id. at 212.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 212-13.
123. Id.
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that the software publisher seeks to prohibit, from obtaining
ownership of the copy.
i. Declaration of retained ownership
Transactions involving software copies are generally held to be
sales of goods, within the scope of Article 2 of the UCC.124 Under the
UCC, if a transaction is a sale, then a purported retention of title
does not prevent title from passing, but only creates a security
interest.125 Therefore, a bare statement in the distribution agreement
that the title to the copies remains in the software publisher does not
prevent the first-level distributor from acquiring title to the copies.
Since the distributor holds title, its subsequent sale to the retailer
conveys that title, as does the retailer's sale to the end user.
ii. Actual retention of ownership
Even a contractual provision that succeeds in preventing the
first-level distributor from acquiring title to the software copies-
such as one that makes the transaction a bailment rather than a
sale-does not under normal circumstances prevent the end user
from acquiring title. Section 2-403 of the UCC governs the authority
of a seller of goods to transfer good title to a purchaser under various
124. See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[W]e
hold that software is a 'good' within the definition in the Code."); Mark A. Lemley,
Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1244 n.23
(1995) (observing that "almost all courts and commentators that have considered the
issue have concluded that a shrinkwrap license transaction is a sale of goods rather
than a license, and is therefore covered by Article 2"). But see Lorin Brennan, Why
Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 459, 545-77 (2000)
(criticizing many cases finding software transactions are covered by Article 2, and
praising a few cases to the contrary).
Recent amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code ratify these judicial
interpretations. The 2003 revision of Article 2 contains an amended definition of
"goods," which explicitly excludes "information." U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(k) (2004). The
exclusion is worded so that the material objects on which information may be recorded
are not excluded, and therefore are impliedly within the definition of "goods." In 2003,
the definition of "goods" in Article 9 of the UCC was amended, so that it includes "a
computer program embedded in goods" if the program "customarily is considered part
of the goods" (as in the case of mechanical goods containing embedded code), but "[t]he
term does not include a computer program embedded in goods that consist solely of the
medium in which the program is embedded." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44). Thus, the medium
on which a computer program is distributed, such as a CD-ROM or a floppy diskette, is
explicitly within the definition of "goods," although the computer program is not.
If the CD-ROM on which a computer program is distributed is not a "good" for
purposes of the UCC, it is hard to see how the bound paper book on which a literary
work is distributed, or the canvas on which a painting is distributed, could be a "good."
125. See U.C.C. § 2-401(1) ("Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title
(property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a
reservation of a security interest.").
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circumstances in which the seller does not hold title.126 In particular,
section 2-403(2) deals with a situation in which the owner of a good
places it in the possession of a merchant who deals in goods of that
kind, and the merchant sells it to a good-faith buyer without the
owner's authorization.127 In that case, the buyer acquires title to the
good, and the prior owner is out of luck.128 Section 2-403(2) provides:
"Any entrusting of goods to a merchant that deals in goods of that
kind gives the merchant power to transfer all of the entruster's rights
to the goods and to transfer the goods free of any interest of the
entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business."29 "Entrusting"
is broadly defined, to include "any delivery and any acquiescence in
retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between
the parties to the delivery or acquiescence."130
A "buyer in ordinary course of business" is defined as "a person
that buys goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale
violates the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary
course from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of
selling goods of that kind."131
The rationale of section 2-403(2) is that where both the entruster
and the ultimate purchaser are innocent, the loss should fall on the
former, since he is in a better position to avoid placing the goods in
the hands of a dishonest intermediary, and since this rule promotes
the free flow of commerce.132
This rule applies to transfers of material objects containing
copyrighted material, no less than it does to automobiles and farm
equipment. In Independent News Co. v. Williams,133 plaintiff
Independent, a distributor of comic books, sold comics to wholesalers,
126. See 2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-403:1
(2002) (stating that section 2-403 embodies the common law doctrine by which "a seller
with an imperfect title ... pass[es] perfect ownership to a bona fide purchaser").
127. Id. § 2-403:7.
128. Id. § 2-403:1. Many section 2-403(2) cases involve cars and other vehicles. See,
e.g., Marlow v. Conley, 787 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. App. 2003). In Marlow, the purchaser of a
truck was held to have obtained good title to it, even though the dealer from whom he
bought it was not authorized to sell it, where the owner had acquiesced in the dealer's
possession of it, and the buyer had no knowledge of the lack of authority. Id.
129. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
130. Id. § 2-403(3).
131. Id. § 1-201(b)(9).
132. Heinrich v. Titus-Will Sales, Inc., 868 P.2d 169, 173 (Wash. App. 1994). See
Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1057 (1954) (The good faith purchaser "is protected.., to the end that commercial
transactions may be engaged in without elaborate investigation of property rights and
in reliance on the possession of property by one who offers it for sale.").
133. 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961).
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which in turn sold them to retailers.134 The contract between
Independent and the wholesalers provided that a wholesaler must
collect unsold comics from its retailers, return the covers to
Independent, and then destroy the coverless comics.135 A wholesaler
sold the comics to a wastepaper dealer, which sold them to the
defendant, a dealer in used books and magazines, who resold them as
reading material.136 The complaint charged the magazine dealer with
conversion and copyright infringement, among other things.137 The
court held that section 2-403(2) applied, since (1) plaintiff entrusted
the comics to the wholesaler, a merchant that deals in goods of that
kind, and (2) the wastepaper dealer was a good-faith purchaser, since
it was not aware of any restrictions on the use of the coverless
comics.138 Therefore, the wastepaper dealer acquired full title to the
comics, which it transferred to the defendant, defeating the
conversion claim.139 Applying the first-sale doctrine,140 the court held
that, as owner of the comics, defendant was free to resell them
without authority of the copyright owner, and therefore defendant
did not infringe the distribution right.141
iii. Restrictions on the distributor's authority to
transfer software copies
A software publisher may seek to control the disposition of its
products by binding the distributor contractually to distribute copies
only to certain users, such as educational or non-commercial users, or
by permitting distribution only in connection with the sale of a
computer. A distributor's failure to observe such restrictions may
constitute breach of the distributor's contract with the publisher, or
infringement of the publisher's copyright, but it does not prevent the
end user from gaining ownership of the software copy.
Illustrating this principle is John D. Park & Sons Co. v.
Hartman,142 an opinion by Judge, later Supreme Court Justice,
134. Id. at 511.
135. Id. at 511-12.
136. Id. at 511.
137. Id. at 512, 515-17.
138. Id. at 513-14.
139. Id. at 512-14.
140. Id. at 515-17. The case was decided under the 1909 Act, and accordingly the
first-sale doctrine of section 27 was applicable. Id. at 517. The court's statement of the
doctrine--"Under this provision, once there is lawful ownership transferred to a first
purchaser, the copyright holder's power of control in the sale of the copy ceases," id. at
517-is consistent with present section 109(a).
141. Id. at 515-17; see also Fournier v. Tichenor, 944 S.W.2d 398, 399-400 (Tenn.
App. 1996) (applying section 2-403(2) to artworks).
142. 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
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Lurton, in which the plaintiff, a manufacturer of proprietary
medicines, sought to control the distribution of his products through
a system of contracts.143 Plaintiff sold his products to wholesalers,
pursuant to contracts under which they agreed to resell the products
only at specified prices, and only to authorized retailers.144 The
authorized retailers were those who had agreed to resell the products
to consumers only at specified prices.145 The defendant was a
wholesaler who did not enter such a contract with the plaintiff.146
Defendant purchased the products from plaintiffs authorized
wholesalers, at prices less than those for which the wholesalers were
contractually bound to sell them, and then resold them to "retailers
operating 'cut rate drug stores"' (also not under contract with the
plaintiff), which sold them to consumers at less than the prescribed
retail price.147 Plaintiff sought an injunction restraining the
defendant from any further unauthorized purchases and sales.14s
The court assumed that the defendants were not "licensed" to
purchase the products; that the vendors who sold the products to the
defendants did so in breach of their contracts with the plaintiff; and
that the defendants were aware of the whole arrangement, and thus
knew that the vendors' sales to them were not "authorized" by the
plaintiff.149 Nevertheless, the court held, the defendants were owners
of the goods they purchased under these circumstances:
What is the result? Did the defendants by so purchasing, with
knowledge of the restrictions imposed upon sales, thereby enter
into contractual relations with complainant? Manifestly not.
Did they obtain the absolute title, notwithstanding their
knowledge that the sale was in breach of restrictions imposed
upon the seller? Undoubtedly. The restrictions imposed by
complainant upon sales and resales, if valid at all, are only so
because they constitute personal contracts upon which an
action will lie only against the contracting party. 150
Thus, if a software publisher sells software copies to a
distributor, who is bound contractually to distribute the copies only
to specified users or under specified circumstances, but who
faithlessly distributes the copies in violation of the contract, the
143. Id. at 25.
144. Hartman v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 145 F. 358, 359 (E.D. Ky. 1906), rev'd,
153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 359.
148. Id.
149. John D. Park & Sons Co., 153 F. at 38-39.
150. Id. at 39.
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transaction nonetheless transfers good title to the acquirer.151
To summarize the above critique: (1) a mere declaration in a
distribution agreement stating that the software publisher retains
title to the copies it sells to its distributors does not prevent the
passage of title, but only creates a security interest; (2) if the
publisher does not sell the copies but only gives the distributor
possession of them through a bailment, a good-faith purchaser from
the distributor nevertheless acquires ownership of the copies; and (3)
a distributor that sells software copies in violation of its distribution
agreement nevertheless conveys ownership of the copies to the
purchaser.152
151. Courts that have failed to appreciate this point include Adobe Sys. Inc. v.
Stargate Software Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the
distribution agreement "contains numerous restrictions on title that are imposed on
the reseller, limiting the reseller's ability to re-distribute Adobe software"); Adobe Sys.
Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that
contractual restrictions on a distributor's authority to dispose of software copies
prevented title from passing to a purchaser); and Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony
Computers & Electronics, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 212-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that
reseller did not acquire good title to copies of Microsoft's products because it could not
trace its title to one who was "authorized to sell the product").
For examples of courts that have applied the principle correctly see SoftMan
Products Co. v. Adobe Systems Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083-85 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(unauthorized distributor of unbundled software products is nevertheless owner of the
copies, making first-sale doctrine applicable); and Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade
Center, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1231 (D. Utah 1997) (holding that defendant,
although "a wholly unauthorized distributor," had good title to software copies and
could distribute them free from the copyright owner's control), vacated in part due to
parties'settlement, 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999).
As other courts have correctly held, a software publisher's policy against
transferring ownership of software copies to unauthorized recipients does not control,
if its actions show that a transfer of ownership has occurred. See Picker Int'l Corp. v.
Imaging Equip. Servs., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 18, 38 (D. Mass. 1995), affid mem., 94 F.3d
640 (1st Cir. 1996) (competitor that purchased copy of service manual from plaintiff's
parts department, in violation of plaintiffs policy, nevertheless became the owner of
the copy for purposes of the first-sale doctrine); Walt Disney Prods. v. Basmajian, 600
F. Supp. 439, 441-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Disney's alleged policy prohibiting transfer of
animation cels to its employees did not defeat employee's title to cels given to him).
152. UCITA's provisions on transfer of title to a software copy seem to contradict
some of these conclusions. UCITA seems to say that a software publisher can control
ownership of the copy by a bare declaration in the license agreement, without regard
to the economic realities of the transaction, and that a distributor that does not hold
title to a software copy cannot convey good title to a good-faith purchaser. See UCITA
§ 502(a)(1) (2002) ("title to a copy is determined by the license"); id. § 506(b) ("a
transferee acquires no more than the contractual interest or other rights that the
transferor was authorized to transfer"). To the extent these provisions enlarge the
degree of control that a copyright owner can assert over copies that he has distributed,
they may be held preempted by the Copyright Act. See infra Part II. A finding of
preemption seems inevitable with respect to one particular provision on title transfer:
"a licensee's right under the license to possession or control of a copy is governed by
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3. Attaching use restrictions to the copy itself
a. The strategy
Another strategy that copyright owners have occasionally
adopted in an effort to limit the end user's authority to dispose of a
copy that has been subject to a first sale is imposition of a restriction
on use of the copy that follows the copy itself and purports to bind
whoever possesses it. For example, in RCA Manufacturing Co. v.
Whiteman,153 RCA sold phonograph records containing recordings of
orchestral performances to a distributor, which resold them to
W.B.O. Broadcasting, which used them to broadcast the music by
radio.154 The records were clearly labeled as "Not Licensed for Radio
Broadcast."155 RCA claimed that W.B.O.'s use of the records for
broadcast infringed its common-law copyright in the performances.156
This common-law protection would have been available only if the
contractual use restriction had prevented RCA's distribution of the
records from being considered a "publication" of the orchestra
performances. 157
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, held that the
restriction RCA attempted to place upon use of the phonograph
records was invalid. The court explained: "Restrictions upon the uses
of chattels once absolutely sold are at least prima facie invalid; they
must be justified for some exceptional reason, normally they are
'repugnant' to the transfer of title."158
the license and does not depend solely on title to the copy." UCITA § 502(a)(2). Under
the first-sale doctrine, the "licensee's" right to "control of a copy" does indeed "depend
solely on title to the copy." Id.
153. 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
154. Id. at 87
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 88-89. Federal copyright law did not protect sound recordings until 1972,
so the only possible source of copyright protection for the performances (as opposed to
the musical works that they performed) was under state law, known as common-law
copyright. Once a work was published, however, it lost its common-law protection.
"Publication" for this purpose was a highly technical concept: distribution of copies of a
work might be held not to constitute publication if the distribution were to a limited
group or for limited purposes. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194
F.3d 1211, 1214-16 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, in RCA Manufacturing Co., the issue was
whether the label prohibiting use of the phonograph records for commercial broadcast
sufficiently limited their use so that distribution of the records did not constitute
"publication." 114 F.2d at 88-89. The label could, of course, have such an effect only if
it were an enforceable restriction on use.
158. RCA Mfg. Co., 114 F.2d at 89. Other cases involving efforts to impose a use
restriction that would follow a copy of a copyrighted work include Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 341 (1908) (stipulation of minimum resale price printed on the
copyright page of the book); Indep. News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510, 517-18 (3d Cir.
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In recent years, software publishers have revived and updated
the strategy of attaching a use restriction to a copy of a copyrighted
work, in the form of clickwrap licenses. This device is familiar to
anyone who has installed software on a computer in the past decade
or two. During the installation process, a message appears on the
user's screen, stating certain terms and conditions that the publisher
wishes to impose on the user. To proceed to the next step of the
installation, the user must take some action-usually clicking an on-
screen button labeled "I Agree" or the like-indicating her assent to
those terms. On the strength of that click, the software publisher
claims, generally successfully,159 that the terms and conditions are
incorporated into a contract between the user and the software
publisher, limiting the uses that may be made of the software.
While the enforceability of such use restrictions is premised upon
contract, the technological features of this method of acquiring
consent make the use restriction functionally one that inheres in the
software copy itself. In the normal course,160 it is impossible to make
use of the software without agreeing to the use restriction. Therefore,
the use restriction is equally binding on anybody who happens to
come into possession of the software copy and install it.161 The
restriction thus travels with the copy, in a way that contractual
restrictions usually do not.
b. Critique of the strategy
This strategy conflicts with longstanding public policy strongly
1961) (notice on comic book stating that it may not be sold if its cover is removed);
Authors & Newspapers Ass'n v. O'Gorman Co., 147 F. 616, 617 (D.R.I. 1906) (notice
inside cover of book, prescribing a resale price, and forbidding resale before a certain
date).
159. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453-54 (7th Cir.1996) (holding
that shrinkwrap licenses are generally enforceable); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv.
Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338-39 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding clickwrap license
agreement enforceable); Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (App. Div. 2002)
(same). The enforceability of software clickwrap agreements is also supported by cases
that enforce clickwrap agreements presented in online transactions. See Forrest v.
Verizon Communications, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010-11 (D.C. 2002); Barnett v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204 (Tex. App. 2001); 1-A Equip. Co. v. ICode,
Inc., 43 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 807, 807 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2000); Caspi v. Microsoft
Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Groff v. Am.
Online, Inc., 1998 WL 307001, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1998).
160. By application of sufficient ingenuity one might manage to circumvent the
installation system and install the software without clicking "I Agree," but only at
peril of exposing oneself to liability under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), which provides:
"No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to
a work protected under this title."
161. See Lemley, supra note 79, at 147-49.
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disfavoring restraints on alienation of personal property. 162 In Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,163 the Supreme Court
invalidated the same system of distributing goods as was at issue in
John D. Park & Sons, Co. v. Hartman.64 The Court explained that "a
general restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid."165 It
continued:
The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right
of general property in movables, and restraints upon alienation
have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public policy,
which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such
things as pass from hand to hand. General restraint in the
alienation of articles, things, chattels, except when a very
special kind of property is involved, such as a slave or an
heirloom, have been generally held void. "If a man," says Lord
Coke, in 2 Coke on Littleton, § 360, "be possessed.., of a horse
or of any other chattel, real or personal, and give or sell his
whole interest or property therein, upon condition that the
donee or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void,
because the whole interest and property is out of him, so as he
hath no possibility of a reverter; and it is against trade and
traffic and bargaining and contracting between man and
man."166
Although Dr. Miles involved an effort by the vendor to control
resale prices, which ran counter to the policy of the antitrust laws,
the Supreme Court has made clear that the holding was premised
not on the illegality of the end result, but on the means of achieving
it:
"Dr. Miles... decided that under the general law the owner of
movables... could not sell the movables and lawfully by
contract fix a price at which the product should afterwards be
sold, because to do so would be at one and the same time to sell
and retain, to part with and yet to hold, to project the will of the
seller so as to cause it to control the movable parted with when
it was not subject to his will because owned by another."167
162. By contrast, a restriction on the use of real property is generally permitted to
run with the land. However, such a servitude is invalid, as contrary to public policy, if
it "imposes an unreasonable restraint on alienation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 3.1(3) (1998).
163. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
164. See id. at 405 (citing John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th
Cir. 1907)).
165. Id. at 404.
166. Id. at 404-05 (quoting John D. Park & Sons Co., 153 F. at 39).
167. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 733 (1988) (quoting
Boston Store of Chicago v. Am. Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 21-22 (1918)) (omissions
by Court).
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The courts have almost universally rejected the possibility of
such a running servitude, both in copyright cases168 and in other
contexts.169  Only a few courts have held such servitudes
enforceable,170 and they are regarded as aberrations.171 Some
168. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908) (statement of
minimum resale price printed on the copyright page of the book does not extend
copyright owner's rights to copies that it has voluntarily sold); Indep. News Co. v.
Williams, 293 F.2d 510, 517-18 (3d Cir. 1961) (notice on comic book stating that it may
not be sold if its cover is removed not enforceable against one who bought the comics
from a wastepaper dealer); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1940)
("Restrictions upon the uses of chattels once absolutely sold are at least prima facie
invalid; they must be justified for some exceptional reason, normally they are
'repugnant' to the transfer of title."); Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689,
691 (2d Cir. 1894) (explaining that once a copy has been sold, "the ordinary incidents
of ownership in personal property, among which is the right of alienation, attach to
it"); Authors & Newspapers Ass'n v. O'Gorman Co., 147 F. 616, 619-20 (D.R.I. 1906)
(notice inside cover of book, stating a prescribed resale price, and forbidding resale
before a certain date, not enforceable as against purchaser who did not assent to be
bound contractually by those terms).
169. See Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1917) (refusing to
give effect to manufacturer's "License Notice" attached to a patented machine, as
against one not in a contractual relationship with the manufacturer); Hewlett-Packard
Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("A
noncontractual intention is simply the seller's hope or wish, rather than an enforceable
restriction."); Hartford Charga-Plate Assocs. v. Youth Centre-Cinderella Stores, 215
F.2d 668, 671 (2d Cir. 1954) (defendant retail store's acceptance of charge plates that
plaintiff store had issued to common customers was not wrongful, since "plaintiff,
having relinquished its plates freely to its customers, could no longer burden them
with an inconsistent servitude passing with their transfer and binding upon
strangers"); John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907) ("A
covenant which may be valid and run with land will not run with or attach itself to a
mere chattel.").
170. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 702, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(holding a package insert stating "For Single Patient Use Only" accompanying a
patented medical device is enforceable against one with notice of it, so that a third
party that reconditions the device for reuse infringes the patent); Chemagro Corp. v.
Universal Chem. Co., 244 F. Supp. 486, 490 (E.D. Tex. 1965) ("A purchaser of a
patented product having actual notice of a limited patent license in the form of a
written label notice attached to the product restricting the use to which the purchaser
may put the product, and who uses and sells such product in violation of the limited
patent license is an infringer of the patent for such product."). Additional cases
enforcing servitudes on personal property are discussed in Glen 0. Robinson, Personal
Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 (2004), and Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The
Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV.
1250 (1956).
In Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., the court observed: "Where public
policy or some other determinative consideration is not involved, why should the law
adopt an immutable principle that no restrictions, reservations, or limitations can ever
be allowed to accompany the sale of an article of personal property?" 194 A. 631, 637
(Pa. 1937). The court did not, however, actually enforce the restriction, but only found
it effective to prevent a copyright owner's distribution of phonorecords from
constituting "publication" that divests the work of common-law copyright protection.
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commentators have argued that the prohibition against equitable
servitudes that run with personal property lacks a firm grounding in
policy, and should be reconsidered.172 As applied to traditional
property, the prohibition is a creature of the common law and may
bear judicial reconsideration. With respect to material objects
containing copyrighted works, however, the prohibition on running
servitudes has its basis in positive law: the first-sale doctrine. As the
Supreme Court established in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,173 and as
Congress has ratified, a restriction on disposition of a copy of a
copyrighted work that purports to bind any possessor of the copy is
an invalid attempt to extend the public distribution right beyond
Congress's grant.
Since clickwrap terms are functionally a running servitude, and
only formally a contract, there would seem to be a good argument
that they are ineffective to extend the publisher's distribution right
to allow control of a copy that has been subject to a first sale, both
under the general policy disfavoring restraints on alienation, and as
inconsistent with the first-sale doctrine.174
4. Why all the confusion?
As the above discussion indicates, courts, as well as
commentators and even the Copyright Office, have evinced a good
deal of confusion in applying the first-sale doctrine to software
copies. The most common error is to confuse the copyrighted work
with the material object in which it is embodied: when required to
determine whether a person is the owner of a software copy, they
171. See Robinson, supra note 170, at 1455 ("[T]he conventional wisdom among
commentators appears to be [that] such servitudes are the rough equivalent of a liger,
the sterile offspring of a male lion and a female tiger that is found only in the
occasional zoo."). Professor Chafee, writing in 1928, argued that the per se rule against
servitudes on chattels was not well founded, but confessed he was unable to locate "a
single square decision establishing such a conception in a court of last resort."
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945, 1013
(1928).
172. See Robinson, supra note 170, at 1480-1515 (arguing that traditional
justifications for the prohibition against servitudes on personal property are
formalistic and unconvincing, and arguments founded on competition policy do not
justify a broad-ranging prohibition); Thomas Arno, Comment, Use Restrictions and the
Retention of Property Interests in Chattels Through Intellectual Property Rights, 31
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 279, 295-97 (1994) (arguing that use restrictions facilitate price
discrimination, which may be efficiency-enhancing); Chafee, supra note 171, at 977-87
(arguing that a rationale for treating servitudes on real property, which are
permissible, so differently from servitudes on personal property had not been well
articulated).
173. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
174. Enforceability of such use restrictions, qua contract, is addressed infra in Part
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frequently have inquired instead whether that person is the owner of
the copyright or only a licensee.
This persistent confusion is puzzling, given that courts have not
had the slightest difficulty distinguishing between the work and the
object with respect to other types of copyrighted works. I am not
aware of any case, for example, in which a court accepted an
argument that the acquirer of a book, since she did not obtain
ownership of the copyright in the literary content, is not the owner of
the paper and ink of which it is made. Yet the relationship between
work and object is precisely the same for software as with any other
type of work: computer program is to diskette, as novel is to paper, as
music is to CD, as artwork is to paint, and so forth.
What might explain this confusion concerning software? The
answer, it seems to me, must lie in the fact that no other type of
copyrighted work (with the exception of motion pictures) is routinely
distributed subject to a "license agreement."175 The existence of the
license agreement-more properly, a putative contract between the
software publisher and the end user176--means that the distribution
of a software copy involves two separate transactions. First, there is
the transaction in which the acquirer obtains the copy from a retailer
or other vendor, the terms of which are governed by a contract
between the acquirer and the vendor. Second, there is a transaction
involving the acquirer and the software publisher, governed by the
"license agreement," which becomes effective if and when the
acquirer assents to it. Software publishers assert that the second
contract governs the first transaction. Unaccustomed to such three-
party transactions, the courts allow their attention to drift away from
ownership of the copy and focus instead on ownership of the
copyright.
5. Summary: the applicable principles
We may distill from the above discussion several principles that
courts should apply in assessing claims by software publishers that
the Copyright Act empowers them to control the disposition of copies
175. Why license agreements arose in connection with software, but not any other
types of copyrighted works, has historical roots. Before the 1980 amendment of the
Copyright Act, which explicitly established that computer programs are protected by
copyright, license agreements were designed to protect the intellectual property of
software publishers through a combination of contract and trade secret law. See
SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
One might speculate that they continue to be used because they provide a handy
mechanism for imposing contractual limitations on the acquirer's rights with respect
to the software, and for introducing additional terms such as mandatory arbitration
and choice-of-forum clauses.
176. See supra note 79.
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of their software that have been acquired by end users:
1. In determining whether a first sale has occurred, exhausting
the software publisher's right to control distribution with respect to a
particular copy containing its software, the determinative issue is
whether there has been a sale of the material object that contains the
software: ownership of the copyright in the software is irrelevant.
2. The question whether a transaction through which the end
user acquired the software is a "sale" or only a "license" is a red
herring. The vast majority of transactions involving software involve
both: a sale of the material object on which the software is
distributed, and a license (which may be no more than a restatement
of the prerogatives of a software copy owner under section 117(a) of
the Copyright Act) to use the computer program.
3. A software publisher's claim that it "licenses" the material
object on which software is distributed does not resolve the first-sale
inquiry. A court must look behind such a claim, and determine
whether the transaction is a sale or a lease or other bailment.
4. Contractual restrictions on a distributor's authority to transfer
ownership of software copies do not prevent the acquirer from
gaining ownership.
5. If the software publisher places copies in the hands of a
distributor, a good-faith purchaser from the distributor acquires
ownership of the copy even if the distributor is only a bailee.
C. Copy ownership and use restriction in three common software-
distribution scenarios
In this section, I apply the principles developed above to
determine the ownership status of copies of software that are
distributed through three common commercial paradigms: (1) a
standard retail chain of distribution from the software publisher to
the end user via one or more levels of distributors; (2) direct
distribution from publisher to end user, either by physical transfer of
a diskette or some other material object, or by download; and (3)
supply of systems consisting of both hardware and software, with the
hardware either leased or sold.
1. Standard retail chain of distribution
When software is distributed through a standard retail chain of
distribution-from the software publisher, through one or more
levels of distributors, to a retailer, and finally to the end user-the
end user inevitably acquires ownership of the material object on
which the software is distributed.
Consider some concrete examples. You walk into a ComputoMart
store, select a package containing 50 blank CD-R disks, bring it to
the cashier, pay the price indicated, and walk out of the store with
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your package in hand. Nobody would doubt that you are the "owner"
of those disks, free to exercise all of the normal incidents of
ownership. Even if you have not exchanged a single word with the
cashier, context indicates that there has been a purchase and sale.
By placing the package of CD-Rs on its shelf accompanied by a price,
ComputoMart has extended an offer to sell.177 When you take the
package to the cash register and pay the indicated price, you have
accepted that offer. A sale has occurred, and you are the new owner
of the disks.
Suppose that while in the same store you pay the indicated price
for a copy of Macworld magazine. By the same reasoning you walk
out as the owner of the magazine as well. Note that the magazine is a
"copy" in the copyright sense: it is a material object in which
copyrighted works, consisting of text, pictures, and perhaps other
elements, are fixed. The involvement in this transaction of a
copyrighted work is irrelevant to the question whether you own the
magazine. Certainly you do not, by virtue of your purchase of this
material object, gain any ownership of the copyright in the literary or
pictorial works embodied in it; but just as certainly, the embodiment
in that material object of the literary and pictorial works does not
defeat your ownership of the paper and ink. If somebody grabs the
magazine from you, it is theft--even if the grabbing is done by an
agent of the copyright owner.
Now suppose that you add an additional item to your shopping
cart: a computer game, "The Sims Deluxe Edition," published by
Electronic Arts. This item ships on a CD-ROM. Like the Macworld
magazine, the CD-ROM is a "copy" in the copyright sense: a material
object containing a copyrighted work, namely a computer program.
Based on the same logic that applies to the magazine and the blank
CD-R, it is clear that you are the owner of the CD-ROM (though not
of the copyright in the computer program). If somebody takes the
disk from you, you would report it as a theft, and the police, when
apprised of the facts, would not refuse to investigate the incident on
the ground that you are a mere licensee, and not an owner, of the
disk.
In each of these ComputoMart transactions, the context
indicates that the transaction is a purchase and sale, and you become
the owner of each of the material objects (though of none of the
177. A vendor's holding out an item for sale at a particular price may be construed
either as an offer to sell, or as an invitation for a prospective purchaser to make an
offer to buy at that price, depending on what the context indicates about the intent of
the vendor. In the former case, the buyer's handing over the money is an acceptance of
the offer. In the latter case, the vendor's handing over of the item is an acceptance of
the buyer's offer to purchase. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§ 3.10 (2d ed. 1998).
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copyrights) once you pay for it.
a. Assertion of retained ownership in a license
agreement
Software publishers assert, however, that by virtue of language
in the accompanying license agreement, the transaction involving the
Sims Deluxe software is different from the other two. While
presumably agreeing that you own the blank CD-Rs and the
Macworld magazine, they claim you are not the owner of the CD-
ROM that holds the software, but only a licensee. They base this
claim upon language in the license agreement to the effect that the
software is licensed, not sold.178
Applying the principles developed above, it is clear that language
in the Sims Deluxe license agreement is incapable of bringing about
this result. In the ordinary course of distributing its goods through a
retail distribution chain, Electronic Arts sold the package containing
the software disk to a distributor, which sold it (perhaps via one or
more additional levels of distributors) to ComputoMart, which sold it
to the end user. In each of those transactions, the ownership of the
box, CD-ROM, manuals, and whatever else was in the package was
transferred from the seller to the buyer. In the last transaction,
ownership was transferred from ComputoMart to the end user. A
statement by Electronic Arts in the license agreement can have no
effect on the ownership of any of these materials, because Electronic
Arts divested itself of its ownership of the materials in the first
transaction. Once it has ceased to be the owner of the package and its
contents, Electronic Arts has no more power to affect their ownership
than does any other stranger to the transaction.
The implausibility of the assertion that a license agreement is
effective to establish the software publisher's ownership of the copies
it distributes is exacerbated by the timing of the presentation of the
license agreement. In a typical retail software transaction, the
178. See, e.g., SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083
(C.D. Cal. 2001) ("Adobe argues that the first sale doctrine does not apply because
Adobe does not sell or authorize any sale of its software. Adobe characterizes each
transaction throughout the entire stream of commerce as a license."); Adobe Sys. Inc.
v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (relying on a
declaration stating "Adobe's intent in drafting and signing these documents to create
a license, rather than a sale of our software"); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Center,
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230 (D. Utah 1997) ("Novell argues that it retains
ownership and that the 'shrinkwrap' license included with each copy of NetWare is
binding, giving to authorized purchasers only a license to use the software."), vacated
in part due to parties' settlement, 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999); Applied Info. Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("AIM argues that because
Brownstone is a licensee it can not be the 'owner of a copy' of the Software entitled to
the protection of Section 117.").
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acquirer of the software copy is not permitted to see the terms of the
license agreement until after completion of the transaction resulting
in acquisition of the software. The bulk of the license terms are
generally not printed on the outside of the packaging in which the
software copy is distributed, but rather are inside the box--either
printed in the user's manual, on a separate piece of paper in the box,
or appearing on the monitor of the user's computer the first time it is
loaded.179 The software publisher is therefore not only a stranger to
the transaction through which the end user acquires the software,
but is attempting to alter the terms of that transaction post hoc.
What is stated in the license agreement can have no effect on the
ownership of the material object embodying the copyrighted software
program for the simple reason that, as explained above, ownership of
the material object is entirely independent of ownership of the
copyright in the work of authorship fixed in that object.18o In each of
those transactions down the chain of distribution, first Electronic
Arts and then each subsequent party transferred ownership of the
material object; but in none of those transactions was there any
transfer of ownership of the copyright. Electronic Arts retained full
ownership of the copyright, as the package containing the software
moved from its hands to the distributor, to the retailer, and finally to
the end user. Indeed, even if Electronic Arts had elected to sell the
software without any accompanying license agreement, it would still
retain full ownership of the copyright.81 Language in the license
agreement may govern the acquirer's prerogatives with respect to the
computer program, a work of authorship protected by copyright; it
has no relevance whatsoever to ownership of the material object that
embodies this work of authorship.
The relationship between a license agreement and the material
object it accompanies may be more clearly illustrated by considering
the other two items involved in our hypothetical purchase from
ComputoMart. Suppose the manufacturer of the blank CD-R disks,
Imation Corporation, included in its package of disks, underneath a
plastic wrapper that must be broken to get access to the disks, a
piece of paper captioned "License Agreement," which states: "The
179. Whether statements of terms and conditions that are presented in this
manner, called "shrinkwrap agreements," are contractually binding is controversial.
Compare ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding validity of
software license terms presented post-transaction); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline
Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (same); with Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v.
Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that post-transaction terms are
proposed additional terms that purchaser did not accept); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104
F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (same).
180. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
181. There can be no transfer of copyright ownership without a signed writing. See
17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2000).
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disks contained in this package are licensed, not sold." Surely nobody
would believe that such a statement would cause the purchaser of
the package not to be the owner of the disks; Imation sold those disks
to a distributor, which sold them to ComputoMart, which sold them
to the end user. It would be as though General Motors stuck a notice
in the glove compartment of a car that it manufactured, stating 'This
car belongs to General Motors," and then invoked the notice in an
action in replevin to recover the car from the person who bought the
car from the person who bought the car from the dealer that
originally sold it.
But the items in this package, CD-R disks, are precisely the
same commodity whose ownership is at issue in the case of the Sims
Deluxe program. The only difference is that the latter disk has a
copyrighted software program inscribed on it, the rights to which the
license agreement may indeed control. But in neither case does the
license agreement control the ownership of the disks.
The same holds true of the Macworld magazine. Imagine a
declaration on the cover of the magazine stating: "This magazine,
and its contents, are licensed, not sold. By opening this magazine you
assent to these terms." Nobody would contend that this declaration
makes the purchaser of the magazine only a licensee, and not an
owner, of the paper and ink constituting the magazine. The
purchaser acquired it in a sales transaction from ComputoMart, and
the desire of the copyright owner that the purchaser should not gain
ownership of the copy of the magazine is irrelevant. Yet the
magazine, like the Sims Deluxe CD-ROM, is a material object
embodying a copyrighted work.
In several other contexts, courts have routinely recognized that
transactions that software producers characterize as licenses of
copyrighted work are in fact, or in addition, sales of material objects.
First, as discussed above,182 courts generally hold that a transaction
involving a material object containing software is a sale of goods, and
that contracting issues are therefore governed by Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Second, while early cases held that
software was intangible and therefore not subject to state sales and
use taxes, the modern trend, beginning in the early 1980s, is to find
that a software transaction involves the sale of a tangible item, and
is therefore subject to state sales, use and gross receipts taxes.183
182. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
183. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Mobile, 696 So.2d 290, 291 (Ala. 1996)
(software is tangible personal property and thus subject to state's gross receipts tax);
S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Barthelemy, 643 So.2d 1240, 1246 (La. 1994) (software is
tangible personal property subject to sales and use tax); Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Dir.
of Revenue, 765 S.W.2d 611, 613-14 (Mo. 1989) (en banc) (software is subject to sales
tax); Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Computer Software or Printout Transactions as
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Third, retailers charge sales tax on transactions involving software.
Fourth, both an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") advisory group, and the U.S. Treasury
Department, have determined that income arising from a software
transaction should generally be characterized as business income,
rather than as royalties paid for a license of intellectual property, for
tax purposes.18 4
The implications of a rule allowing the ownership of a material
object to depend on a provision in a license agreement between the
owner of the copyrighted work contained in that object and the
acquirer of the object are startling. What software publishers can do,
so can publishers of any other copyrighted content; any copyright
owner could circumvent the first-sale doctrine, defeating the effect of
section 109(a), simply by distributing its goods subject to a license
agreement stating that the product is licensed, not sold.
Consider books. Some authors and book publishers are upset
with Amazon.com, and other online book sellers, for making used
books easy to buy and sell. There has always been a secondary
market in books. Students whenever possible sell their textbooks
back to their university bookstore, allowing next year's students to
buy those books used at a significant savings. Many people are
accustomed to buying and selling books at garage sales and flea
markets, donating books to the local library, and giving their
children's books to parents of younger children. But in 2000,
Amazon.com started making used books available online. The web
page on which Amazon.com offers a new copy of the book sometimes
also presents a link offering one or more used versions of the same
book. Amazon.com does not own the used books, but acts as a broker,
listing books that are owned by individual sellers. When a sale is
made, the seller receives the proceeds, less a commission that is paid
to Amazon.com.185
The Author's Guild, representing its 8,000 member authors, and
the Association of American Publishers, representing 278 member
publishers, took umbrage. They addressed a joint letter to
Amazon.com, explaining that the making of a market in used books
Subject to State Sales or Use Tax, 36 A.L.R.5TH 133 (1996).
184. See OECD TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP ON TREATY CHARACTERISATION OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE PAYMENTS, TAX TREATY CHARACTERISATION ISSUES ARISING
FROM E-COMMERCE, 16 (Feb. 1, 2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
46/341l923396.pdf; Classification of Transactions Involving Computer Programs, 26
C.F.R. § 1.861-18 (2004).
185. Amazon.com's used-goods brokerage program now extends to many other types
of goods, including information goods such as music on CDs, movies on DVD or
videotape, and computer video games, as well as non-information goods such as
electronics and tools. In addition, other online sellers, including Barnes & Noble.com
and Half.com, have joined Amazon.com in offering used books.
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is detrimental to authors and publishers, cutting into their sales of
new books.186 In this letter, they asked Amazon.com to modify its
used-book program, to protect the interests of several constituencies:
For the sake of authors, publishers, readers and Amazon, a
compromise must be found that will not discourage writers from
writing or consumers from buying new books. We believe the
compromise is simple and straightforward: restrict the blue-box
link [that appears directly adjacent to the new-book price] to
out-of-print and collectible books and list all used book offerings
after all new versions of a title are listed. 187
Rebuffed by Amazon.com,188 in April 2002 the Authors Guild
recommended to its members that they remove any links from their
websites that point to the Amazon.com site, and link instead to other
online booksellers.189
Instead of getting mad, book publishers could take a page out of
the software publishers' book, and declare that their goods are only
licensed, not sold.190 This could be done by placing the license
agreement on top of the book, covering the book in shrinkwrap, and
placing a label on the outside stating that important terms are
enclosed.191 The purchaser of the book acquires it subject to the terms
of the license agreement. The agreement licenses the acquirer to read
the book as many times as she likes, and to distribute it to members
of her immediate family. (Just for fun, the agreement might prohibit
186. Letter from Letty Cottin Pogrebin, Author's Guild President & Patricia S.
Schroeder, Assoc. of Am. Publishers President, to Jeffrey P. Bezos, Amazon.com
C.E.O., available at http://www.authorsguild.org/news/aap-press-amazon.htm (last
visited Jan. 31, 2005).
187. Id.
188. Jeff Bezos, the founder of Amazon.com, responded by firing off an e-mail to
Amazon.com's cadre of used-book sellers, asking them to send an e-mail to the Authors
Guild in support of Amazon.com's program. Letter from Jeff Bezos, Founder and
C.E.O. of Amazon.com, to all Amazon used book resellers (Apr. 15, 2000), available at
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/ wlg/1291.
189. The Authors Guild, Guild Recommends De-Linking from Amazon, available at
http://www.authorsguild.org/news/recommends-de .linking.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2005). In the early 1990s record companies made a similar effort to pressure music
stores to stop selling used CDs. See Fara Daun, Comment, The Content Shop: Toward
an Economic Legal Structure for Clearing and Licensing Multimedia Content, 30 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 215, 253 (1996).
190. Jessica Litman, The Tales that Article 2B Tells, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 931,
938-39 (1998).
191. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that an
agreement enclosed in the box in which a computer was shipped created an
enforceable contract between the vendor and the purchaser when the latter failed to
return the computer within thirty days of purchase). For an early example of an in-
the-shipping-box agreement, see Waltham Watch Co. v. Keene, 202 F. 225, 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1913) (watch movements shipped in boxes, each in an inner box containing a
"Contract Notice" specifying terms and conditions).
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her from reading the ending before slogging through the entire book,
or require the publisher's written permission before publication of
any review of the book.) Under the theory that software publishers
urge upon the courts, since the acquirer is not the owner of the book,
but only a licensee, the publisher would not have exhausted its first-
sale right. Therefore, any distribution of the book to the public, such
as by offering it at a garage sale or on Amazon.com, would infringe
the publisher's distribution right. What the Copyright Office
(erroneously) declares to be true for CD-ROMs-"Libraries are not
able to use CD-ROMs donated to them because the donors are not
owners of the CD-ROMs, only licensees, and thus lack the legal
authority to transfer the copy of the work they possess"192--would
become equally true for books.193
Or consider music CDs. Some people buy used CDs because the
new ones are so expensive. Others, such as Candice Dylhoff of
Wheaton, Illinois, do so for spite: "As a musician and music teacher, I
eagerly await the demise of the recording industry as we know it.
And I am hastening the arrival of that day in a way that's perfectly
legal-I buy only used CDs."194 If software publishers can convince
courts that their products are only licensed, never sold, the record
companies can ruin Ms. Dylhoffs day by doing the same. Music CDs
are already sealed in shrinkwrap. All that is lacking is a license
agreement. 195
In sum, software copies that are distributed through a typical
retail chain of distribution are invariably sold, with the end user
becoming the "owner" of the copy for purposes of sections 109(a) and
117(a) of the Copyright Act. A declaration in the license agreement
accompanying the copy, to the effect that the software is licensed, not
sold, does not change this result.
b. Limitation of a distributor's authority to dispose of
software copies
Rather than inserting language in its license agreements, a
software publisher may seek to extend its control over copies of the
software it has sold by placing restrictions on the authority of its
distributors to convey ownership of the software copies. Based on the
principles set forth above, this strategy will not prevent the end user
192. SECTION 104 REPORT, supra note 85, at 105.
193. For further elaboration of this scenario, see Charles R. McManis, The
Privatization (or "Shrink-Wrapping') of American Copyright Law, 87 CAL. L. REV. 173,
173-74 (1999).
194. WIRED, Apr. 2003, at 25 (letters to the editor).
195. Record companies have in fact attempted to limit sales of used music CDs by
withholding co-op advertising payments from retailers that offer both new and used
products. See Daun, supra note 189, at 253.
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from gaining ownership of the software copies.
First, a mere statement, in an agreement between any two
participants in the chain of distribution from the software publisher
to the end user, that the seller retains ownership of the copy is
effective only to create a security interest, and does not prevent title
from passing.196
Second, if the software publisher actually does retain ownership
of the copies, by constituting the distributors as its selling agents, the
requirements of section 2-403(2) will typically be satisfied, with the
consequence that the end user obtains title to the copy.197 The
publisher entrusts the copies to the first-level distributor, by
delivering them to the distributor and acquiescing in the distributor's
continued possession of them. The first-level distributor is, by
hypothesis, a merchant that deals in "goods of that kind," i.e.
software. The second-level distributor that acquires the software
copies from the first-level distributor is ordinarily a "buyer in
ordinary course of business," who does not have knowledge that the
transaction violates the rights of others in the software copy.
Iterations of the same analysis apply as the software travels through
additional levels of distributors before reaching the retailer. Even if
title to the software copies is successfully withheld from the retailer,
it is hard to see how an end user, who purchases the shrinkwrapped
box as she would any other merchandise in the store, who pays sales
tax on the transaction, and who receives a receipt stating, "All sales
are final," could have actual or constructive knowledgeleS that the
retailer was not entitled to make the sale.199 The end user is
accordingly a buyer in ordinary course of business, and is the "owner"
of the software copies.
Third, if the retailer owns the software copies, and sells them to
the end user in violation of its distribution agreement with the
196. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
198. See James L. Padgett, Note, Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-403(2): The
Authority of a Bailee to Convey Title, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 241, 250 (1968) (suggesting
that constructive knowledge of the dealer's lack of authority to sell should defeat the
purchaser's claim).
199. What if the software publisher sells the software copies to its distributors,
subject to a restriction that they may only be resold to qualified buyers (such as
educational users) or in connection with the sale of computer hardware: would a
subsequent purchaser's knowledge of the restriction defeat the availability of an
argument, based on section 2-403(2), that the subsequent purchaser takes the copy
free of the restriction? It would seem not. The good-faith criterion requires that the
purchaser not have knowledge that sale of the good violates the rights of another "in
the goods." U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9) (2004). In this scenario, sale of "the goods," namely the
material object on which the software is distributed, would not violate any rights,
although use of the software program might violate the rights of the copyright owner.
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publisher, the retailer may have breached its contract with the
publisher, and may have infringed the publisher's public distribution
right, but that circumstance will not prevent the acquirer from
gaining ownership of the copies.200
c. Impressing a use restriction on the material object
holding the software
As discussed above, use restrictions that run with chattels are
generally unenforceable under the common law, and are directly in
conflict with the first-sale doctrine.201 They are no more valid if
deployed in a retail chain of distribution than in any other context.
2. Direct distribution from software publisher to end user
What if the software publisher does not distribute its products
through a typical retail chain of distribution, but rather supplies
them directly to end users? Many publishers of mass-marketed
consumer software offer their products directly to end users via their
website or by mail. Some will ship the product on CD-ROM disks;202
others allow the software to be downloaded.203 Direct contact between
the software publisher and the customer also sometimes occurs when
the customer is a business. The vendor may provide software that
has been customized to fit the needs of the business, or it may supply
canned software with a customized license agreement.204
Software acquired via download. In the case of downloaded
software, the acquirer is perforce the owner of a copy of the software.
The software must be downloaded onto some material storage
medium, typically the hard drive of the receiving computer. The
purchaser normally owns that material object.205 By hypothesis, this
copy of the software has been made with the authorization of the
200. See supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
202. E.g., Broderbund, http://www.broderbund.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
203. E.g., McAfee, http://www.mcafee.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
204. Direct distribution of software in conjunction with the hardware on which it
runs is coqsidered infra in Part I(C)(3).
205. The storage medium might be owned by somebody other than the downloader,
as, for example, if it consists of the hard drive of a publicly accessible computer, or one
belonging to her employer, or a removable medium (such as a CD-R disk or a flash
drive) that the downloader has borrowed. In that case, it is the owner of the medium,
rather than the downloader, who is freed from the copyright owner's distribution right
with respect to that copy.
What if the software publisher were to declare in the license agreement
accompanying the download that, as part of the consideration for the transaction, the
publisher acquires ownership of the CD-R, or the hard drive, to which the software is
downloaded? A court should give no weight to such a declaration, unless it is backed
up by economic realities evidencing true transfer of ownership.
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copyright owner. Therefore, the purchaser is the "owner" of the copy
for purposes of sections 109(a) and 117(a), and needs no
authorization from the publisher to load the software into her
computer's RAM, or to dispose of the copy by sale or gift.2o6 If the
software is downloaded to a hard drive, the first-sale doctrine allows
the owner to dispose of the copy only by transferring the entire
computer, which may happen if the owner sells her computer without
first deleting the software from the hard drive, or by removing and
transferring the hard drive, which will occur rarely in practice.207 If
the software is downloaded directly to a removable medium, such as
a floppy diskette, CD-R disk, flash memory, or Zip drive, gift or sale
of the copy becomes more feasible.
For the reasons discussed above,208 a statement in the license
agreement accompanying the download, declaring that the software
publisher retains ownership of the "software," has no bearing on
ownership of the copy. Because the transaction occurs directly
between the software publisher and the acquirer, there is no question
of contractual limitations on distributors. Nor is there any physical
object to which the publisher might attach a notice seeking to
impress a running servitude. Therefore, none of the standard
206. SECTION 104 REPORT, supra note 85, at 78 ("[A] lawfully made tangible copy of
a digitally downloaded work, such as an image file downloaded directly to a floppy
disk, is subject to section 109."); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
STUDY EXAMINING 17 U.S.C. SECTIONS 109 AND 117 PURSUANT TO SECTION 104 OF THE
DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT (Mar. 2001), at Part IV (reaching a similar
conclusion).
For the first-sale doctrine to apply, there is no requirement that the copyright owner
physically transfer the copy or phonorecord. See Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d
621, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1995) (where synchronization license permitted licensee to
produce copies of videocassettes containing copyright owner's musical works, first sale
occurred, despite the absence of any transfer of copies) (decided under the 1909 Act);
cf. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a), (d) (2000) (when a sound recording is transmitted across a
digital network, and is fixed in some material object at the receiving end, the resulting
object is treated like any other phonorecord for purposes of a compulsory license
provision).
207. See Reese, supra note 43, at 612-13 (observing that transferring a hard drive
containing downloaded music files is "far less convenient than selling a used CD").
Some have argued that the Copyright Act provides, or should provide, for a "digital
first-sale right." Such a right would limit a copyright owner's distribution right by
permitting the owner of a copy of the copyrighted work in a digital format to transfer
the work to another by making a new copy and deleting her own copy of the work,
without any physical transfer of the copy. Arguments for and against the
establishment of such a right are canvassed in SECTION 104 REPORT, supra note 85, at
78-101. Bills that would have amended the Copyright Act to implement a digital first-
sale right were introduced in 1997, and again in 2003, but were not enacted. See H.R.
3048, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997); H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003).
208. See supra Part I(B)(1)(b).
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strategies that software publishers employ can prevent the acquirer
of the software from becoming the owner of a copy of it.
Software acquired through shipment of a physical medium. If the
software is purchased directly from the publisher and is shipped on
CD-ROM or some other physical medium, the analysis is different.
The software publisher, as vendor, can seek to structure the
transaction as it likes through the accompanying contract terms.
Thus, the software publisher might state in the contract governing
the transaction that the CD-ROM holding the software-that is, the
material object, not the computer program-is not sold to the
acquirer, but is leased. The publisher would rely on that statement as
preventing the acquirer from gaining any rights as "owner" under
sections 109(a) or 117(a). The direct-to-consumer sale approach
avoids the problem the software publisher faces when it distributes
products through normal retail channels, namely that once it sells
the material objects embodying the software product to its
distributors, it loses control over title to those objects.
For this argument to be successful, however, the software
publisher would have to do more than merely declare that the disk is
leased: it would have to structure the transaction so that it actually
is a lease. That is because the legal import of a commercial
transaction depends not on the label attached to the transaction, but
rather on the economic realities underlying it.209
209. See David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer Program Copies and the
Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157, 169 (1990) ("When faced
with the unconventional use of contract labels, the courts closely examine realities to
determine if a transfer constitutes (disguised or otherwise) a sale.") (citation omitted);
Samuelson, supra note 83, at 189 ('There is precedent in copyright caselaw for
disregarding the manufacturer's characterization of a transaction, looking through the
form of a transaction to its substance to find a sale when the manufacturer asserts
there is only a license.").
Courts apply the economic realities approach in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Neb.
Dept. of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123, 134 (1994) (a transaction that parties
characterize as a "sale-and-leaseback" of federal debt securities, in order to gain tax
advantages, is held instead to be a loan of cash from the "purchaser" to the "seller" of
the securities, based on the Court's evaluation of "the substance and economic realities
of the transaction" (quoting Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 582
(1978))); United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-49 (1975) (an
ownership interest in a real-estate cooperative that the parties designate as "stock" is
not a "security" for purposes of the federal Securities Acts, even though the Acts'
definition of "security" includes any "stock," since "Congress intended the application
of these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on
the name appended thereto"); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 164 F.
803, 804-05 (6th Cir. 1908) (party designated in contract as a "consignee" of goods
acquired from other party is in fact owner of the goods, based upon "the meaning and
intent of the instrument as a whole"), affd, 220 U.S. 373 (1911); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573-76 (1978) (relying on "the substance and economic
realities" of a transaction to uphold the parties' characterization of the transaction as a
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The principle is well illustrated in a cohort of cases addressing
the question whether a transaction involving a transfer of goods
constitutes a lease of the goods, with the transferor retaining title, or
a sale of the goods, with the transferor retaining only a security
interest. Under the UCC, if a transaction is a sale, then a purported
retention of title is ineffective, except to create a security interest.210
The UCC directs that a court should ascertain the legal status of
such a transaction based on "the facts of each case."211 Factors
supporting a determination that what the parties call a lease is
actually a sale with retained security interest include (1) that the
lease term is "equal to or greater than the remaining economic life of
the goods;" and (2) that "the lessee has an option to become the owner
of the goods for ... nominal additional consideration."22 The parties'
characterization of the transaction is not one of the relevant facts.
Numerous cases have applied this approach and determined that an
arrangement that the parties characterize as a lease is actually a
sale.213
"sale-and-leaseback" of a building, against the government's argument that it should
be treated as a financing transaction).
210. See U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (2004) ("Any retention or reservation by the seller of the
title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a
reservation of a security interest."); Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. HFH
USA Corp., 805 F. Supp. 133, 141 (W.D.N.Y. 1992). One purpose of this provision is to
implement the UCC's policy against a "hidden-title subterfuge" that defeats the
expectations of creditors. See Kinetics Tech. Int'l Corp. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 705 F.2d
396, 399 (10th Cir. 1983).
211. U.C.C. § 1-203(a) ("Whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a lease
or security interest is determined by the facts of each case.").
212. U.C.C. § 1-203(b)(1) -(4). This provision is quoted in note 68, supra.
213. See K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1164 (10th Cir. 1985)
(transaction denominated a lease with purchase option is in reality a sale, making the
warranty provisions of UCC Article 2 applicable); United States ex rel. Eddies Sales
and Leasing, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 634 F.2d 1050, 1052 (10th Cir. 1980) ('The parties
attempted to transform a printed 'Retail Installment Contract-Security Agreement'
form into a lease agreement by changing the form title to 'Installment Lease-Security
Agreement' and by typing the words 'lease', 'lessee', and 'lessor' over some of the
printed words 'purchase', 'purchaser', and 'seller.' Despite the interlineation of leasing
terminology, the parties' agreement provides for rights and duties more commonly
found in a contract of sale.... Most significantly, there was an oral understanding
that the equipment was to be owned by the 'lessee' at the termination of the lease with
no more than the nominal payment of $1.00."); Percival Constr. Co. v. Miller & Miller
Auctioneers, Inc., 532 F.2d 166, 171 (10th Cir. 1976) ("Although denominated a 'lease,'
the lower court correctly found the terms of that agreement to be such that title
actually passed to the 'lessee' and a security interest was created in the 'lessor."');
Atlas Indus., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 531 P.2d 41, 43-44, 47 (Kan. 1975) (where
accounting equipment was shipped directly from the manufacturer to the end user, the
'leasing company" did not select or inspect the equipment, the monthly payments
under the 'lease" were calculated to return to the leasing company the purchase price
plus sales tax and interest, and the equipment need not be returned to the 'leasing"
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Several courts have applied the economic realities approach to
software transactions, concluding that what the software publisher
characterizes as a license is in fact a sale. For example, in Microsoft
Corp. v. DAK Industries, Inc.214 Microsoft claimed a priority in
bankruptcy involving a seller of computer hardware to which
Microsoft had supplied a copy of Microsoft Word for Windows
software, pursuant to what Microsoft characterized as a "license
agreement" that allowed DAK to load copies of the software onto the
hardware units that it sold to end users.215 The court denied
Microsoft's claim, holding that the transaction "is best characterized
as a lump sum sale of software units to DAK, rather than a grant of
permission to use an intellectual property."216 In reaching this
conclusion, the court pointedly rejected Microsoft's argument that its
characterization of the transaction as a 'license" is controlling:
"[b]ecause we look to the economic realities of the agreement, the fact
that the agreement labels itself a 'license' and calls the payments
'royalties,' both terms that arguably imply periodic payment for the
use rather than sale of technology, does not control our analysis."217
Another example of this approach may be seen in SoftMan
Products Co. v. Adobe Systems Inc.,218 in which the court held, based
on the economic realities of a software transaction, that a software
publisher's distribution of its products, though denominated a
"license," results in transfer of title in the disks containing the
software to each party in the chain of distribution.219 The court noted
it was "well-settled that in determining whether a transaction is a
sale, a lease, or a license, courts look to the economic realities of the
exchange," and found "that the circumstances surrounding the
transaction strongly suggesto that the transaction is in fact a sale
rather than a license."220 Accordingly, the court held that "SoftMan is
company, the transaction was not a lease, but rather a sale from the manufacturer to
the putative lessee); Beneficial Commercial Corp. v. Cottrell, 688 P.2d 1254, 1256
(Mont. 1984) ("The lease agreement here contained an option to purchase for a small
sum at the end of the lease agreement .... Although the lease provided that '...
nothing [in the agreement] shall be construed as conveying to lessee any right, title, or
interest...' in the printing press, the purchase option clause establishes the
underlying transaction to be a sale."); Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Way, 208
S.E.2d 31, 34 (S.C. 1974) (transaction designated as a lease, with right to obtain
ownership of the goods at the end of the lease term upon payment of a nominal
amount as sales tax, is a sale of goods).
214. 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995).
215. Id. at 1092-93.
216. Id. at 1095.
217. Id. at 1095 n.2.
218. 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
219. Id. at 1085-87.
220. Id. at 1084-85.
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an 'owner' of the copy and is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the
software, with the rights that are consistent with copyright law."221
Courts have therefore recognized that the mere fact the parties
characterize a transaction as a "license" does not make it one: based
on the economic realities, the transaction may actually be a sale. A
court confronted with a software transaction that the parties
characterize as a "lease" should follow the same approach, applying
the criteria set out in Uniform Commercial Code section 1-203.
Accordingly, if a software publisher ships its product on a
physical medium directly to the end user, and seeks to avoid the
applicability of sections 109(a) and 117(a) by structuring the
transaction as a lease, the terms would have to include a
requirement that the lessee return the copies of the software (i.e., the
floppy diskettes or CD-ROMs) to the lessor at the end of the lease
term, and before the economic life of the copy has expired. For
reasons discussed more fully below,222 this procedure would be
cumbersome to implement in the context of mass-marketed software,
and would likely meet market resistance.
3. Sale or lease of a hardware/software combination
Another paradigm for distributing software is for the publisher
to provide the software as part of a package including the computer
hardware on which it runs. This might occur when the manufacturer
of a proprietary hardware system (which might be a computer, or
some other equipment with embedded software223) also supplies the
221. Id. at 1089. See also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70
(5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the acquirer of a software copy is entitled to the privileges
granted by section 117, despite license agreement's characterization of the transaction
as a license); Applied Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
("Determination of whether an agreement transfers ownership of a copy of a computer
program requires interpretation of the contract between the parties."); Rice, supra note
209, at 172-73 (proposing a set of factors to consider in determining whether the
acquirer of a software copy is the owner of the copy).
For an unusual case in which the software publisher argued that the acquirers of its
software became the owners of the copies on which it was distributed, see Quill Corp.
v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 n.8 (1992) (adopting without discussion the state
court's characterization of the transaction as one in which the software publisher
retained title to the copies, but rejecting such ownership as a basis for finding the
publisher had a physical presence in the state, in view of its de minimis extent).
In the patent context, see Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U.S. 490, 500-
01 (1917) (disregarding manufacturer's characterization of a transaction as conveying
only a "license" to use a patented machine, where the economic realities indicate it is a
sale).
222. See infra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
223. An automobile is such a piece of equipment: a modern automobile may contain
a million lines of software code. See Philip Koopman & Cem Kaner, The Problem of
Embedded Software in UCITA and Drafts of Revised Article 2, 43 U.C.C. BULL.
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proprietary software that runs on it. It also commonly occurs in the
mass-market context when a software publisher authorizes a
computer manufacturer to distribute software pre-installed on the
hard drives of the computers it sells.
Under this distribution scenario, the software copy is the
hardware itself. Ownership of the software copy will therefore
depend on whether the hardware is sold or leased.224 In the case of
mass-marketed personal computers, the hardware is almost
invariably sold, not leased. Since the purchaser is therefore the
owner of the software copy, she is free, by virtue of the first-sale
doctrine, to sell her computer on the secondary market, donate it to a
school, or lend it to a friend, without implicating the public
distribution right of the copyright owner of any of the software pre-
installed on the hard drive.225 However, she may not lease or lend the
computer for commercial advantage.226
RELEASE 1, at 5 (Feb. 2001). Since an automobile is thus a material object in which a
computer program is embodied, it constitutes a software copy. The general rule
established by the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990 would seem to
imply that the owner of an automobile remains subject to the copyright owner's public
distribution right, and may not rent the automobile without authorization. See 17
U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2000) (forbidding unauthorized rental of a copy of a computer
program). However, a statutory exception for "a computer program which is embodied
in a machine or product and which cannot be copied during the ordinary operation or
use of the machine or product" allows the owner of an automobile to rent it without the
authorization of the copyright owner of the embedded code. Id. § 109(b)(1)(B)(i).
224. The manufacturer of a computer might in principle sell the computer,
excepting the hard drive, which it would lease. In practice, a requirement that the
computer buyer remove the hard drive at some point in time and return it to the
manufacturer is likely to meet significant market resistance.
225. As owner of the copy, she is also entitled to load the software into the random
access memory of her computer, and to authorize others to do so. See 17 U.S.C. § 117.
Thus, the friend to whom she lends the computer will not infringe the software
publisher's exclusive right to make copies of the software, id. § 106(1), when he makes
a copy in the computer's RAM by running the program.
226. Id. §§ 109(a), 109(b)(1)(A). The analysis is slightly different for software that is
not pre-installed; that is, software that she acquires on a separate medium, such as a
floppy diskette or CD-ROM, and installs on the computer. Section 117 clearly
privileges the owner of a copy of a computer program to load it into the random access
memory of her computer, since that is an "essential step in the utilization of the
computer program." Id. § 117(a)(1). Though there does not appear to be any solid
authority on point, it would seem that installing a program on one's hard drive in
order to use it would also qualify as an "essential step"; certainly that is true of many
types of software, such as software that is distributed on multiple diskettes, operating
system software, and most Windows software, that can only be used by installing it on
a hard drive. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 649 (W.D. Wis. 1996)
("RAM copies may be essential copies of a computer program but hard drive copies are
just as essential for the effective use of today's computer software."), rev'd on other
grounds, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F.
Supp. 2d 1218, 1229 (D. Utah 1997) ("Since owners, without restriction, may copy
software onto the hard drive of their computers or into temporary memory, copyright
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1
In other contexts, particularly those involving proprietary
systems that are provided to business customers, the hardware may
be either sold or leased. If the hardware is sold, the purchaser owns a
copy of the software in the form of the hardware itself, and may avail
itself of the privileges provided by sections 109(a) and 117(a).227 If it
is leased, the lessee is not an owner of the copy, and those privileges
therefore do not apply.
A case that should have been resolved on this ground, but was
not, is MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.228 The court held
that defendant Peak, an independent computer service provider,
infringed the reproduction right of MAI, the copyright owner of
software, when its technician turned on a computer on which the
software was installed, loading the software into the computer's
random access memory.229 The court found that the section 117(a)
privilege was unavailable: "[s]ince MAI licensed its software, the
Peak customers do not qualify as 'owners' of the software and are not
eligible for protection under § 117."230 However, MAI supplied the
software as part of a hardware/software system, and the district
infringement would not result if the end-user is the 'owner."'), vacated in part due to
parties' settlement, 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999); Robert A. Kreiss, Comment, Section
117 of the Copyright Act, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1497, 1523-25 (1991). Having made such
a copy on the hard drive, the computer user is subject to section 117(b), which provides
that such a copy "may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy
from which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer
of all rights in the program." Thus, the user may sell her computer, with software
installed on the hard drive, only if she also sells the installation diskettes and any
archival copies she made from them. Since the user will, as I argue, almost invariably
be the owner of the diskettes, she is free to sell them without implicating the software
publisher's public distribution right.
227. See Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments Co., 922 F. Supp. 299,
315-16 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (purchaser of laser eye-surgery equipment, with embedded
software, was owner of the copy of the software, i.e. the equipment itself, and therefore
was privileged by section 117(a) to turn on the machine and load the software into
RAM); Synergistic Techs., Inc. v. IDB Mobile Communications, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 24,
29 (D.D.C. 1994) (company that purchased a system, consisting of hardware and
software, for interacting with communications satellites is the owner of a copy of the
software for purposes of section 117(a)).
Some hardware/software suppliers have asserted that a subsequent purchaser of the
hardware must purchase its own license, for which they might demand $15,000, to use
the software installed on it-much to the dismay of those who pick up used hardware
at a bargain price, only to discover that the vendor refuses to enter a maintenance
agreement unless the software is relicensed. See Ed Foster, The Hidden Cost of
Hardware, INFOWORLD, Aug. 8, 2003, available at www.infoworld.com/article/
03/08/08/31FEfairl.html.
228. 991 F.2d 511, 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
229. Id. at 519.
230. Id. at 518 n.5.
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court found that MAI sold the hardware to its customers.231 As owner
of the hardware on which the software was installed, the customer
was owner of a copy of the software. As such, the customer was
entitled under section 117(a) to authorize Peak's service technician to
make a copy of the software in RAM, as an "essential step" in using
the program. 232
The Federal Circuit made the same mistake in DSC
Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc.233 DSC
provided its telephone company customers ("RBOCs") with
equipment for routing telephone calls, consisting of hardware and
software components.234 The infringement issue turned on whether
the RBOCs were owners of the copies of that software, and therefore
entitled to the prerogatives granted by section 117(a).235 To resolve
the ownership issue, the court looked at the terms of the license
agreements governing the software component of the transaction. It
focused in particular on a provision stating that "[a]ll rights, title and
interest in the Software are and shall remain with seller, subject,
however, to a license to Buyer to use the Software," and on other
provisions that, as it found, "severely limit the rights of the RBOCs
with respect to the... software in ways that are inconsistent with
the rights normally enjoyed by owners of copies of software."236 Based
on these contractual limitations on the RBOCs' authority to use the
231. The district court's findings of fact state:
5. MAI is a company which previously manufactured and sold a line of
minicomputers .... Thousands of these machines were sold and many
remain in active use.
6. MAI continues to provide supplies and services to the purchasers of these
machines ....
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., Civ. A. No. CV 92-1654-R, 1992 WL 159803, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part, dismissed in part, 991 F.2d 511
(9th Cir. 1993).
232. MAI's license agreement forbade the customer to authorize a non-MAI repair
person to access the software:
12. MArs license agreements for its operating system and diagnostic
software restrict the use of the software. A sample operating software license
provides, regarding access, that "customer may give access to the initial
software only to the following: (i) bona fide employees of customers who
agree to be bound by these terms and conditions; (ii) representatives of MAI;
and (iii) others authorized by MAI in writing."
Id. at *2. But this statement cannot overcome section 117 and render the customer's
authorization of a Peak repair person to load the software into RAM a copyright
infringement. At most the license language could give rise to a breach-of-contract
action; but as discussed below, see infra Part II, there is a good argument that the
contract claim would be preempted.
233. 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
234. Id. at 1359.
235. Id. at 1359-60.
236. Id. at 1361.
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computer program, the court concluded that the RBOCs were not
owners of the software copies.237
In this analysis, the court confused the copyrighted work of
authorship, a computer program, with the material object on which it
is distributed. The material object was the nonvolatile storage
medium that was part of the hardware component of what DSC
supplied to the RBOCs. The agreements governing DSC's provision of
the hardware/software system specifically provided that the RBOCs
acquired title to the hardware.238 Therefore, the RBOCs perforce
acquired title to the only "copy" of the software at issue in the case. 239
The court's confusion is further evidenced by the fact that it
reached the opposite conclusion with respect to other copies of the
software that co-defendant Pulse purchased. As to these copies, the
court explained: "[Pulse] obtained its Litespan systems on the open
market. It was thus an owner of those systems and the associated
software."240 But Pulse's purchase of the systems "on the open
market" does not distinguish its ownership status from that of the
RBOCs. Both Pulse and the RBOCs were owners of the hardware,
which is the "copy"; and both were licensees, not owners, of the
software.
237. Id. at 1362.
238. "Two of the agreements also contain clauses that provide for the passage of
title to all the material transferred from DSC to the RBOCs, except for the software."
Id. at 1361.
239. On nearly identical facts, the Fifth Circuit made nearly the identical error. See
Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999).
Again on similar facts, another court held that the possessor of the telephone
switching equipment was the owner of the copies of the software. Telecomm Technical
Servs., Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Communications, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1325 (N.D.
Ga. 1998). The court relied on the facts that the transaction in which the switches
were acquired involved a single payment, and that the "license is granted for the life of
the system." Id. While the result is correct, the reasoning is faulty. As in DSC
Communications Corp., the possessor of the switch was indubitably the owner of the
hardware component of the switch. Since the switch was the sole instantiation of the
software, the hardware owner was the owner of the software copy. The duration of the
license, and the payment plan, are irrelevant.
Yet another case in which the court missed the point in analyzing ownership in the
context of a hardware/software system is Applied Information Management., Inc. v.
Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Plaintiff provided defendant with a "custom
computer system" consisting of both hardware and software. Id. at 151. Plaintiff
acknowledged that it sold the hardware to defendant, but argued that defendant was
not owner of the software for purposes of section 117 because it did not sell but only
licensed the software. Id. at 154. The court held that there was a triable issue of fact as
to whether defendant owned a copy of the software. Id. at 155. However, since
defendant was concededly owner of the computer, and the software was installed on
the computer, defendant was owner of the copy: namely, the computer itself.
240. DSC Communications Corp., 170 F.3d at 1363.
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D. Two methods that software publishers may use effectively to
limit end users'prerogatives with respect to software copies
As the discussion above demonstrates, in the most common types
of software transactions the end user typically becomes the owner of
a copy of the software, and is therefore entitled to the benefits of the
first-sale doctrine, section 109(a) of the Copyright Act, and the
special rules applying to software copies, section 117(a) of that Act.
This is so, as a general matter, even if the software publisher
employs any of three strategies: (1) a provision in the license
agreement accompanying the transaction declaring that the
publisher retains title to the software, or that the software is
licensed, not sold; (2) a provision in an agreement with a distributor
that authorizes the distributor to supply copies of the software only
to specified categories of buyers, or under specified circumstances; or
(3) a notice attached to the software copy that purports to bind any
possessor of it.
This is not to say, however, that it is impossible for a software
publisher to allow others to use its products while preventing the
user from obtaining ownership of the material object on which the
software is distributed. In fact, a software publisher may avail itself
of at least two methods of making its software available without
transferring ownership of any copy of the software, thereby avoiding
entering into a first sale that cuts off its distribution right. Those
methods are (1) conveying to the acquirer only temporary possession
of the copy, through a lease or other bailment; and (2) conveying
nothing but access to the software as it resides on the publisher's
networked servers.
1. The software publisher may bail, rather than sell, the
software copies
In a bailment, the owner of the bailed property retains
ownership of it, while the recipient acquires only temporary rightful
possession. The most common form of bailment in commercial
settings is the lease.241 As discussed above,242 a lease differs from a
241. Bailments of information goods other than leases are also possible. In Picker
International Corp. v. Imaging Equipment Services, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 18 (D. Mass.
1995), affd sub nom. Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Leavitt, 94 F.3d 640 (1st Cir. 1996), a
manufacturer of computed tomography scanners sold its machines to end users, but
did not sell them the service manuals. Id. at 24-25. Because the manuals were very
bulky and were customized for each installation, the manufacturer stored a set of
manuals at the site where each scanner was installed. Id. at 25. The court found that
storage of the manuals at the customer's site was "a bailment rather than a transfer of
ownership," id. at 40, making the customer's attempt to sell them an infringing
distribution. Id. at 41. In Little, Brown & Co. v. American Paper Recycling Corp., 824
F. Supp. 11 (D. Mass. 1993), publisher Little, Brown & Co. ("Little, Brown") contracted
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sale in that a lessee must relinquish possession of the good during its
useful life, while a purchaser is entitled to perpetual possession. If
the software publisher only leases and does not sell its software
copies, an acquirer does not become the "owner" of the copy and is not
entitled to the rights granted by sections 109(a) and 117(a).243
What would a software publisher have to do to implement this
approach? As the discussion above indicates,44 it would not be
sufficient merely to declare in the license agreement: "Copies of the
software provided under this agreement are leased, not sold." For
there to be a true lease, the software publisher would have to require
the end user to return possession of the software copies at the end of
the lease term. If the acquirer gets to keep the CD-ROMs
indefinitely, the transaction is a sale, regardless of how the
transaction is characterized in the license agreement or elsewhere.245
with American Paper Recycling ("APR") to dispose of unwanted copies of its books, by
recycling them. Id. at 13. Instead of destroying the books itself, APR sold several
batches of these books to another recycler, which sold them to another recycler, which
sold them to a distributor, and ultimately, the books were sold intact as books rather
than as waste paper. Id. at 14. The court found that Little, Brown had not sold the
books to APR, but rather had bailed them, and had contracted with APR to perform
the service of destroying them. Id. at 16-17. The court concluded that APR had both
breached its contract with Little, Brown (to destroy the books and certify their
destruction) and had infringed Little, Brown's distribution right by selling the books.
Id. at 17. See also Stein & Day Inc. v. Red Letter Books, Inc., 1984 Copyright L. Dec.
(CCH) 25,728, at 19,243, 19,246 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (default judgment) (finding that
defendants who agreed to transport approximately 16,000 books to a paper recycler for
destruction, but instead sold them, infringed the publisher's distribution right, as no
first sale had taken place).
242. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
243. This is provided explicitly in section 109(d): "[tlhe privileges prescribed by
subsections (a) and (c) do not, unless authorized by the copyright owner, extend to any
person who has acquired possession of the copy or phonorecord from the copyright
owner, by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it." 17
U.S.C. § 109(d).
The idea of leasing software is not a new one. In the 1960s, some software was
leased, rather than sold, for the specific purpose of enabling the software publisher to
retain title to the software copy, and thereby avoid application of the first-sale
doctrine. See Luanne James Johnson, A View from the 1960s: How the Software
Industry Began, 20 IEEE ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING 36, 38-39 (1998).
244. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
245. Movie studios have implemented such a system for the distribution of their
films. In United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1977), the court held
that there had been no first sale of reels of movie film, where the agreements
governing transfer of the films "reserved title to the films in the studios and required
their return at the expiration of the license period." See also United States v. Drebin,
557 F.2d 1316, 1326-28 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that the first-sale doctrine did not
apply because the agreements transferred only limited rights). These films were not
distributed through normal retailing channels, but through a procedure involving
rentals and loans. See Rice, supra note 209, at 167-69.
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This rule creates several practical problems in the context of
mass-marketed consumer software. First, it would be very costly for
software publishers to attempt to round up all those floppies at the
end of the lease term, and consumers who had their disks taken
away would be none too pleased. On the other hand, if the lessor
routinely ignored this requirement and failed to take action against
lessees who did not return their copies, it is likely that courts would
deem the transaction to be a sale.
Second, the lease agreement would have to specify the duration
of the lease, and the duration would have to be something less than
the expected useful life of the software.246 Again, consumer resistance
is to be expected.247
Third, a lease implemented through a stream of recurring
payments would be expensive to administer-as IBM discovered
when it first unbundled its software from its hardware in 1969.248
Fourth, implementing a true leasing program using a chain of
distribution would also require software publishers to redefine their
relationships with retailers. Either the publisher, or the retailer,
would have to be the lessor. If the former, the retailers would have to
be set up as the publisher's agents.249 If the latter, retailers would
need permission from the publisher to engage in software rental. If
the software publisher deals directly with the end user, this
246. A license agreement specifying the license term as fifty years, such as in the
form agreement in 2 RODITTI, supra note 82, FM 8.10-4, at 8-318, would tend to
establish that the transaction is a sale, not a lease.
247. Prior to enactment of the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990,
the software rental industry, while extant, was not a thriving one. See Corsello, supra
note 45, at 198-99. Although market conditions in the software industry have no doubt
evolved significantly in the intervening years, this experience offers at least some
support for the intuition that any attempt by software publishers to lease rather than
sell their software would encounter resistance in the mass market.
248. IBM initially offered the software under a lease arrangement, requiring
payment of monthly fees, but found this program infeasible due to high collection
costs. It therefore adopted "paid-up licenses," which required only a single payment.
See Watts S. Humphrey, Software Unbundling: A Personal Perspective, 24 IEEE
ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING 59, 60-61 (2002). IBM pursued an analogous strategy in
connection with its computers, renting and not selling them, until in 1956 the U.S.
Justice Department compelled IBM to change its practices. For an argument that the
purpose of IBM's rent-only strategy (as well as of similar strategies pursued by United
Shoe Machinery and Xerox) was to eliminate the secondary market in its products, see
Michael Waldman, Eliminating the Market for Secondhand Goods: An Alternative
Explanation for Leasing, 40 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1997).
249. Some movie rental stores rent computer programs in the form of game
cartridges. Rental of video games falls within a statutory exception from the
prohibition against commercial rental of computer programs. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(b)(1)(B)(ii) ('CThis subsection does not apply to... a computer program embodied
in or used in conjunction with a limited purpose computer that is designed for playing
video games ... ").
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complication would be avoided, at the cost to the publisher of
developing an in-house direct distribution capability.
It should be recalled that the Computer Software Rental
Amendments Act of 1990 was enacted in response to software
publishers' unhappiness with the then-extant software rental
market. In the absence of foolproof technology for preventing the
unauthorized copying of software programs, or a substantial change
in market conditions, software publishers are unlikely to consider it
in their interest to implement a revival of the prior regime. In view of
these considerations, leasing is unlikely to be an attractive option for
software publishers in the context of mass-marketed consumer
software.
Leasing software copies may be more feasible in the context of
business-to-business transactions, where the dollar amount involved
in the transaction justifies the additional costs of processing
recurring payments and collecting the disks at the end of the lease
term. Likewise, when the software publisher provides the software as
part of a hardware/software combination (or licenses another to do
so), and the system is customized for a business user, a true leasing
arrangement may be feasible. If the hardware is leased, and the only
copy of the software is the hardware itself (or the system includes
copies on separate media that are included in the lease of the
system), then the user does not become the owner of a copy.
2. The software publisher may refrain from providing any
copies
In a networked environment, a software publisher can enable
customers to use its software without providing any copies of that
software. The person providing such a service, which may be either
the software publisher or some other authorized party, is known as
an "application service provider," or "ASP." The software application
that does the job required by the customer resides on the ASP's
computers; the customer never gets possession of, let alone title to, a
copy of the software. The customer uses the software by shipping
data across the network to the ASP's computers. The application
residing on the ASP's computers performs some manipulation on that
data, and ships its results across the network back to the customer.
A variety of business software applications are provided on the
ASP model. For example, it is possible to set up an e-commerce
website relying nearly entirely on software provided by an ASP. The
ASP might offer software that hosts the website, operates the
shopping cart, calculates shipping costs, enables downloads of digital
goods, implements encryption, allows customers to use credit cards,
tracks sales, generates coupons, manages inventory, and performs
whatever software services are required. The e-commerce website
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operator never sees a disk containing any of the software, and no
software resides on the operator's computers. The software
applications that perform all of these tasks reside on the ASP's
servers. One ASP offers such a turnkey package for ninety-seven
dollars a month, terminable at any time.250 Alternatively, the e-
commerce operator may "[b]uy the software" for $5,995.251 For a
startup e-commerce company, the ASP model of obtaining the
software services it needs offers plenty of advantages. For the
software publisher, it has the additional benefit of eliminating the
possibility of a secondary market in the software.
The ASP model is nothing new. In the early days of computing,
when computer hardware was expensive, companies provided
computerized payroll-processing services on an outsourced basis, and
operated computer installations under contract. Time sharing, in
which multiple users access computing resources through dumb
terminals attached to a mainframe, is another example.252 More
recently, the ASP model has been heralded as the wave of the future,
failed to live up to expectations, and has undergone something of a
revival.253
The ASP model has not gained much traction with consumers,
other than in a few limited niches. For example, millions of
individuals use free Web-based e-mail services, like those provided
by Hotmail.com, Lycos.com, and Yahoo.com. Instead of acquiring
mail-reader software to install on their computers, the users of these
services read their mail using the browser software that already
resides on their computers. Many also use free online appointment
calendars and phone directories. Publishers of tax-preparation
software offer services on an ASP basis as an alternative to
purchasing the product on disks and running it on one's own
computer 254
The ASP model is a valuable approach for software publishers
that wish to exercise more control over their intellectual property
than is available when distributing their products on physical media.
250. Volusian, http://www.volusion.com/shopping-cart-software-smallbusiness-
solutions.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
251. Id. "Buy the software" is a phrase that presumably emanated from the
marketing department, not from the legal department. The lawyers would no doubt
make it clear that the software is licensed, not sold.
252. Thomas Haigh, Software in the 1960s as Concept, Service, and Product, 24
IEEE ANNALS HIsT. COMPUTING 5, 8 (2002).
253. Brian Livingston, Known Issues: ASP Musical Chairs, EWEEK, Jan. 19, 2004,
at 56; Brad Grimes, The At-Your-Service ASP, PC MAG., Nov. 25, 2003, at 70; Don
Clark, Renting Software Online: the Next Big Idea, WALL ST. J., Jun. 3, 2003, at B1.
254. See TurboTax for the Web, http://www.turbotax.com/tax-products/
online-products.html?ttid=ttheeader (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
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In some market segments it has proved highly successful, but its
appeal is likely to be more limited in other areas. Probably few
consumers would be willing to dial in to their Internet service
provider and access their ASP just to use a word processor or a
spreadsheet-unless perhaps they were receiving the service for free.
Concerns with privacy limit the willingness of consumers to ship
sensitive data across the network.255 It is therefore unlikely that the
ASP model can ever fully replace the existing system of software
distribution.
E. Evaluation: Is current doctrine good public policy?
As the above discussion demonstrates, existing law, properly
interpreted, makes it exceedingly difficult for software publishers to
restrict the secondary market in copies of their software products.
The expedients of leasing the software copies, and of making their
products available only on an ASP model, are available, but are not
feasible in all market segments.
This outcome does not result from any natural features of the
world, but is an artifact of the policy choices that have gone into the
construction of the Copyright Act. It would be a simple matter to
reverse the present rule, and ratify software publishers' attempts to
extend their control over copies they have sold, by adding language to
section 109(b) such as the following:
Nor may any person in possession of a particular copy of a
computer program engage in any distribution of such copy to
the public that is inconsistent with the terms of a license
agreement between such person and the copyright owner of the
distribution right with respect to that copy.
This would effectively result in the elimination of the first-sale
doctrine with respect to software copies. Would such a revision of the
statutory scheme be desirable?
I will not here address the question whether the first-sale
doctrine is in general well founded in policy. As the history of the
doctrine indicates, the rule that a copyright owner's distribution
right with respect to a particular copy is exhausted after the first
sale of the copy has its roots in nineteenth-century judicial
interpretation of the copyright laws, was enacted into positive law by
Congress both in 1909 and in 1976, and received further
congressional scrutiny in 1984 and 1990 with the enactment of
255. See Alan S. Kay, Rating the Tax Programs, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2004, at F7
("All of these firms offer Web-only versions of their applications that run in a browser
window. But we can't recommend them, knowing the erratic state of online security;
stick to software that lives on your hard drive and keeps your personal data at
home.').
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amendments limiting the doctrine with respect to copies of computer
programs and phonorecords containing sound recordings but
retaining it otherwise.256 Given the longstanding and fundamental
status of the first-sale doctrine as a limitation on the public
distribution right, and Congress's repeated affirmations of the
general rule even while enacting exceptions to it, I will assume for
present purposes that the doctrine should as a general matter be
retained, and address only whether grounds exist for limiting further
its present limited applicability to copies of computer programs.
In what follows I first describe the differences between software
and other types of works protected by copyright that might be
thought relevant to determining the proper scope of the first-sale
doctrine. I then review the purposes that the first-sale doctrine
serves, as well as the detriments that the doctrine may be considered
256. See supra text accompanying notes 32-44. Outside the United States, the first-
sale doctrine is implemented more equivocally. The World Intellectual Property
Organization Internet treaties permit, but do not require, member countries to
implement a rule of exhaustion of the distribution right after first sale. See WIPO
Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, art. 6(2), WIPO Doc. CRNRIDC/94, available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo033en.htm; WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, arts. 8(2), 12(2), WIPO Doc. CRNRJDC/95,
available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo034en.htm.
The TRIPS Agreement requires member countries to preserve a rental right with
respect to computer programs (as does U.S. law, 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)), and to preserve
the same right as to movies if within that country "such rental has led to widespread
copying of such works which is materially impairing the exclusive right of
reproduction." Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 11, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). In other respects, TRIPS is agnostic on
exhaustion, providing "nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights." Id. at art. 6. This stance may be
attributable to the fact that TRIPS is a trade treaty, rather than a traditional
intellectual property treaty, and the protection of intellectual property rights is in
some tension with the anti-protectionist bent of trade treaties. See Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting
TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 280 n.12 (1997)
("Exhaustion, then, is one issue that could have forced the drafters of TRIPS to
consider the inconsistency between free trade and intellectual property protection.").
Within the European Union, both rental and public lending rights are preserved,
although member states may derogate from the lending right. See Council Directive
92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain
rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property, arts. 1, 5, 1992 O.J. (L
346) 61. The Information Society Directive limits member states' authority to
implement a first-sale rule, providing that a first sale outside the European
Community shall not constitute exhaustion. Directive 2001/291EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects
of copyright and related rights in the information society, art. 4(2), 2001 O.J. (L 167)
10. On the other hand, the Software Directive requires implementation of a first-sale
rule for computer programs. Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal
protection of computer programs, art. 4(c), 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42.
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to inflict while accomplishing its purposes. For each such purpose or
detriment, I then consider whether the special characteristics of
software justify removing software from the scope of the first-sale
doctrine.
My conclusion is that (1) several of the differences between
software and other types of information goods offer no basis for
further limiting or eliminating applicability of the first-sale doctrine
to software copies, and (2) other differences offer some support for
differential treatment of software, but depend ultimately on the
resolution of empirical issues that cannot be addressed in the
abstract.
1. Special characteristics of software
Many different types of intellectual creations, with widely
varying characteristics, are within the subject matter of copyright-
among them works of literature, graphic art, music, performances of
musical works, dance, architectural works, and computer programs.
Is there anything in the nature of software, in the structure of the
current market for software, or in the current technology of its use,
that calls for a reconsideration of whether the first-sale doctrine
should be further narrowed in its application to software, or
eliminated?
Several features of software might be thought relevant. First, as
with certain other types of information goods that are stored in
digital formats, software can be copied at low cost and with
essentially no degradation in quality, and can be transmitted cheaply
and almost instantaneously across digital networks. These
characteristics are widely viewed as facilitating unauthorized
copying of copyrighted works in digital formats,257 a concern reflected
in policy studies,258 copyright treaties,29 implementation of
technological protection measures, 260 and congressional action.261 The
257. This view is debatable. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination,
Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845,
881-82 (1997) (noting that sharing of hard-copy materials, like books and magazines,
is easier than sharing of digital materials, and that technological measures are
available to control the latter but not the former).
258. See, e.g., INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 177-200 (1995).
259. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 256, at arts. 11-12; WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 256, at arts. 18-19 (both requiring
member states to forbid circumvention of technological protections of protected works,
and to forbid tampering with copyright management information). Congress has
implemented these treaty requirements in 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205.
260. Movies recorded on DVDs are protected against unauthorized copying by an
encryption technology called the Content Scramble System. The movie studios have
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absence of degradation from copying means that a copy, licit or illicit,
has nearly the same use value as the original.
Second, software copies do not wear out through use to the
extent that some more traditional media for copyrighted expression
do. Books, magazines, and newspapers that are passed from hand to
hand get torn, lose their bindings, and fade. Celluloid film
disintegrates over time. Software should, in principle, not deteriorate
at all through use; and while floppy diskettes are subject to
mechanical failure and demagnetization, and CD-ROMs and DVDs
can deteriorate,262 it is cheap and easy to make and use backup
copies of these media, and preserve the original in pristine condition.
This extended physical life means that software may remain in active
use longer than other media used for copyrighted expression.
Moreover, no matter how much wear and tear the floppy diskette or
CD-ROM has endured, as long as the disk is still operable the
functionality of the software is identical to that of a disk fresh out of
the shrinkwrap; the pixels on the monitor do not show any signs of
the use that has been made of the disk.
Third, the technological complexity of software makes it feasible
to distribute copies in different versions.263 For example, a software
program can be released in "basic," "deluxe," and "premier" editions,
with the enhanced versions offering the same basic functionality but
adding bells and whistles, and costing progressively more.264
Software can also be released in an advertising-supported version,
and an otherwise-identical version without advertising, the latter
costing more.265 Versioning is possible with other media types as
brought several lawsuits against promoters of technology that disables the CSS. See
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 340-41 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), affd, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding defendants liable for posting on their
website software code that allows one to bypass the CSS, and for linking to other
websites that post the code); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321 Studios, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d
2023, 2024 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (entering preliminary injunction against company that
produced software allowing copying of DVDs).
261. See, e.g., Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (requiring
implementation of technology that prevents serial copying of works recorded on digital
audio tape media).
262. See Peter Svensson, CD and DVD Owners Finding Techno-Rot, WASH. POST,
May 11, 2004, at C10 (noting that "optical discs, including DVDs, may be a lot less
long-lived than first thought").
263. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 93, at 53-81.
264. Software publisher Intuit follows this strategy with its TurboTax line of tax-
preparation products. See Intuit, http://www.intuit.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
Zone Labs offers a free basic version, and a more capable paid version, of its
ZoneAlarm firewall software. See Zone Labs, http://www.zonelabs.com (last visited
Jan. 31, 2005).
265. Qualcomm does this with its Eudora e-mail client program. Qualcomm, Eudora
6.1: Three Modes, http://eudora.com/emaillmodes (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
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well: for example, book publishers first release an expensive
hardback edition, and only later a cheaper paperback edition. But the
technology of software offers more possibilities, and more fine tuning,
in versioning.
Fourth, the medium through which software is distributed is
very inexpensive in comparison with the value of the program
inscribed on it. The price of software ranges from a few dollars to
hundreds of dollars or more. The CD-R disks on which the software is
distributed are available at retail for twenty-five cents or less. The
fat, printed user's manual that used to accompany software is now
typically delivered in electronic form, as a PDF file on the
distribution disk itself. Packaging, which may be simple or elaborate,
adds to the cost.
2. Purposes of the first-sale doctrine
Several justifications for the first-sale doctrine may be advanced.
First, the first-sale doctrine serves to limit the scope of the
copyright grant, implementing Congress's policy judgment that once
a copyright owner has sold (or authorized sale of) a particular copy, it
has derived all the revenue attributable to distribution of that copy to
which it is entitled.266 The conventional, instrumentalist
justification267 for granting authors the set of rights that constitute
copyright is that without such a grant authors will lack the incentive
to bring forth the creative output that society deems optimal.
However, the grant of copyright comes at a cost: the copyright owner
is able to price access to his creations at a level above the marginal
cost of providing that access, with the result that some potential
users are priced out of the market, thus limiting the benefits that
accrue to the public.268 The task of the legislator, therefore, is to
calibrate the rights included within copyright so as to provide
266. See cases cited supra note 59.
267. The chief rival to the instrumentalist justification, honored in this country
more in the breach than in the observance, but taken more seriously elsewhere, is the
concept of author's rights, according to which an author has certain moral rights to
control the disposition of her intellectual creations merely by virtue of her creation of
them. See Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under
the Berne Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 1203, 1205 (2002) (discussing moral rights).
268. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283, 292-93 (1996); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1700-03 (1988). The classic statement of the
opposing interests is from Macaulay, who characterized copyright as "a tax on readers
for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers." THOMAS MACAULAY, Speech on
Copyright I, in 17 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF LORD MACAULAY 235, 243 (1900)
(speech delivered Feb. 5, 1841).
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authors269 with just enough economic incentive to create-but not
any more than that.
Second, the first-sale doctrine tends to promote the public's
access to copies of copyrighted works. It does this in several ways.
First, it allows retailers and other distributors to set their own prices
for copies of copyrighted works, competing for customers on price. 270
In fact, the Supreme Court's first recognition of the doctrine came in
a case involving a retailer that sold a copyrighted book at less than
the price that the publisher ordained.271 Second, it promotes access to
copyrighted works by permitting the operation of a secondary
market. Some potential users may be unwilling to pay the price that
retailers charge for new copies, but willing to pay a lower amount to
buy a used copy on the secondary market. The existence of a
secondary market also promotes access by a person who buys the
item new, since she can sell the item when she is finished with it and
thereby lower her effective cost of use.272 The secondary market also
limits the vendors' pricing power, since they must compete with used
copies of their own products.273 Third, it allows copies of certain types
of copyrighted works to be rented, which can make them available for
temporary use at a price significantly lower than the purchase
price.274 Stores that rent movies and computer games are the most
familiar example. The rule also allows public libraries to make books,
269. The publisher and distributors of copies of a copyrighted work are usually, in
commercial contexts, not the same person as the author of the work. A book author, for
example, will typically assign his copyright in the literary work to a publisher, which
publishes the book and distributes it through distributors and retailers. The author
therefore does not receive directly the revenues generated from sales of his books.
However, the author's initial ownership of the copyright is what enabled him to
require the publisher to pay him some form of compensation, typically in the form of
royalties, in exchange for the right to publish the book. See Stephen Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 292 (1970) (noting that normally, an author grants a
publisher an exclusive license to publish her book). The broader the property right that
the copyright laws grant to the author, the greater the publisher's expected return
from acquiring that right, and therefore the more the publisher should be willing to
pay for the copyright ex ante. Therefore, broadening the rights conveyed by copyright,
such as by eliminating the first-sale doctrine, should, according to economic theory,
result in higher compensation to the author. Whether it has this result in practice will
depend upon market conditions.
270. See Reese, supra note 43, at 585; SECTION 104 REPORT, supra note 85, at 21
("[C]ompetition policy is viewed as one of the underlying bases for the first sale
doctrine.").
271. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
272. See Reese, supra note 43, at 586-87.
273. See Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination:
Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1389 (1998) ("Under the First
Sale Doctrine, there are many sources for books and cassettes, and many prices.").
274. Reese, supra note 43, at 587-88.
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movies, music CDs, and software available for borrowing at no
charge.275
Third, the first-sale doctrine implements the common law
principle that restraints on free disposition of one's property are
disfavored.276 The rationale for this principle is not entirely clear,277
but in application to personal property the chief justification seems to
be that it promotes the goal of achieving economic efficiency by
allowing goods to flow to their highest-value uses.278 If the person
who owns a good is permitted to sell it to another who values it more
highly, the welfare of both is increased.279 A restraint on alienation,
such as the public distribution right in the absence of the first-sale
rule, prevents such welfare-enhancing transfers, or at least vests in
the copyright owner the right to control such transfers.
Fourth, the first-sale doctrine is an application to information
goods of the rule of free alienability that is sometimes identified with
the concept of ownership of property of all types, 2s0 and that has a
longstanding grounding in the common law.
275. See id. at 588-90 (noting that there is no direct charge for borrowing, though
there may be indirect charges in the form of taxes or membership fees).
276. See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1096
(3d Cir. 1988) ("The first sale rule is statutory, but finds its origins in the common law
aversion to limiting the alienation of personal property."); H.R. REP. NO. 98-987, at 2
(1984) ("The first sale doctrine has its roots in the English common law rule against
restraints on alienation of property.").
277. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS, Part I, at 8
(1981) ('The basis or justification for the assumption that social welfare requires the
imposition of restrictions upon the interference with the alienation of property has
never been adequately explored and has been seldom discussed.").
278. See Liu, supra note 75, at 1291 ("Under the common law, such restraints were
generally disfavored because they hindered the free exchange of property and its
eventual transfer to its most socially productive uses."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROP., supra note 277, Part I, at 9 (stating that a rule restricting interference with
alienation of property "probably contributes to the increased use of the wealth of
society"); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 37-38 (5th ed. 1998)
(explaining how transferability of property rights maximizes property's value).
279. POSNER, supra note 278, at 38.
280. See Sexton v. Wheaton, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 100, 106 (1823) ("It would seem to
be a consequence of that absolute power which a man possesses over his own property,
that he may make any disposition of it which does not interfere with the existing
rights of others, and such disposition, if it be fair and real, will be valid."); Harrison v.
Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1894) ("[T]he copy having been
absolutely sold to him, the ordinary incidents of ownership in personal property,
among which is the right of alienation, attach to it."); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 304 (1985) ("The conception
of property includes the exclusive rights of possession, use, and disposition."). But see
MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 102 (1993) (criticizing the
argument that free alienability is inherent to the nature of ownership as "timeless
conservative conceptualism.").
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3. Detriments attributable to the first-sale doctrine
From the standpoint of copyright owners, the first-sale doctrine
has several drawbacks.
First, and most obviously, the first-sale rule likely results in the
sale of fewer copies. When the purchaser of a book sells it on the
secondary market, two people get the use of it, but the publisher
makes only a single sale. While some of those secondary purchasers
perhaps would not have bought the book at full price, others would.
Second, the first-sale rule makes it more difficult for vendors of
information goods to engage in price discrimination. Price
discrimination is the practice of charging different purchasers
different prices for a particular good or service, based on the strength
of each purchaser's demand for it.281 The economist's downward-
sloping demand curve reflects the fact that some people are willing to
pay more than others for a particular item. A vendor will maximize
its profits if it charges each purchaser the highest amount that she is
willing to pay, thereby capturing all of the surplus that would
otherwise accrue to purchasers in the form of the gap between what
each purchaser is willing to pay and what she is charged.2s2 This
pricing strategy can expand the market for the item, since setting a
uniform price means that potential users who value it at less than
that price will not acquire it.283
To make this strategy work, the vendor must have a way of
determining (or at least approximating) the willingness to pay of
each prospective purchaser, and must have sufficient market power
so that competition among vendors does not push the price down to
marginal cost.284 The determination of willingness to pay is
commonly accomplished through a rough approximation, by
segmenting purchasers into two or more subgroups based on their
perceived demand for the item, gauged on the basis of how much
value each purchaser is expected to derive from it.285
But price discrimination can work only if the vendor is able to
prevent arbitrage: that is, the vendor must prevent those who
purchase the item at a low price from turning around and reselling it
281. See Meurer, supra note 257, at 869.
282. See Fisher, supra note 50, at 1238 (diagramming the economic effect of price
discrimination).
283. Id. at 1238-39.
284. See Meurer, supra note 257, at 870.
285. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing
the practice of segmenting purchasers into commercial users and personal users, and
charging the former a higher price). For a discussion of various methods of
determining willingness to pay, see Meurer, supra note 257, at 871-74.
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to those from whom the vendor is seeking to extract a higher price.286
The most effective form of arbitrage control would be a device that
causes the item to be useless in the hands of anyone but the original
purchaser. This can be accomplished quite successfully with certain
types of services. For example, airlines are able to classify customers
as either business or casual travelers, and to make the former pay
more by setting higher prices for last-minute purchases and
refundable tickets. Casual travelers are unable to make their seats
available to business travelers because the ticket is valid only when
used by the original purchaser. Sellers of goods, however, generally
find it much more difficult to control arbitrage, since it is not usually
feasible to make a good lose its value when transferred from the
original purchaser to another.287
If the distribution right were unrestricted by the first-sale
doctrine, it would constitute a potent tool for controlling arbitrage,
since the copyright owner could deny the first purchaser permission
to transfer it publicly to someone else. Under the first-sale doctrine,
that power to control distribution is exhausted once a sale is made to
the original purchaser. Therefore, if one believes price discrimination
with respect to information goods is desirable,288 the first-sale
doctrine must be accounted as a detriment to the extent it interferes
with application of this strategy.
The third sort of detriment that might be assigned to the first-
sale doctrine is that it promotes infringement of copyright through
the making of unauthorized reproductions. If the owner of a copy of
an information good may freely and publicly transfer it to another,
she gains an incentive to make an unauthorized copy: she can keep
the copy, continuing to derive value from it, while selling the
original, getting back at least a portion of her purchase price. If, on
286. Fisher, supra note 50, at 1236-37.
287. In Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research International, Inc., 523
U.S. 135, 145 (1998), the Court made it more difficult for publishers to control
arbitrage consisting of importation into the United States of copies manufactured
domestically, but first sold abroad, holding that the first-sale doctrine is applicable to
such copies. Publishers of textbooks that sell their books in foreign countries for much
less than they sell them domestically are battling against such arbitrage through some
of the strategies discussed above: imposing contractual restrictions on their foreign
distributors' right to resell, and placing a legend on the books stating "Not for Sale in
North America." See Tamar Lewin, Students Find $100 Textbooks Cost $50, Purchased
Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2003, at Al.
288. The proposition is a debatable one. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the
Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1801-08 (2000) (arguing that the price
discrimination model is not necessarily more efficient than the traditional copyright
framework at encouraging distribution and creative output); Gordon, supra note 273,
at 1386-89 (arguing that increased competition may yield greater benefits than price
discrimination).
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the other hand, her public distribution is itself an infringement, she
will hesitate to do so for fear of finding herself a defendant in an
infringement action, and will find fewer avenues for gaining by
copying-and-resale. Preventing unauthorized copying was the stated
goal of the 1984 and 1990 amendments to the Copyright Act, which
granted copyright owners control over commercial rental of software
copies and sound recordings.2s9
4. Relation between the first-sale doctrine and the special
characteristics of software
We may now consider whether any of the special characteristics
of software, discussed above in Part I(E)(1), justify reconsideration of
the applicability of the first-sale doctrine to software, in light of the
purposes of the doctrine, Part I(E)(2), and the detriments that may
be thought to flow from it, Part I(E)(3).
Setting the correct level of compensation. The first of the
justifications for the first-sale doctrine is that it is one element of
setting the "correct" level of compensation that the copyright owner
receives in exercising his rights. Congress's determination,
implemented by the first-sale doctrine, is that the copyright owner
may charge whatever the market will bear for the initial transfer of
ownership of a copy, but nothing for any subsequent transfers.290
This amounts to a division of the revenue stream generated by
successive transfers of ownership of a copy, with revenue from the
first sale going to the copyright owner, and revenue from subsequent
sales shared among the subsequent sellers. It might be argued that
in the case of software, dividing the revenue stream in this way
results in the copyright owner's retention of a smaller proportion of
total revenues than is the case with other types of copyrighted
materials. Because software copies do not degrade much in use, and
the software's functionality does not degrade at all, a used software
copy has nearly the same use value as a new copy. 29 1 Therefore, the
value to be had from a copy is not front-loaded into the first sale of it,
as with other types of information goods, but is distributed more
evenly through the entire string of first and subsequent sales.292
289. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
291. However, a software copy might be less valuable in the hands of a subsequent
user than it was to the first user, if the software publisher offers support only to the
first user, and the support is of significant value.
292. A simple example will illustrate the point. A software publisher sells a CD-
ROM containing a computer program for $100. The purchaser uses it, and then sells it
on the secondary market for $90. This is only a 10-percent discount from the new
price, but the second purchaser is willing to pay it since the used disk offers nearly 100
percent of the functionality of a new one. This means that the original purchaser has
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Several objections to this argument come to mind. First, it
assumes that the software publisher must price the software no
higher than the value that a prospective purchaser places on using
the software. But if the publisher knows there is a lively secondary
market for its products, it can raise its selling price above the value
that the product holds for its purchasers, since purchasers will
recognize that the true cost to them is the purchase price less what
they receive on resale.293 In this way, the publisher can appropriate,
through the first sale of a copy, some share of the surplus generated
in subsequent resales.294
had use of the software for a net cost of only $10. The first-sale doctrine prevents the
software publisher from sharing in the surplus enjoyed by the first purchaser: namely,
the difference between the $10 that he paid, and the $100 that use of the software is
presumably worth to him (assuming that the vendor has accurately priced the
software at the purchaser's valuation of it). The publisher's share of that surplus, if it
could be appropriated, would be in the range of $0 to $90, depending on market
conditions.
Now consider a book publisher that sells a book for $100. The purchaser sells it used
for $50. This is a 50-percent reduction from the original price, which is all a second
purchaser is willing to pay, since the book has deteriorated in use and is therefore not
as appealing; unlike the second purchaser of the software, the second purchaser of the
book would rather pay $100 for a new item than $90 for a used one. The first-sale
doctrine therefore takes less of a bite out of the book publisher's potential distribution
revenues: it loses only a share of the difference between the net $50 that the first
purchaser paid, and the $100 that the book was worth to him, something in the range
of $0 to $50.
293. See Peter L. Swan, Alcoa: The Influence of Recycling on Monopoly Power, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 76, 78 (1980). Returning to the example from the preceding footnote, the
software publisher might sell its product for $200 instead of $100. The first purchaser
is willing to pay $200, even though he values use of the software at only $100, because
he expects to be able to sell the disk for $180, representing 90 percent of its original
purchase price. The first purchaser is happy, since he has paid $20 net for use of
software he valued at $100. The second purchaser is also happy, because he got the
software for $20 less than if he had bought it new, and he expects to sell it for
something close to his purchase price, so his net cost of ownership will be much less
than the value he derives from it.
294. Analogous premises lead to the conclusion that under certain circumstances
the publisher of an information good may earn higher profits under a regime that
allows small-scale private copying than under one that prohibits such copying. The
publisher in effect uses consumers as distribution agents, and makes money by
charging more for the initial copy in the expectation that several users will derive
value from it. See Stanley M. Besen & Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Private Copying,
Appropriability, and Optimal Copying Royalties, 32 J.L. & ECON. 255, 264-72 (1989);
see also Meurer, supra note 257, at 880-81 (noting that when copying occurs
publisher's reduced revenues are partly offset by reduced distribution costs). Where
the marginal cost of sharing is negligibly low, as it might be in the case of digital
copies that are transmitted via the network, the publisher may still be better off under
conditions of small-scale copying, as aggregation of several users' demand curves
facilitates the publisher's price discrimination. See Yannis Bakos et al., Shared
Information Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117, 123-27 (1999).
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Second, the argument assumes that the useful economic life of a
computer program is the same as that of other information goods.
But it is the rare consumer software title that has a useful life of
more than a few years. A particular copy may degrade in market
value very quickly, as it is superseded by a newer version, as the
medium falls out of fashion (5 4 -inch floppy diskettes are of little
value to anyone given the near disappearance of drives capable of
reading them), or as the operating system it was written for fades
away (how much would you pay for a copy of Lotus 1-2-3 for OS/2?).
By contrast, a classic piece of literature may have a useful life lasting
hundreds of years, or (we may speculate) perpetually.295 To the
extent software has a shorter useful life, there will be fewer
purchasers who will derive value from a particular copy, and less
surplus that fails to be captured in the publisher's first sale. On the
other hand, the shorter useful life may be more than offset by the
absence of degradation of software's functionality through continued
use. Furthermore, other types of information goods have short useful
lives. A two-week-old daily newspaper is not highly marketable, and
eight-track tapes and phonograph albums have limited market
appeal due to the scarcity of tape players and turntables.
In sum, whether the special characteristics of software prevent
software publishers from deriving the revenue from the sale of a
given copy that Congress has decreed appropriate is a complex
empirical question to which no ready answer may be supplied in the
abstract.
Promoting access. The goal of promoting access to copyrighted
works, by enabling the existence of secondary, rental, and lending
markets, and by promoting competition among vendors, seems as
applicable to software as it is to other types of information goods.
Particularly since the first-sale doctrine with respect to software has
been narrowed so as to preclude the development of a rental
market,296 further narrowing or eliminating the doctrine would
substantially interfere with the goal of access.
Economic efficiency. As is the case with other information goods,
a person who owns a copy of a computer program may value it less
highly than another person. A loss to society results if the low-
valuing owner is disabled from transferring the copy to a higher-
valuing person. But the welfare loss may be less in the case of
software than with other information goods. This is because of the
limited extent of resources bound up in a copy of software distributed
295. See Aileen Jacobson, Literary Classics Return to the Bestseller Lists, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2003, at E44 (reporting on the resurgence of widespread interest in
literary classics).
296. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2000) (prohibiting software purchasers from
renting, leasing, or lending the software for commercial advantage).
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on a CD-ROM, floppy diskette, or some other low-cost material
object. Suppose, for example, that Alice owns a software copy, for
which she no longer has any use, and therefore values it at $0. Bob
would like to own a copy of the software, which he values at $50. If
Alice sells the copy to Bob for $45, there is a total welfare increase of
$50, less the attendant transaction costs: Alice's welfare increases by
$45 less her share of the transaction costs, while Bob's increases by
$5 less his share of those costs. Now suppose that the first-sale right
is eliminated, so that Alice may not sell the copy to Bob absent
authorization from Publisher, which authorization is withheld. Bob
must then obtain his copy from Publisher. The latter, exercising price
discrimination, is willing to sell a copy to Bob at $45. The total
welfare increase is then $50, less Publisher's cost to produce the copy
to Bob, and less the attendant transaction costs: Publisher gains $45
less its production and transaction costs, while Bob gains $5 less his
transaction costs. Assume that the transaction costs in the two
scenarios are equivalent. Then moving from the first scenario, in
which the first-sale doctrine applies, to the second scenario, in which
it does not, results in a net welfare loss amounting to Publisher's cost
to produce the copy. 297
Put another way, the welfare gain attributable to applying the
first-sale doctrine to a transaction involving a particular information
good is an increasing function of the cost of producing and delivering
a copy of that good. Thus, if the cost of producing and delivering a
software copy is small in comparison to the same costs with respect
to other types of information goods, then the welfare loss resulting
from elimination of the first-sale doctrine with respect to software
copies will be correspondingly smaller, and might be outweighed by
other considerations in favor of expanding a software publisher's
control over copies of its products beyond the first sale. As suggested
above, given how cheap blank CD-ROMs are, the cost of producing
and delivering a software copy may well be low in comparison with
other information goods such as books, newspapers, and lithographic
reproductions of graphic artwork. But this is not the end of the story.
297. More generally, suppose that Alice values the software at VA, and Bob values it
at VB. Under the first scenario, in which the first-sale doctrine is in force, Alice sells
her copy to Bob for PriceA, where VA < PriceAs < VB. The attendant transaction costs
total TC. The welfare increase generated by this transaction is (VB - PriceA) + (PriceA
- VA) - TC= VB - VA - TC. Under the second scenario, without the first-sale doctrine,
Publisher sells a copy to Bob at PricepB, where MCp < PricePB < VB, and MCp
represents Publisher's marginal cost to produce a copy. If the transaction costs in this
scenario are also TC, the resulting welfare increase is (VB- PricePeB) + (PricepB - MCp)
- TC = VB - MCp - TC. The change in welfare resulting from elimination of the first-
sale doctrine is therefore (VB - MCp -TC ) - (VB - VA- TC) = VA - MCP. Assuming that
VA will in general be no different for software than for other information goods, the
effect of eliminating the first-sale doctrine depends upon the magnitude of MCp.
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There must also be considered the cost of copying the computer
program onto the disk, the cost of the packaging, and the costs of
marketing and distributing the copies. There are more empirical
questions lurking here, which do not permit an easy conclusion
whether the efficiency loss resulting from elimination of the first-sale
doctrine with respect to software copies would be small relative to
corresponding losses with respect to other types of information goods.
Inherent rights of an owner of property. If one believes that
inherent in the concept of ownership is the right to alienate one's
property at will, then one must support exhaustion of the public
distribution right after the first sale, irrespective of the type of
information good involved.
Reducing the publisher's sales. While the first-sale doctrine may
be expected to reduce the number of copies that a publisher is able to
sell, this is by hypothesis not a detriment but a gain to society as a
whole, since it implements Congress's judgment as to the "correct"
scope of the copyright grant.
Interference with price discrimination. If one believes that price
discrimination can result in welfare gains, then the first-sale doctrine
is a detriment to the extent that it encourages arbitrage, which must
be limited for price discrimination to succeed.298 There are some
reasons to believe that the encouragement of arbitrage resulting from
the first-sale doctrine is less of a problem with software than with
other types of information goods. This is because, as discussed above,
software offers built-in capacities for price discrimination, even if
purchasers are free to resell their copies. A version of software that
the publisher sells for a lower price to lower-valuing users may be a
stripped-down version that will not appeal to higher-valuing users.299
Furthermore, the publisher may confine value-added services to the
original purchaser. The complexity of software means that technical
support often adds substantial value to the product.300 A software
publisher can reduce the attractions of arbitrage by providing
technical support only to the original purchaser, as ascertained
through a registration procedure. This makes the value of a software
copy in the hands of a subsequent purchaser less, in some cases
substantially less, than in the hands of the original purchaser.
Likewise, the publisher may offer updates and bug fixes only to the
original purchaser.
Encouragement of piracy. The first-sale doctrine may be thought
298. See Meurer, supra note 257, at 870 ("Effective price [discrimination]
requires... a means to stop arbitrage by favored consumers .... ).
299. See id. at 872-73 (describing price discrimination techniques that software
publishers may use).
300. Id.
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to encourage unauthorized copying of information goods in digital
forms, including software. This may result in a reduction in sales,
and a consequent diminution of revenues that the author receives.
Once again, however, the effect on revenues of unauthorized copying
is an empirical question. While the publisher may lose sales through
substitution of unauthorized copies, this loss may be more than offset
by gains attributable to increased exposure and reduced distribution
costs. 301 Moreover, as discussed above, the software publisher may be
able to appropriate a share of the surplus generated by these
additional copies, by raising the price to reflect the fact that more
than one person will be deriving use as the result of each sale of a
copy.
F. Conclusion
As demonstrated above in Part I(C) and (D), the first-sale
doctrine, in combination with property law and the law of commercial
transactions, makes it difficult for a software publisher to exercise
control over copies of its products once those copies are in the hands
of end users. In each of the most common distribution paradigms, the
end user generally becomes an owner of the copy, and thus is freed
from the reach of the publisher's exclusive right to control public
distribution of that copy. There are modes of distribution that a
software publisher may employ to extend its control over copies even
in the hands of end users, which are likely to be feasible in some
market segments but not in others.
As the discussion in Part I(E) indicates, the normative basis for
upsetting current doctrine, and removing software from the scope of
the first-sale doctrine, is equivocal at best. There is room to argue
that the first-sale doctrine as applied to software yields less in the
way of benefits, and entails greater detriments, than it does as
applied to other information goods. However, there are also
arguments to the contrary, as well as empirical questions that make
it impossible to conclude with any confidence that present doctrine is
in need of reform.
II. RESTRAINING ALIENATION THROUGH CONTRACT
Another method that software publishers use in an effort to
prevent the development of a secondary market in software copies is
to impose contractual restrictions on the authority of an end user to
301. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 42-43 (2003) (observing that digital
technologies facilitate unauthorized copying, but offer compensations in the form of
lowered costs of production and distribution, an enlarged potential market, and
technological aids to detecting unauthorized copying).
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transfer copies of the software, by gift or sale. These contractual
restrictions appear in the license agreements that accompany
virtually all transactions involving transfers of software to end users.
An example of a contractual provision that purports to prevent
the acquirer from alienating her copy of the software is contained in
the End User License Agreement ("EULA") that accompanies
Microsoft's Windows 98 operating system software:
The SOFTWARE PRODUCT is licensed with the HARDWARE
as a single integrated product. The SOFTWARE PRODUCT
may only be used with the HARDWARE as set forth in this
EULA.
Software Product Transfer. You may permanently transfer all
of your rights under this EULA only as part of a permanent
sale or transfer of the HARDWARE, provided you retain no
copies, you transfer all of the SOFTWARE PRODUCT
(including all component parts, the media and printed
materials, any upgrades, this EULA and, if applicable, the
Certificate(s) of Authenticity), and the recipient agrees to the
terms of this EULA.
Thus, it is a violation of the EULA to give or sell your copy of
Windows 98 to someone else, if that person will use it on a personal
computer other that the one with which it was sold as a bundle.302
As I show below, contractual restrictions on the transfer of a
material object containing a computer program are generally
unenforceable, because state contract law is preempted by the
Copyright Act to the extent it would allow enforcement of such a
provision.
A. Preemption under the Copyright Act
The 1976 Copyright Act broke with all prior federal copyright
laws, going back to 1790, by creating a unitary regime of copyright
protection applying uniformly to both published and unpublished
works. Prior to the effective date of the 1976 Act, a dual system
prevailed. Unpublished works of authorship were protected, if at all,
by state law, generally referred to as "common-law copyright."
Common-law protection was perpetual in duration: that is, it lasted
as long as the protected work remained unpublished.
Publication of the work altered its status under both state and
federal law. Upon publication, the work lost its common-law
302. Similarly, the License Agreement accompanying Quicken 2003 Premier states:
"You may not attempt to ... assign, loan, resell for profit, [or] distribute... the Intuit
Software, Disk(s), or related materials .... "
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protection, and it might-or might not-gain federal (often referred
to as "statutory") protection. If publication of the work was
accompanied by the requisite notice, federal protection would attach;
the required notice consisted of the word "Copyright" (or sometimes
the copyright symbol, "©"), the name of the copyright owner, and the
date of publication. However, if the work was published without the
requisite notice, the work did not acquire statutory protection.
Having lost its common-law protection, and not having achieved
statutory protection, the work went into the public domain, free to
use by all.303
The 1976 Act eliminated publication as the dividing line between
state and federal protection. As of the January 1, 1978 effective date
of that Act, works of authorship are protected by federal law as soon
as they are fixed in some tangible medium, regardless of whether
they have been published.304 Common-law protection for works of
authorship thus became vestigial, limited in scope primarily to those
works that are not "fixed," such as extemporaneous and unrecorded
speeches, jazz performances, and dances.305
When it extended the scope of federal copyright to include
unpublished works, Congress decided to preempt state law to the
extent that it conflicted with the federal scheme. It accomplished this
by including in the 1976 Act an explicit preemption provision, section
301(a), which provides:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression
and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by
sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date
and whether published or unpublished, are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any
such right or equivalent right in any such work under the
common law or statutes of any State.306
The courts have distilled this provision into a two-part test,
according to which a state-law right is preempted to the extent that
it (1) is 'equivalent' to any of the exclusive rights" granted by section
303. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 233 (1990).
304. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
305. See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d
663, 675 (7th Cir. 1986).
306. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). Section 301(b) provides, redundantly, that state law is not
preempted to the extent it applies to "subject matter that does not come within the
subject matter of copyright," or to the extent it applies to "activities violating legal or
equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright." Id. § 301(b)(1), (3).
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106, and (2) is applied to a work that is fixed and comes 'within the
subject matter of copyright."'307
The "subject matter" test is usually straightforward in
application. A work is within the subject matter of copyright if it fits
in one of the categories of works enumerated in section 102(a), even if
it fails to qualify for protection under the Act, as it might if "it is too
minimal or lacking in originality to qualify, or ... it has fallen into
the public domain."308 One category of works that are clearly not
within the subject matter of copyright are those that are not fixed in
some tangible medium of expression. As noted above, state law can
continue to provide copyright-like protection to such works.
The "equivalent rights" criterion has proved more troublesome in
application. How are we to determine whether a right created by
state law is "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright as specified by section 106"?309 Numerous
courts have glossed the criterion as some variation of the following:
Equivalency exists if the right defined by state law may be
abridged by an act which in and of itself would infringe one of
the exclusive rights. Conversely, if an extra element is required
instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduction,
performance, distribution or display in order to constitute a
state-created cause of action, there is no preemption, provided
that the extra element changes the nature of the action so that
it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement
claim.310
The clearest case for application of this criterion would be to a
state law that prohibits unauthorized copying of a work of
authorship. Such a law creates a right that is violated by an act-
copying-that, "in and of itself," infringes a copyright owner's
exclusive right to reproduce the work, protected by section 106(1).31,
307. Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 288-89 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Gemcraft
Homes, Inc. v. Sumurdy, 688 F. Supp. 289, 294 (E.D. Tex. 1988)); see, e.g., Ehat v.
Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir. 1985).
308. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 131; see Baltimore Orioles, Inc., 805 F.2d at
676.
309. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
310. Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 456 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted). For similar formulations, see Lipscher v. LRP Publ'ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305,
1311-12 (11th Cir. 2001); Murray Hill Publ'ns, Inc. v. ABC Communications, Inc., 264
F.3d 622, 636 (6th Cir. 2001); Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 230 (4th
Cir. 1993); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992);
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
311. See MaIjack Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 888 (9th
Cir. 1996) (explaining that a state law that purported to prohibit copying of a music
soundtrack would be preempted) (dictum); Daboub, 42 F.3d at 289 (finding that the
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A paradigmatic example of a state law that, while applying to works
that are within the subject matter of copyright, does not protect
rights equivalent to any of the copyright owner's exclusive rights, is
the law of conversion. This is because a cause of action for conversion
requires an "extra element" beyond those acts that constitute
copyright infringement, namely depriving a chattel's owner of
possession or use of the chattel;312 and that element makes a
conversion claim "qualitatively different from a copyright
infringement claim."313 Thus, a state law giving an author a cause of
action to recover a stolen literary manuscript would not be
preempted.314
The rationale behind preemption of state laws that protect rights
equivalent to those protected by the federal copyright laws is not
hard to discern. The federal scheme of copyright is carefully
calibrated to effectuate an appropriate balance among the various
interests involved. Granting authors the copyright in their works
benefits the public generally, but at a cost. Through exercise of their
exclusive rights, copyright owners raise the price of access to their
works above the level that would prevail in the absence of those
rights, under conditions of unimpeded competition. Increasing the
amount of control that copyright owners may exercise over use of
their works at some point yields negative returns, as an extra unit of
control results in little or no marginal propensity to create additional
works.
The degree of control that copyright owners should be granted, to
plaintiffs state law claims were preempted because they "center on the improper
copying of the song, an interest clearly protected by the Copyright Act"); Rosciszewski,
I F.3d at 230 (holding that since the essence of the claim is the "unauthorized copying
of a computer program," the claim is preempted).
Note that, for preemption to occur, the conduct in question need not actually
constitute infringement. For example, a state law that provides perpetual protection
against unauthorized copying would be preempted to the extent it prohibits copying of
works the statutory copyright of which has expired, even though (indeed, precisely
because) such copying does not infringe the statutory copyright.
312. "Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel
which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may
justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1965). Actions that can constitute such a serious
interference include dispossessing the owner of the chattel, destroying the chattel, and
using it in a manner inconsistent with the right of the owner to control it. Id. § 223.
313. Wrench, 256 F.3d at 456.
314. See Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 635 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Conversion of tangible
property involves actions different from those proscribed by the copyright laws, and
thus is not preempted."); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 133 ("Nothing contained in
section 301 precludes the owner of a material embodiment of a copy or a phonorecord
from enforcing a claim of conversion against one who takes possession of the copy or
phonorecord without consent.").
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optimize societal welfare, thus is a policy choice, and one that
Congress has determined to exercise according to its own lights,
excluding any contrary choices that might be made by state courts or
legislatures. If states were allowed to protect works within the
subject matter of the federal copyright laws, by granting rights
equivalent to but more expansive than those protected by federal
law, the federal scheme could be set at naught. For example, a state
law giving a copyright owner the right to prohibit copying of her
works in perpetuity would render practically irrelevant the
constitutional limitation of federal copyright to "limited Times."315
Likewise, a state law allowing a copyright owner to prohibit
quotation of small excerpts from his works for purposes of comment
and criticism would eviscerate the doctrine of fair use, which has
been part of the federal law for a century and a half.316
B. Preemption of contract claims under section 301(a)
When a software publisher seeks to enforce a provision of a
license agreement that purports to limit the uses that may be made
of the software that it accompanies, the publisher must have
recourse to state law making breach of contract actionable. A
computer program, fixed (as it must be to be usable) in a tangible
medium of expression, is a literary work that falls "within the subject
matter of copyright."317 Therefore, state contract law will be
preempted, under section 301(a), to the extent it purports to create
"rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright as specified by section 106" by enforcing
provisions of a license agreement. 31 8
There are two lines of authority on the question whether section
301(a) preempts contract causes of action. According to the first view,
whether a contract claim is preempted depends upon the nature of
the conduct that constitutes the claimed breach of contract. If the
breach consists of some conduct that could itself constitute an
infringement of one of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner
under section 106, then the contract claim is preempted-just as
would be a state law that directly creates such a right. Conversely, if
the conduct that is alleged to breach the contract consists of some
315. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. According to the legislative history of the 1976 Act,
the goals underlying the preemption rule of section 301 include "national uniformity"
and implementation of the "limited times" provision of the Constitution's Intellectual
Property Clause. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 129-30.
316. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) ("[A] justifiable
use of the original materials ... the law recognizes as no infringement of the
copyright ... ").
317. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
318. Id.
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
action different from or in addition to conduct that infringes one of
the exclusive rights, the claim is not preempted. This approach is a
straightforward application of the "equivalent rights" test, as
described above: "Equivalency exists if the right defined by state law
may be abridged by an act which in and of itself would infringe one of
the exclusive rights."319
An example of this approach is provided by National Car Rental
System, Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc.320 Computer
Associates ("CA") made its data processing software available to
National Car Rental ("National"), subject to a license agreement
stating that National may use the software "only for the internal
operations of Licensee and for the processing of its own data."21 CA
discovered National was using the software to "process the data of
third parties" and threatened to sue.3 22 In response, National
initiated an action for declaratory judgment, and CA counterclaimed,
alleging that National had breached the license agreement. National
sought dismissal of the counterclaim on the basis that it was
preempted by section 301(a).323
The court recited the "equivalent rights" test, and explained that
the issue for determination was "whether CA's allegation that
National breached their contract by using the program in a fashion
not allowed under the contract protects a right equivalent to one of
the exclusive copyright rights."324 The court found that the conduct
alleged as the breach was not conduct that infringed any of the
copyright owner's exclusive rights.325 The alleged breach consisted of
using the software in a manner not permitted by the contract terms.
But "use" for a particular purpose is not one of the copyright owner's
exclusive rights, so the contract claim was predicated on conduct
different from that which infringes copyright. Accordingly, the
contract cause of action did not protect a right "equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights,"326 and the claim was not preempted.
The same approach may, in other circumstances, yield the
conclusion that a contract claim is preempted. In Higher Gear Group,
Inc. v. Rockenbach Chevrolet Sales, Inc.,327 Higher Gear provided
software to Rockenbach, an automobile dealership, under a license
agreement allowing Rockenbach to use it for internal business
319. Wrench, 256 F.3d at 456 (6th Cir. 2001).
320. 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993).
321. Id. at 427 (internal quotations omitted).
322. Id. at 428.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 430-31.
325. Id. at 433.
326. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
327. 223 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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purposes only.328 The agreement also forbade Rockenbach "to copy or
create derivative works of the software."329 Higher Gear alleged that
Rockenbach breached the agreement in several ways, including (1) by
using the software for the benefit of third parties and (2) by allowing
another company to copy the software and make derivative works
based on it.330 The court held that the first of these claims was not
preempted: as in National Car Rental, the infringing conduct was use
of the software for an unauthorized purpose, which conduct does not
in itself infringe any of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.331 But
the court reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the second
claim, explaining: "A breach of contract claim should be
preempted... if the allegations of breach are based on nothing more
than the act of infringement."332 Here, the conduct that plaintiff
alleged breached the contract included making copies and derivative
works, conduct that infringed the copyright owner's exclusive rights
of reproduction and adaptation under section 106(1) and (2).
Other courts have applied a similar methodology, looking at the
conduct that is alleged to have breached the contract, and
determining whether that conduct involved an element beyond those
which infringe one of the exclusive rights of copyright. This approach
leads in some cases to the conclusion that the contract claim is
preempted,333 and in other cases to the conclusion that the claim is
not preempted.334
328. Id. at 956.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 957-58.
332. Id.
333. See Wrench, 256 F.3d at 457 (dictum) ("If the promise amounts only to a
promise to refrain from reproducing, performing, distributing or displaying the work,
then the contract claim is preempted."); Endemol Entm't B.V. v. Twentieth Television
Inc., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1524, 1528 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("Plaintiffs breach of implied contract
claim falls squarely into the category of contract claims that allege no additional rights
other than promising not to benefit from the copyrighted work. Plaintiffs claim... is
preempted by federal law."); Am. Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entm't Co., 922 F.
Supp. 926, 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[The rights asserted under the contract claim are
equivalent to the Copyright Act's exclusive right of public performance. Accordingly,
[plaintiffs] breach of contract claim is preempted.") (footnote omitted); Wolff v. Inst. of
Elec. and Elecs. Eng'rs, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 66, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("IEEE breached its
contract.., by infringing plaintiffs' copyright. It is difficult to see how the resulting
claims are qualitatively different. Accordingly, the breach of contract claim is
preempted."); Green v. Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 784, 790 (Ind. 2002)
(preempting a claim that defendant breached a contract by printing additional copies
of a copyrighted book).
334. Lennon v. Seaman, 63 F. Supp. 2d 428, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[W]e read the
breach of contract claim to be seeking to enforce the plaintiffs bargained-for right not
to have certain information disclosed to others, rather than, as the copyright law
provides, to enforce an exclusive right to reproduce, distribute and display certain
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The alternative approach to preemption of breach-of-contract
causes of action is to hold that they are per se not preempted. The
most influential proponent of this approach-though an equivocal
one, as we shall see-is ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.335 ProCD
published a database of telephone listings, which it distributed on
CD-ROM.336 The "Single User License Agreement" ("Agreement")
accompanying the software provided, among other things: "[Y]ou will
not make the Software or the Listings in whole or in part available to
any other user in any networked or time-shared environment, or
transfer the Listings in whole or in part to any computer other than
the computer used to access the Listings."337 The Agreement also
"limits use of the application program and listings to non-commercial
purposes."338 The Agreement was of the "shrinkwrap" variety: its
terms were not made available to the purchaser of the software until
after purchase.339 The license terms were printed in the manual
accompanying the software, and appeared on the user's monitor each
time the software was run.340
Zeidenberg purchased a copy of the software, and made the
telephone listings available to users via a website.341 ProCD sued,
alleging (among other things) that Zeidenberg infringed its copyright
in the software and breached the Agreement.342 The district court
works. As such, the contract claim seeks to enforce rights that are qualitatively
different from those created by the federal copyright laws.") (footnote omitted);
Howard v. Sterchi, 725 F. Supp. 1572, 1579 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs
claim for breach of contract for failure to attribute authorship of drawings was not
preempted because the claim required proof of additional elements); Brignoli v. Balch
Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that
plaintiffs claim alleging breach of contract through failure to pay is not preempted
because failure to pay is an element beyond section 106 rights).
In Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), the court held
that some of the contract claims that plaintiff asserted are preempted, and some not,
depending on the particular rights involved. Thus, the claim for breach of contract
based on defendant's '"producing, duplicating, selling, [etc.]"' copyrighted works is
preempted since "[t]hese are simply the reproduction and distribution rights protected
by federal copyright law." Id. But the contract claim based on failure to deliver a
master recording is not preempted, because failure to deliver "is an extra element that
is different from a copyright infringement claim." Id. at 734-35.
See also Lemley, supra note 124, at 1255-59 (discussing copyright preemption of
shrinkwrap licenses).
335. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
336. Id. at 1449.
337. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644-45 (W.D. Wisc.), rev'd, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
338. 86 F.3d at 1450.
339. Id. at 1449-50.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1450.
342. ProCD, Inc., 908 F. Supp. at 644.
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held that section 301(a) preempts ProCD's contract cause of action,343
but the court of appeals reversed.344 The court of appeals found that
the contract claim met the first of the two conditions for preemption:
the claimed rights pertained to a work "within the subject matter of
copyright,"345 even if, as the district court held,346 and the appellate
court assumed,347 the telephone listings did not feature sufficient
originality to qualify for copyright protection.
However, the court of appeals held that the contract claim did
not meet the second requirement for preemption: it did not protect
rights "equivalent to" any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner.348 The court explained:
Rights "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright" are rights established by law-
rights that restrict the options of persons who are strangers to
the author.... A copyright is a right against the world.
Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties;
strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create
"exclusive rights."349
The court proffered an additional reason why the contract claim
was not preempted. A contract is a private pact between two parties.
Subject only to narrow exceptions, the law respects private ordering,
and enforces contracts.350 That is true, in particular, of section
301(a). Since that provision "does not itself interfere with private
transactions in intellectual property, so it does not prevent states
from respecting those transactions."351
Since all contracts bind only the parties to the contract, and all
contracts reflect private ordering, the implication of the court's
reasoning is that no contract cause of action is preempted by section
301(a). Indeed, the court restates its holding as: "a simple two-party
contract is not 'equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright' and therefore may be enforced."352 Several
343. Id. at 659.
344. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1453-55.
345. Id. at 1453.
346. See 908 F. Supp. at 647 ("As a collection of facts arranged in a commonplace,
non-original fashion, the Select PhoneTM listings themselves are not copyrightable.").
347. See ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1449 ('We may assume that this database cannot
be copyrighted .... ").
348. Id. at 1454-55.
349. Id. at 1454.
350. Id. at 1455.
351. Id.
352. Id. The court seeks to limit the scope of its holding with a proviso that directly
contradicts both the statement of the holding quoted in text, and the rationale leading
to that statement: "[W]e think it prudent to refrain from adopting a rule that anything
with the label 'contract' is necessarily outside the preemption clause: the variations
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courts have adopted the approach of ProCD, holding that no contract
cause of action is preempted by section 301(a).353
As various commentators have observed, the absolutist approach
of ProCD is palpably incorrect.354 For one thing, the court's
distinction between the "public" rights that copyright establishes and
the "private" rights that contract creates breaks down in the context
of typical consumer software, including the very software at issue in
the case. The contractual restriction on commercial use of the ProCD
software is effective (if at all)355 not only against the party who
contracted to purchase the software, but also against any possessor of
the software copy. Upon loading it onto her computer, the user is
required to assent to the "license agreement," by clicking a button
signifying her assent, before she may proceed to use the software.
Thus, a contractual term presented in the form of a clickwrap
and possibilities are too numerous to foresee." Id. The court makes no effort to
reconcile this statement with the rest of its opinion.
353. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(adopting ProCD's view "that the mutual assent and consideration required by a
contract claim render that claim qualitatively different from copyright infringement");
Lipscher v. LRP Publ'ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1318 (11th Cir. 2001) (adopting ProCD's
view that "claims involving two-party contracts are not preempted because contracts
do not create exclusive rights, but rather affect only their parties").
Some courts explain the non-preemption of contract claims on the basis that the
promise of the contracting party constitutes an "extra element" that renders the rights
protected by contract not "equivalent to" the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.
See Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990) ('This
action for breach of contract involves an element in addition to mere reproduction,
distribution or display: the contract promise made by Taquino, therefore, it is not
preempted."); Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 438
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) ('Tort-like copyright infringement claims, unlike breach of contract
claims, do not require a promise by the defendant to refrain from using protected
subject matter."); cf. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright
and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 523,
528-29 (1995) (in the context of a negotiated contract with a no-decompilation term,
the breach of promise is an "extra element" that prevents a contract claim from being
preempted; but in the context of a standard-form, take-it-or-leave-it contract, the
absence of informed consent to the term presents a more difficult preemption issue).
354. See Lemley, supra note 79, at 140 ("[I]t is generally accepted that... copyright
law does not automatically preempt either trade secrets law or contract law. Rather,
those state laws are evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they
impermissibly operate in any given situation to create a state right 'equivalent' to
copyright."); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal
Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PIT.
L. REV. 543, 604 (1992) ("[I]t is clearly established that state enforcement of contract
rights is not wholly immune from Section 301(a) preemption. Where the effect of
enforcing a right under state contract law is to create a right in statutory subject
matter which is the equivalent of a Section 106 exclusive right, state law is
preempted.").
355. This adverts to the contestability of the proposition that terms presented to the
buyer only after the purchase are contractually binding. See supra note 179.
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agreement is "a right enforceable against the world" no less than a
copyright.356
Furthermore, the view that section 301 preempts no contracts is
inconsistent with the clearly expressed intent of Congress to craft a
unitary, federal-law scheme establishing the scope of copyright
protection.357 Consider a hypothetical license agreement associated
with the distribution of a software product, providing:
Licensee may make a copy of the Software Product by loading it
into the random access memory of a single computer, as an
essential step in utilizing the Software Product. Licensee is not
permitted to make a copy of the Software Product for any other
purpose, including for archival purposes.
This restriction on the acquirer's use of the software directly
conflicts with section 117(a), which provides that the copyright
owner's reproduction right does not include the right to prevent the
owner of a computer program from making a backup copy of it.35s The
right that the contract purports to grant to the copyright owner is
therefore a right "equivalent to" one of the exclusive rights, namely
the reproduction right. Enforcing such a state-created right would be
counter to the explicit language of section 301(a).
But the unacceptably broad sweep of the Seventh Circuit's
approach in ProCD v. Zeidenberg is not limited to hypothetical cases.
In Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.,359 a panel of the Federal
Circuit, with one judge dissenting, applied this same approach to
hold that section 301(a) does not preempt enforcement of a provision
in a shrinkwrap license prohibiting reverse engineering of a
computer program.360 The court acknowledged that, under its own
caselaw,361 reverse engineering for the purpose of discovering an
unprotected idea locked up in computer code is fair use, and therefore
is not copyright infringement.362 However, it followed ProCD in
356. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 170, at 1478.
357. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 11, at 129-30.
358. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a).
359. 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
360. Id. at 1325.
361. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("Atari did not violate Nintendo's copyright by deprocessing computer chips in Atari's
rightful possession. Atari could lawfully deprocess Nintendo's 1ONES chips to learn
their unprotected ideas and processes."); see also Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d
1532, 1539-40 n.18 (11th Cir.1996) (expressing agreement with the view that reverse
engineering may be a fair use); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,
1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[W]here disassembly is the only way to gain access to the
ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where
there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the
copyrighted work, as a matter of law.").
362. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325.
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holding that "the mutual assent and consideration required by a
contract claim" saves it from preemption, regardless of the content of
the claim.363
Since the absolutist position on the preemption of contract
causes of action is not tenable, the correct criterion must be the one
that applies to all other causes of action: a state law applying to
material within the subject matter of copyright is preempted to the
extent it may be violated by an act that itself infringes one of the
exclusive rights of copyright.
C. Preemption of contractual restrictions on the alienability of
copies of software
Let us return to contractual provisions in software license
agreements that purport to limit the right of the acquirer of a
software copy to alienate that copy. Is state contract law preempted
by section 301(a) to the extent it would permit enforcement of such a
term?
It is. The right created by state law consists ofthe right of the
software publisher to prevent the possessor of a software copy from
transferring possession of the copy to somebody else. That state-law
right is violated by an act that, in and of itself, infringes one of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner: namely, public distribution of
the copy. The contract cause of action for enforcement of the non-
alienation clause is therefore preempted.
Note that this result follows regardless of whether the possessor
of the software copy is the owner of that copy. If the possessor is the
owner of the copy, then the state law purports to grant the copyright
owner rights beyond those assigned by the Copyright Act. If the
possessor is not the owner of the copy, the state-law right is to some
extent redundant with the federal rights: unauthorized distribution
will both infringe copyright and be a breach of contract. But this sort
of state-law right too must fall to the preemptive effect of section
301(a), as it too has the capacity to interfere with the federal scheme.
For one thing, the contractual proscription on unauthorized
distribution is perpetual in duration, contrary to the federal
scheme.364 For another, the state-law remedial scheme may be
inconsistent with the remedies prescribed in the Copyright Act.365
Thus, even if the software publisher set up a distribution system
consisting of the bona fide rental, rather than sale, of the disks
363. Id. For a critique of the majority opinion in Bowers, see David A. Rice,
Copyright and Contract: Preemption After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 595, 617-34 (2004).
364. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304.
365. Id. §§ 501-505.
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containing the computer programs, a contractual restriction on
alienation of the disks would still be preempted.366 The copyright
owner's only remedy-not one to be trifled with, featuring statutory
damages of up to $150,000 per infringement367-would be that
provided by the Copyright Act.
D. Conflicts preemption of contractual restraints on alienation
Coexisting with preemption under section 301(a) is preemption
based on direct conflict between state law and the Copyright Act.368
Founded upon the Supremacy Clause,369 this sort of preemption
occurs to the extent state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."370
Prior to the 1976 Act, this was the only species of preemption
that could be invoked to invalidate a state law conflicting with
federal copyright law, since the earlier federal statutes did not
366. The House Report accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act states that the first-
sale rule "does not mean that conditions on future disposition of copies or
phonorecords, imposed by a contract between their buyer and seller, would be
unenforceable between the parties as a breach of contract, but it does mean that they
could not be enforced by an action for infringement of copyright." HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 11, at 79. It would be incorrect to read into this language anything beyond
a statement of the effect of section 109(a): the language means no more than that the
first-sale rule of section 109(a) does not make such a contract unenforceable. This
statement does not address whether a contract purporting to prevent the owner of a
software copy from selling or giving it to someone else is unenforceable for some other
reason, such as because it is preempted by section 301 (or because unconscionable,
contrary to public policy, constituting copyright misuse, or on any other ground).
367. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
368. The general conflicts preemption retains its vitality despite Congress's
enactment of a specific preemption provision in section 301(a). See Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 715-16 (1984) (holding state law banning television
commercials for alcoholic beverages conflicts with the Copyright Act, as well as other
federal law, and is therefore preempted); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 189 F.3d
377, 386-87 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding state law regulating distribution of
motion picture films is preempted). See also Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property
Protection and Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs in the United States and
the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 25, 89 (1993) ("Of course, the inclusion of
an express statutory preemption provision in the 1976 Copyright Act does not
necessarily preclude a finding of preemption under the implied Supremacy Clause test
articulated in [Sears, Roebuck, & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964)].'); O'Rourke, supra note 353, at 534
("Even if a particular cause of action survives a § 301 preemption analysis, it still must
be evaluated for consistency with constitutional concerns because it still may be
preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.") (internal quotation and footnote omitted).
369. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
370. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See Orson, Inc., 189 F.3d at 381-82
(discussing express preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption).
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contain an explicit preemption provision like the current section
301(a). Thus, in the Sears and Compco cases, the Supreme Court
applied this form of analysis to hold that state law is preempted to
the extent it purports to prevent copying of an article that is
unprotected by either patent or copyright, and is therefore in the
public domain.371 Subsequently, in Goldstein v. California,372 the
Court followed a divergent approach in upholding a state law
prohibiting the unauthorized copying of a sound recording.373 In a
decision that has been much criticized for failing to appreciate the
balancing implicit in the Copyright Act,374 the Court found that the
absence from the Act of any protection for sound recordings375 should
be interpreted as an expression of Congress's intent that the states
were free to legislate in the area. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp.,376 the Court likewise upheld a state statute against a
preemption challenge, concluding that a state trade-secret law did
not conflict with the federal patent laws.377 Similarly, in Aronson v.
Quick Point Pencil Co.,37s the Court relied upon Kewanee to hold that
a contract requiring payment of royalties for the right to use an
invention that was not patented did not conflict with the patent laws,
and was therefore not preempted.379 Finally, in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,380 the Court reaffirmed the approach it
had applied in Sears and Compco, holding that a state law
prohibiting the copying of a boat-hull design was preempted because
it conflicted with the patent laws.381
Commentators have found it difficult to reconcile this series of
copyright and patent preemption cases.3S2 However, it appears
371. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 232-33 ("[B]ecause of the federal patent
laws a State may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the
copying of the article itself or award damages for such copying."); Compco Corp., 376
U.S. at 237 ("[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law
may not forbid others to copy that article.").
372. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
373. Id. at 570-71.
374. See, e.g., Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 509,
530.
375. The Copyright Act did not protect sound recordings until 1972. The sound
recordings at issue in the case were created before 1972, and thus were unprotected by
federal law. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 551-52.
376. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
377. Id. at 491-93.
378. 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
379. Id. at 265-66.
380. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
381. Id. at 165-68.
382. See Thomas F. Cotter, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?: Resolving an
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warranted to derive from these cases the rule that while a state law
is not preempted merely because it touches on subject matter within
the scope of the copyright or patent laws, it is preempted if it directly
conflicts with the federal statutory scheme.
Applying conflicts preemption, state contract law should be held
preempted to the extent it allows enforcement of a contract provision
prohibiting alienation of a copy of a copyrighted work. As discussed
above,383 the first-sale doctrine's limitation on the public distribution
right is an important element of the balance the Copyright Act seeks
to achieve between the interest of authors in receiving economic
rewards for their creative activity, and the interest of the public in
access to the fruits of that creative activity. Moreover, if a copyright
owner may by contract expand the scope of its distribution right, it
may do the same with respect to all of the exclusive rights.
This conclusion follows even more strongly with respect to a
contractual restraint on alienation of a software copy that is
implemented via a clickwrap agreement. As noted above,384 the
provisions of a clickwrap agreement, although they have the form of
contractual terms, are functionally equivalent to servitudes that run
with the software copy. Such a servitude is inconsistent with the
first-sale doctrine, the purpose of which is to deprive the copyright
owner of control over disposition of a software copy once a first sale
has occurred.
Consider a hypothetical "license agreement" that is
shrinkwrapped to a book, and is made binding on a purchaser (whom
the book publisher would call a "licensee") of the book who fails to
return the book after having an opportunity to review the terms of
the license.3S85 The agreement provides that the purchaser-licensee (1)
may not make any copy of the book, (2) may not quote any brief
excerpt from the book for purposes of criticism or commentary, (3)
may not copy the book's appendix, consisting of a chronological list of
Ostensible Conflict Between Patent Law and Federal Trademark Law, 3 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 25, 46-49 (1999); Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other
Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
338, 361-65 (1992); O'Rourke, supra note 353, at 539-41.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 266-79.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 160-61.
385. The idea of limiting by contract the uses that may be made of a book is not a
new one. See, e.g., Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1894) (sale of
damaged books under contract requiring them to be used as paper stock only); Authors
& Newspapers Ass'n v. O'Gorman Co., 147 F. 616 (D.R.I. 1906) (notice inside cover of
book, prescribing a resale price, and forbidding resale before a certain date); Ladd v.
Oxnard, 75 F. 703 (C.C.D. Mass. 1896) (book transferred under contract providing that
it is a loan, not a sale); Jewelers' Mercantile Agency, Ltd. v. Jewelers' Weekly Pub. Co.,
49 N.E. 872 (N.Y. 1898) (contract providing that title to a guidebook remains in the
publisher).
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the presidents of the United States, (4) may not resell the book, (5)
may not recite passages from the book in any setting, and (6) may not
display any pages of the book in a venue open to the public.
Each of these provisions of the contract purports to broaden the
exclusive rights beyond their scope as established in the Copyright
Act. Thus, provision (1) expands the reproduction right by
disallowing certain copying that the Act permits.386 Provision (2)
expands the reproduction right by eliminating the fair-use
doctrine.387 Provision (3) extends copyright protection to material
that the Act does not protect.3ss Provision (4) expands the
distribution right beyond the first sale of the copy.389 Provision (5)
expands the performance right beyond the scope the Act gives it.390
Provision (6) expands the display right beyond its prescribed scope. 391
In addition, each of these provisions extend the exclusive rights
beyond the duration of copyright that the Act establishes, making
them perpetual.392
Allowing enforcement of such contractual provisions under state
law would create "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress,"393 and should therefore
be preempted.
E. Contractual restrictions in software license agreements may be
unenforceable for lack of consideration
Some "license agreements" accompanying software in mass-
market transactions are unenforceable for another reason as well. As
explained above,394 the term "license agreement" is for the most part
a misnomer. These agreements purport to consist of a set of
undertakings, to which two parties, usually the software publisher
and the end user, have assented. The publisher grants the end user a
license to use the software, by installing it on the user's computer,
and usually also grants a license to make a backup copy of the
software. The end user, for her part, agrees to a great number of
limitations of her rights, such as forgoing the right to bring a court
action based on conduct relating to the agreement, being limited
386. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000) (permitting libraries to make copies of books under
certain circumstances).
387. Id. § 107.
388. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that
facts are not original and thus not copyrightable).
389. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
390. Id. § 110.
391. Id. § 109(c).
392. See id. §§ 302-04.
393. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
394. See supra note 79.
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instead to arbitration.
As the discussion in Part I of this Article shows, however, the
software publisher's undertaking is illusory. Since the end user is
"the owner of a copy of [the] computer program," section 117(a)
means she needs no authorization from the copyright owner either to
install the software on her machine or to make a backup copy of it.395
In many "license agreements" accompanying consumer software, this
is the only undertaking by the software publisher. Since this
undertaking gives the end user nothing that she does not already
have, it amounts to no consideration. Absent such consideration, the
promises attributed to the end user are unenforceable.
CONCLUSION
Claims by software publishers that they retain ownership of the
floppy diskettes and CD-ROMs on which they distribute their
copyrighted software are generally not supportable. In ordinary
mass-market transfers of their products to end users, software
publishers part with title to those material objects when they release
them into the chain of distribution. Title passes from the publisher,
through one or more levels of distributors, to the retailer, and then to
the end user. Title likewise generally passes when the software
publisher distributes software through a transaction directly with
the end user, and when it distributes the software as part of a
hardware/software system.
The strategies that software publishers use in an effort to
prevent this transfer of title are ineffective. A statement in the
license agreement accompanying the software to the effect that the
software is licensed, not sold, cannot affect ownership of the material
object on which the software is distributed. Contractual restrictions
on the authority of a distributor to transfer copies are generally
ineffective. Use restrictions that run with the software copy itself are
disfavored at common law, and are inconsistent with the first-sale
doctrine.
Software publishers could attain their objective of preventing the
end user from obtaining ownership of material objects containing
their software by two expedients-a bona fide regime of software
copy rental rather than sale, or keeping the software safely on one's
own servers by following the application service provider model.
However, a bare statement that the disks are rented, not sold, will
not suffice, as a court will look through the style of a transaction to
ferret out the underlying economic realities. The ASP model is a
legally unassailable method by which a software publisher may
extend its control over its products, and whether to employ it is a
395. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a).
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matter for a software publisher's business judgment.
Efforts by software publishers to extend their control over
software copies through contractual restrictions are likewise
ineffective. Under both the Copyright Act's preemption provision,
and general conflicts analysis, state law should be held preempted to
the extent it allows enforcement of contractual provisions that limit a
software acquirer's authority to dispose of software copies that she
owns.
